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Cert to CA DC (en bane with maj by 
. Leventhal and dissents by Wilkey 
and Danaher) 
Federal/Civil Timely (by ext.) 
1. SUMMARY. This case presents the questiqn whether the 
Speech and Debate Clause, article I, section 6, ~~ause ' l of 
the Constitution, provides immunity to a Senator .and his staff 
against a private action for damages. The suit alleges illegal 
and unconstitutional conduct by the Senator and his staff during 
a Senate subcommittee investigation. 
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW. After a riot in Nashville, Tenn., 
in 1967, Kentucky officials seized allegedly seditious documents 




were arrested for violating the state's criminal sedition law. 
A three-judge federal court enjoined the state prosecution 
because it decided the sedition statute violated the first amendment. 
The court also appointed the commonwealth atmrney, Thomas Ratliff, 
as custodian for the "safekeeping" of the seized documents. After 
the appointment, Ratliff discussed the resps' activities with 
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on 
Government Operations of the U.S. Senate. The subcommittee had 
been empowered by the Senate to investigate violent disturbance~, 
to identify their causes, and to recommend appropriate legislation. 
A subcommittee investigator, John Brick, was sent to Kentucky to 
meet with Ratliff. 
Ratliff permitted Brick to examine the seized materials. 
t'::::; After !tric}c had read the court's "safekeeping" order on October 
9, 1967, he copied 234 of the documents and took the copies to ,_ ._..awe ,., 
Washington, D.C. Although Ratliff testified that one judge on 
the panel approved the copying, neither Ratliff nor Brick received 
formal permission from the court or notified the resps of the 
copying and transport. Brick, who is now deceased, testified in 
a previous action that he knew that many of the 234 documents 
did not pertain to the subcommittee's investigation. They included 
~~~ a love letter from columnist Drew Pearson to one of the resps. 
After reviewing the copies, the subcommittee subpeonaed 
documents pertinent to the Nashville riots. The three-judge court 
refused to prevent the disclosure and ordered the resps to 
cooperate with the subcommittee. This Cou~t ordered a brief stay 
pending consideration of the validity of the subpeona. Eventually, 
- ;:, -
G- the Court refused to note jurisdiction in the appeal from the 
district court decision rejecting the challenge to the subpeone. 
I 
When the resps refused to produce the documents, the sub~ittee 
cit: d them for -:ontem~ ;~ongress. Their convictions: erereversed 
by theCA DC, 473 F.2d 1178 (1972), on the basis that the subpeona 
should have been suppressed as the fruit of the illegal seach and 
---------------. 
s~ure by Kentucky officials. The court declared the Kentucky 
~ search invalid because the supporting affidavit was conclusory and 
the warrant was overly broad. 
On March 4, 1969, the same day they refused to produce the 
documents, the resps filed the damage action that has now reached 
this Court. In their amended complaint they alleged that the 
Senator, three of his aides, and Ratliff had violated their privacy 
~ and their constitutional rights by examining the documents, copying 
them, transporting them to Washington, basing the subpeona on them, 
basing the comtempt proceedings on them, and giving them to unknown 
persons in Washington. Later, the resps discovered that the 
\ ~S IRS been given access to the documents. 
~ The Senator and his staff members filed a motion for summary 
judgment arguing that the Speech and Debate Clause provided them 
~nity from the suit. After a hearing and a 19-month delay, 
the district court denied the summary judgment motion without 
explanation. Despite t~e refusal of the district court to certify 
an interlocutory appeal, the Senator and his staff a ealed. A 
three-judge panel of the CA DC reversed the district court (Danaher, 
Leventhal (dis), and Wilkey). Upon rehearing en bane, the court 




--It reversed the refusal of the district court to grant 
summary judgment on behalf of thefederal defendants 
regarding the part of the complaint that challenged 
the original search and seizure by Kentucky authorities. 
--It reversed the district court's refusal to grant summary 
judgment on that part of the complaint relating to the 
use of the documents in congressional hearings. 
--It affirmed by a ~jQ~ty ~ the refusal of the district 
court to grant summary judgment on the part of the 
complaint that alleged dissemination of the documents 
outside Congress. -
--It affirmed by an ~Y divi ded v~te the district court's 
refusal to grant summary judgment on the part of the 
complaint challenging Brick's copying and transporting 
of the documents after the imposition of the "safekeeping" 
order. 
--It rejected the argument of Judge Danaher in dissent that 
the doctrine of official immunity required dismissal of the 
complaint. 
-3. CONTENTIONS. The SG's office haR filed the petn for 
the Senator and his aides. It advances fourarguments to support 
tbe grant of cert. 
1. The CA DC has improperly eroded the protection provided 
to members of Congress by the Speech and Debate Clause. This 
will seriously inhibit congressional action. It poses a serious 
separation of powers question because the independence of Congress 
is subjected to review by the murts. Despite the absence of 
a split among the circuits, the CA DC decision should be reviewed 
• 
now because most challenges to congressional action will be filed __ __.--...,. 
in the District of Columbia. 
The petn submits that the CA DC concluded by a vote of 10-0 
that the activities of the Senator and his staff occurred during 
a legitimate legislative inquiry about the nature and causes of 
~ - --- --------------
violent· civil disorders. Having made that determination, the CA DC 
should have refrained from further review, according to the petn, 
- ;) -
because an absolute immunity attaches to conduct that "is part 
' 
of the sphere of legitimate legislative activity." It cites 
Eastland v. UniterlStates Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), 
which affirmed the refusal of a district ~ourt to enjoin the 
issuance of a subpeona duces tecum by a Senate committee. The 
plaintiffs in Eastland had argued that production of membership 
li~ts in response to the subpeona would chill first amendment rights. 
The petn therefore says the Clause protects unconstitutional conduct 
from attack and prevents any examination of the propriety of the 
method of "legitimate legislative activity." 
... /~ The resps conten~at conduct during preliminary investigations 
J ~ ~ot receive as complete protection by the Clause as basic 
~~legislative action like speaking, debating, or voting. Citing 
~ravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). Furthermore, they 
hat activity associated with the legislative process receives 
no protection if it is not act~ally and _legitimately a part of the 
legislative function. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). 
Here, the legislative function did not require the seizure of the 234 
documents without court approval or ~issemination of the material 
outside Congress. The resps therefore conclude that the Clause --does not protect these actions by the Senator and his staff. 
( 
2. The petn contends that the CA DC opinion conflicts with 
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967). The Court held in 
Dombrowski that the Clause insulated an aide from liability for 
taking possession of evidence illegally seized by state authorities. 
After the aide had taken possession, the state courts ruled that 
the search had not been justified by probable cause. The Ccurt also 




aide had participated in the planning of the illegal raid. The 
Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment 
on the allegation that the Senator had participated in the planning 
of the raid. The Court found no facts on which to base the allega-
tion in the record. The petn argues that this case presents identical 
facts: The aide merely took possession of evidence seized illegally 
by the state authorities. No facts connected the Senator to any illega: 
conduct. 
The respondent distinguishes Dombrowski on two bases. First, 
Brick seized the documents in violation of the court's safekeeping 
order. According to the resps, this constitutes a separate illegal 
seizure, distinct from that of the state authorities. Regarding 
the Senator, the resps submit that the record shows a factual 
{~; dispute about the extent of his involvement in the release of the 
documents outside Congress. They also suggest that the factual 
development of their case should not be attacked before trial 
l 
on a summary judgment motion. 
3. Even if the Clause does not provide immunity, the petn 
says the petrs committed no illegal or unconstitutional acts. First, 
the use of illegally seized documents by federal officials is not 
'illegal. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), permitted 
such use by the IRS in a civil tax proceeding. Second, the aide 
did not violate the safekeeping order. The court ordered Ratliff, 
not the aide, to keep the documents. Third, the copying and 
'---------- -------- --transport of irrelevant documents is permitted by Servicemen's 
Fund. Blind alleys must be investigated. To punish the seizure 
of a few irrelevancies would severely hamper investigations. 
- 7 -
Fourth, regarding outside dissemination, the petn interprets the 
CA DC opinion as affirming a district court order requiring further 
proceedings on the subject. The petrs say this was improper because 
the district court had announced no such order and because the 
complaint had not alleged the disclosure of the materi&s to the IRS. 
Furthermore, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), suggests that 
the resps were denied no property or liberty by the petrs. Finally, 
the information was exposed not to the public but to a government 
agency charged with enforcement of the law. The Senator and his staff 
had a duty to respond in this manner to suspected violations of the law . 
The resps reply: First, as Judge Leventhal explained, this 
case is not Calandra or Janis. The staff member seized these documents 
in violation of a court order that had already declared the state's 
~ --· seizure to be unconstitutional. Second, the aide made a mockery of 
the safekeeping order. He removed copies of the documents from fue 
possession of the custodian,knowing that the court had declared 
their seizure illegal and had ordered their safekeeping. Third, 
this is not a "blind alley" investigation. The aide knew of the 
irrelevance of the documents when he seized them. Fourth, 
the complaint does allege dissemination outside Congress. By 
refusing to grant summary judgment against this allegation the 
district court decided to hear facts on the issue. The CA DC 
opinion merely allows this process to continue. 
4. In a footnote the petrs argue that official immunity, 
as vaguely defined in the CA DC dissent, should preclude any 
challenge to their conduct. This argument .is not well developed, 
and the resps do not address it. 
< J 
- 8 -
DISCUSSION. Even if Judge Leventhal has applied the holdings 
of this Court correctly, the S.G. 's office has developed a persuasive 
case for the grant of cert. First, the separation of powers conflict 
alone probably justifes review. The CA DC has subjected a member of 
Congress to the burden of defending the actiors of himself and his staff 
in relation to a legitimate legislative investigation. According to 
Servicemen's Fund, the Clause is intended in part to prevent the 
imposition of this responsibility. Second, a grant would give the 
Court a chance to clarify the difference at least in tenor between 
Gravel and Servicemen's Fund. Gravel revealed a restrictive attitude 
about the scope of the Clause: 
The [previous] cases reflect a decidedly jaundiced view 
towards extending the Clause so as to privilege illegal 
or unconstitutional conduct beyond that essential to 
foreclose executive control of legislative speech or 
debate and associated matters such as voting and committee 
reports and proceedings. 
On the other hand, Servicemen's Fund in dicta extended the scope 
and 
of the Clause to protect investigations/ "blind alley" searches, 
and in fact extended it to protect the issuance 'of a subpeona that 
threatened to chill first amendment interests. The case also 
included an elaborate discussion of the purpose of the Clause. 
Even if the cases are distinguishable on their facts, the two 
discussions may support inconsistent applications. 
Third, the CA DC obviously does not discern a clear application 
of this Court's previous holdings to the facts of this case. The 
majority and dissenting opinions have developed the issues at 
length. On perhaps the most critical issue, the Court split 5-5. 
The fundamental nature of the separation of powers issues probably 
deserves more certainty. 
- 9 -
Fourth, the facts here present an unusually clear example of 
j~dicial ~co nd .3uess !_ng of the ~~thod of congressional acti. on. 
Previous cases have denied innnun:ity/ conduct that had nothing to do 
with the legitimate functioning of the Congress: taking bribes or 
arranging for outside publishing of the Pentagon Papers. Regarding 
the copying and transport of the documents by Brick, however, the 
CA DC has pierced a ooncededly valid investigation to review 
a particular technique employed. Gravel spoke in dicta of such 
a review. But this case clearly presents it. 
The one argument against granting cert is that the opinions 
that discuss the Clause most fully (Leventhal and Wilkey, JJ) 
differ primarily about the application of the facts to the law. 
; 
Judge Leventhal argues quite sensibly that the seizure of obviously 
private correspondence and the dissemination of material to the 
IRS have no relation to the legislative investigation. As the 
three-judge court subsequently showed, the investigation also did 
not require Brick to seize the documents without permission. 
Nevertheless, the importance of the issue justifies reconsideration 
of the factual dispute. 
As a cross reference, the Court has granted cert in Butz v. ~ 
Economou, No. 76-709, which presents a question about officia~ ~ 
~unity in administrative enforcement proceedings. 
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~1cAdams , II , Executor , in Place 
of John L . McClellan, Deceased , 
as a Party Petitioner 
On October 11 , 19 77 , the Court granted cert in this case . On 
November 28 , 1977 , petr McClellan died . His attorney , the Acting 
SG moves the Court ur.der Rule 48(1 ) to substitute the executor of . 
the estate as petr . Resps support this motion . The new caption 
' . "' 
will be Herbert H. McAdams II, Executor of the Estate of John L . 
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To: Bob Date: February 1, 1978 
From: L.F.P., Jr. 
·------
No. 76-1621 McClellan, et al. v. McSurley 
In this important and difficult case, I would like to 
have a rather carefully written bench memorandum. 
Based on a preliminary reading of the briefs, and 
portions of the Appendix (Parts I and II), I am inclined to think 
that Judge Wilkey's opinion is more persuasive than Judge 
Leventhal's. Yet, either opinion standing alone looks ljke a 
"winner". This case - like so many that reach us - illustrates 
the overuse of summary judgment procedure, with the consequent 
difficulty of appellate courts being sure as to the facts - both 
as to what may arguably be in conflict and factual completeness. 
This is a "Speech or Debate Clause" case. The parties' 
arguments, like the en bane opinions of a divided CADC (the court 
split 5 to 5), seem at times to be talking about different cases. 
The respondents (plajntiffs below) seems to predicate 
their case on what they call an unlawful search and seizure. 
2. 
They argue that the Speech or Debate Clause does not reach - that 
it does not protect - Fourth Amendment violations even if 
authorized by a Senate committee. Accepting this as correct (for 
purposes of argument), the respondents gloss over the question 
whether Judge Wilkey (and the four judges who agreed with him) 
was correct in concluding that there was no Fourth Amendment 
violation. 
In brief summary, a Kentucky prosecuting attorney -
acting under Kentucky's Sedition Law - caused to be issued a 
search warrant against respondents. The execution of this 
warrant resulted in the wholesale seizure of hundreds of 
documents and records from respondents, who were thought to be 
leaders in activities that had resulted - and might in the future 
result - in riots and major disorders. Some 200-odd of these 
documents, including one rather private letter written by Drew 
Pearson to "Dearest Cucumber" (Mrs. McSurley), were turned over 
by the Kentucky prosecuting attorney to petitioner Brick (then an 
investigator for the Senate committee but now deceased). 
Respondents' case - in addition to averring a 
wide-ranging and speculative charge of conspiracy against Senator 
McClellan - is grounded on (i) the invalidity of the initial 
seizure by the Kentucky state authorities under the Kentucky 
Sedition Act that thereafter was held invalid by a 3-judge 
federal court; (ii) the order of the 3-judge court that the 
Kentucky prosecuting attorney (Ratliff) "continue [to hold] in 
safekeeping [all of the seized documents] until final disposition 
of this case by appeal or otherwise" (Petn. for cert., Opin of 
Wilkey, 6la); (iii) an alleged violation of this safekeeping 
order by Ratliff when he selected and turned over 200-odd of 
these papers (including the Cucumber letter) to Brick, who had 
been sent to Kentucky as an investigator for the Senate 
subcommittee. 
According to Judge Wilkey's opinion (and I believe not 
refuted by respondents'), respondents' position with respect to 
the Fourth Amendment is that there was a double violation: 
3. 
first, by the Kentucky state officials in seizing the documents, 
and secondly, by the investigator for the subcommittee (Brick) in 
"knowingly" receiving a large number of these documents from the 
state prosecutor contrary to the "safekeeping" order of the 
3-judge court. 
I am inclined to doubt whether, even if respondents' 
view of what happened is accurate, that the acceptance by Brick 
of documents found to have been illegally seized, itself 
constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Admittedly, 
neither Brick nor anyone connected with the Senate committee had 
anything to do with the initial issuance of the subpoena or its 
execution. 
Judge Wilkey does not reach this question. He concludes 
on the basis of the sequence of events, including communications 
by the Kentucky prosecuting attorney with Judge Moynahan of the 
3-judge court, that the delivery of documents to Brick was not 
in violation of the safekeeping order, but indeed had been 
4 0 
approved by at least Judge Moynahan. Judge Wilkey's opinion 
notes that 
"The six orders (pertaining to these documents) and the 
one opinion of the 3-judge United States District Court 
and the opinion of the Sixth Circuit at no time 
expressed disapproval of the Kentucky officials' actions 
in cooperating with the Senate investigators." Petn. 
68a. 
Judge Wilkey then goes on to say that there is "not one word in 
the language of the six orders, before or after Brick's 
inspection and copying of the documents ••. which indicates that 
this was in the view of those judges in any way unauthorized or 
improper". Petn. 68a. 
I am no doubt oversimplifying this rather complex case, 
but if Judge Wilkey is correct it seems to me that the foundation 
of respondents' argument -and of Judge Leventhal's opinion- is 
undercut. 
I have not undertaken in this memorandum to address the 
"Speech or Debate" issue or to identify the various arguments 
advanced by the SG and the parties. 
I would like the views of my clerk. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell Date: February 14, 1978 
From: Bob Comfort 
As Judge Leventhal and Judge Wilkey frame the issues, 
-
this is a close case. Judge Leventhal's opinion, however, seems 
more sensible given the procedural posture of respondents' case. 
An opinion upholding Judge Wilkey would, I think, be difficult to 
/.~ 
As framed by the Government, this case is easy. The SG 
write in a reasoned manner. 
is pushing for an extreme interpretation of Speech or Debate 
immunity, one that far exceeds the founds of all the prior 
decisions. This memo first considers the Government's extreme 
position, then investigates the Wilkey-Leventhal dispute. 
I 
THE GOVERNMENT'S EXTREMIST POSITION 
The SG, departing from the views of all ten judges on 
the court below, takes the position that a Fourth Amendment 
2. 
violation perpetrated by a committee functionary in the course of 
....____. - -----
an otherwise legitimate legislative investigation is immunized by 
the Speech or Debate Clause. Examination of the relevant cases 
demonstrates that this view - which would appear to immunize all 
activity in any way related to a legislative function - is 
untenable. The SG begins by properly phrasing the inquiry under 
the Speech or Debate Clause as "whether the actions of the 
petitioners fall within the 'sphere of legitimate legislative 
activity.'" Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 
U.S. 491, 501 (1975) (USSF). The SG goes astray, however, by 
giving too expansive reading 
("h \ "" ( 
As used in the a to t h a t t -e-f.'iTl • 
A 
cases, it has a rather limited though irnpr ec i &_e meaning. The 
1 v . the holding of ,/ . Eastland, 387 a so m1srepresents Dombrowsk1 v. 
u.s. 82 (1967), a crucial case in this area. 
The SG begins by quoting USSF to the effect that the 
( ( 
"power to investigation ... plainly falls with"' [the] ,, 
definition" of a legitimate legislative activity. 421 U.S. at 
504. He also cites Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312-315 
(1973), for the proposition that Members of Congress and their 
SG 
staff are immune for conducting an investigation that uncovered 
defamatory and irrelevant information. Because Brick - the 
investigator in this case - was involved in an investigation 
properly initiated by the committee, says the SG, he was 
performing "legitimate legislative activity." 
"[O]nce it is determined that Members are acting within 




an absolute bar to interference." USSF, 421 U.S. at 503; ' Doe 
v. McMillan, 412 U.S. at 312-313; United States v. ~ohnson, 383 
U.S. 169, 183 (1966). Thus, the SG reasons that any 
inf.'i_?mation-gathering activity, even Fourth Amendment violations, 
are absolutely immune. This supports the SG's prayer that the 
judgment should be reversed insofar as it subjects petitioners to 
any further proceedings. 
The first problem with the SG's argument is that 
Dombrowski v. Eastland stands in the way. In Dombrowski, 
plaintiffs alleged that the Chairman of the Senate Internal 
Security Subcommittee and Subcommittee's chief counsel 
participated in a conspiracy with Loui-siana o.fficials to seize ~ 
 plaintiffs' property and records in violation of the Fourth 
tv r ,Am '""e_n_d_m_e_n_t- . __ A_ u_n_a_n_ i_m .... o_u_s_ c_o_u_r_t_ h_e_l_d_ ( per curiam, Black , J. , taking 
no part) that the action could proceed against the Subcommittee 
counsel, but that the record contained insufficient evidence of 
the Chairman's involvement to make out a claim. Dombrowski, 
then, appears to stand for the proposition that participation in 
a Fourth Amendment violation in the course o£ gathering 
~- . ,....::: 
information by either a Member or his staff personnel does not 
-------~------------,-----------~- -fall within Speech or Debate immunity. -The Government attempts to distinguish Dombrowski by 
arguing that there had been no legitimate legislative activity: 
Subcommittee Counsel conspired with state officials to carry out 
a raid to gain records for use in a state prosecution, not to 




inherently implausible. Secondly, the Dombrowski 
~ 
Court nowhere says that. Thirdly, the Court declared in Gr9vel 
v. United States, 408 u.s. 606, 619 (1972), that counsel in 
Dombrowski had been charged with "conspiring with state officials 
to carry out an illegal seizure of records that the committee 
sought f~!:_i~§_own proceedings." (Emphasis added.) The 
Government's feeble attempt to distinguish Qompiowski, then, 
borders on misrepresentation. 
Beyond the direct authority of Dombrowski, the SG's 
proposition that Speech or Debate Clause immunity cloaks all 
activity in the course of legislative information gathering flies 
in the face of the basic principle of the Cla~se as explicated in - - II the cases. That principle is as follows: Speech or Debate 
Clause immunity does not attach merely because granting relief 
might frustrate the objectives of a legislative act; rather, it 
attaches only where granting relief would require proof of a 
legislative act or its underlying m~tiyes, a requirement which 
would threaten legislative independence, Gravel v. United State~ , 
408 U.S. at 621, and "legislative acts" do not embrace "-all 
conduct relating to the legislative process." United States v. 
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 515 (1972). 
The first case decided under the Speech or Debate Clause 
illustrates this principle. In Kilbourn v. !hompso~, 103 U.S. 
168 (1881), the House of Representatives held Kilbourn in 
contempt for refusing to answer certain questions concerning the 
finanacial affiars of Jay Cooke. The Speaker issued a warrant 
5. 
directing the Sergeant-at-Arms to take Kilbourn into custody and 
detain him until he purged himself of contempt. The warrant was 
executed, and Kilbourn sued the Speaker (and others) and the 
Sergeant-at-Arms for false imprisonment. The Court held the 
arrest illegal, since the House has no power to punish for 
contempt. It held the Speaker immune, because voting for the 
resolution authorizing the arrest and issuing the warrant were 
legislative activities for which Members were not answerable in 
any other place. The action against the Sergeant-at-Arms was 
permitted to proceed, however. Thus, even though granting relief 
to Kilbourn frustrated the aims of the legislative act (passing 
the resolution of contempt}, no SpeecQ or Deb~te immunity 
attached to the arresting officer. 
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), Brandhove 
sued state legislators under § 1983, alleging that a committee of 
the California legislature summoned him before it in order to 
intimidate him, silence him, and prevent him from exercising his 
constitutional rights. The Court, applying Speech or Debate 
principles by analogy, held that calling and examining witnesses 
were integral parts of the legislative process. No actions 
outside of the legislative chambers were implicated. Moreover, 
the only way to prove abuse of the subpoena power would be to 
delve into legislators' motives. 
In Unit~Q_States v. ~ghnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), a 
former Congressman was convicted on several counts of violating 
the conflict of interest statute and one count of conspiring to 
r~~ 
l. • 6. 
defraud the United States. The Government proved that, as part 
of the conspiracy, Johnson had taken money to make a slanted 
speech in the House. The Court held that the Speech or Debate 
Clause precluded inquiry into the motivation for any speech 
delivered in Congress and forbade any proof of the circumstances 
of the speech in proving the conspiracy, but permitted the 
conspiracy of which the speech was a part t be proved otherwise. 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), was quite 
similar to Kilbour~ v. Thompson, supr~. The Court held that 
House employees, "acting pursuant to express orders of the 
House," 395 U.S. at 504, in denying Powell his seat and salary, 
were not immune under the Speech or Debate CJ...ause. _Thus, even 
though the employees were carrying out the purposes embodied in 
an immune legislative action - the resolution denying Powell his 
seat - the suit was permitted to proceed. The only issue was 
whether the resolution barring Powell was lawful. The motives 
for its passage were not called into question. 
v 
The year 1972 saw two Speech or Debate Clause cases. In 
vfunited States v. Brewster, 408 u.s. 501 (1972), the prosecution 
of a former Senator for solicitation and acceptance of bribes was 
held not prohibited by the Speech or Debate Clause. The Court 
emphasized that in "no case has this Court ever treated the 
Clause as protecting all conduct relating to the legislative 
process. In every case thus far before this Court, the Speech or 
Debate Clause has been limited to an act which was clearly a part 
of the legislative process - the due functioning of the 
,...., -
7. 
process." Id. at 515-516. Since the illegal conduct charged was 
agreeing to take money in return for a promise to act in a 
certain way, there was no necessity to question any legislative 
act - ~~' an actual vote - of the Member or its motives. Id. 
at 526. 
c---
The other 1972 case was Gravel v. United St~!~~' 408 
U.S. 606 (1972). That case took a bit of a leap by holding that 
an aide was protected by the Clause to the extent a Member was 
..... 
protected for the same conduct. Kilbourn, Tenney, and Powell had ---- --------------
all implied the opposite. In any event, the Gravel Court 
characterized Kilbourn, Dombrowski, and Powell: 
The three cases reflect a decidedly iaundiced 
view towards extending the Clause so as to 
privilege illegal or unconstitutional conduct 
beyond that essential to foreclose executive 
control of legislative speech or debate and 
associated matters such as voting and committee 
reports and proceedings. In Kilbourn, the 
Sergeant-at-Arms was executing-a- legislative 
order, the issuance of which fell within the 
Speech or Debate Clause; in Eastland, the 
I committee counsel was gathering information for a hearing; and in Powell, the Clerk and Doorkeeper were merely carrying out directions 
that were protected by the Speech or Debate 
Clause. In each case, protecting the rights of 
others may have to some extent frustrated a 
planned or completed legislative act; but 
relief could be afforded without proof of ~ 
legislative act or the motives or purposes 
undeLying such ~ act. No threat to 
legislative independence was posed, and Speech 
or Debate Clause protection did not attach. 
408 U.S. at 620-621. The question presented was whether Gravel's 
aide was immune to a subpoena from a grand jury inquiring into 
the acquisition and release of the Pentagon Papers. The answer 
negative: 
Legislative acts arc not all-encompassing. The heart 
of the Clause is speech or debate in either House. In-
sofar as the Clause is cons'trued to reach other matters, 
they mus e an integral part of the deliberative and 
communicat_iye processes by w 1c embers participate 
in committee ana House proceedings with respect to the 
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legis-
lation or with respect to other matters which the Consti-
tution places within the jurisdiction of either House. As , 
the Court of Appeals put it, the courts have extended 
the privilege to matters beyond pure speech or debate 
in either House, but "only when necessary to prevent in-
direct impairment of such deliberations." United States 
v. Doe, 455 F. 2d, at 760. 
Here, private publication by Senator Gravel through 
the cooperation of Beacon Press was in no way essen-
tial to the deliberations of the Senate; nor cfoes ques- -
tioning as to private publication threaten the integrity 
or independence of the Senate by impermissibJy_ expo1t_ 
ing its deliberations to executive influence. The Senator --------· - . 
had conducted his hearings; the record and any report 
that was forthcoming were available both to his com-
mittee and the Senate. Insofar as we are advised, neither 
Congress nor the full committee ordered or authorized 
the publication.16 We cannot but conclude that the 
Senator's arrangements with Beacon Press were not part 
and parcel of the legislative process. -
408 U.S. at 625-626 (emphasis added). Thus, questioning as to 
such arrangements was not forbidden. 
In Doe v. ~~Milla~, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), immunity was 
extended to the introduction of material at committee hearings, 
referral of a report containing the material to the House, and 
voting for the report's publication. There was no immunity, 
8. 
9 . 
however, for the employees who published and distributed 
materials that were irrelevant to the legislative issue before 
the Members. 
Finally, in ~astland v. United St~te§_Servicem~~~s _ Fund, 
421 u.s. 491 (1975) (USSF), the Court held immune the Members and 
aides responsible for issuing a subpoena for respondent's bank 
records to a third-party bank. Even though the bank could not be 
expected to object, thus leaving USSF with no means of contesting 
the validity of the subpoena prior to disclosure, the issuance of 
a subpoena was held to be a legislative act. (This followed 
directly from Ten~~.) Its motivation could not be investigated 
for purposes of proving First Amendment violations. - -
Consideration of all these cases makes it apparent that 
the Government's position is too extreme to be maintained 
seriously. The thrust of the cases is that a "legislative act" 
is one which cannot be attacked without reference to the reasons 
-
or motives underlying it. It does not embrace every action 
relating to legislation. In particular, it does not encompass 
more remote activities such as an arrest at the legislature's 
behest, ~iJbourn, ~upra, physically restraining a Member from 
taking his seat, Powell, ~~ra, or plotting to violate the Fourth 
Amendment in order to gain information for a committee 
investigation, Dombrowski, ~upra. While the decision to gather 
information and its sifting in committee are legislative actions, 
see Doe v. McMillan, supra, a Fourth Amendment violation - like a 
conspiracy bribe - can be shown without any proof of those 
10. 
legislative acts or their motivation. It can be proved 
independently of its role as a result of a legislative act (the 
decision to seek information) , just as the arrest in Kilbg~~n 
could be proved independently of its role as the result of a 
legislative act. The legislative moti~es aren't questioned, only 
their remote results. Thus, Congressional actions are protected 
from executive or other pressures, but excesses of Congressional 
power do not go unchecked. 
There are two ways of envisioning this circumscription 
on Speech or Debate immunity. The broader view would be that 
field work simply is not "legislative activity," although it is 
related to legislation. This, I think_would have been the 
holding of the Courts that decided each case up through Qf~~~1· 
Indeed, ~e Gr~yel Court hinted quite strongly that field - -investigation was not a legislative act. 408 U.S. at 620. With -- ... • 
Gr~yel, however., the focus of immunity widened to include aides 
and a certain amount of preparatory investigation. This was 
broadened further in USSF. 
. The narrower view is that taken by Judge Leventhal and 
(
accepted by Judge Wilkey. In his view investigative field work 
is, in general, a "legislative act" partaking of immunity. Field 
[, l f.' \f( 
~ceases to be a legislative act, however, when illegal means are 
employed, for "the employment of unlawful means to implement an 
otherwise proper legislative objective is simply not 'essential 
to legislating.' As with taking a bribe, resort to criminal or 
unconstitutional methods of investigative inquiry is no part of 
the legislative process or 
act.'" [Citation omitted.] 
The Government objects that this view is 
self-contradictory, since it calls field work an immune 
legislative act, yet strips the immunity whenever there is 
illegal conduct. According to the Government, there is no more 
reason to lift field work's immunity for a Fourth Amendment 
violation than to lift a subpoena's immunity for alleged First 
Amendment violations - which the USSF Court refused to do. 
But when measured against the principle of the cases -
11. 
no immunity where a legislative act or its motivation need not be 
proved - Judge Leventhal's principle i~ not s~lf-contradictory. -
What it really says is this: the reason we call things protected 
"legislative acts" is because we will not delve into a Member's 
motives for doing them. Hence, subpoenas are immune because to 
hold one improper would require asking why the Member "really " 
issued the subpoena. But with a Fourth Amendment violation in 
the field, illegality is an objective, observable fact. It need 
not be predicated on any inquiry into motive. So long as the 
Members and their aids stick to objectively proper means, then, 
no inquiry into motive can follow. This principle flows from the 
( Lj "''/ ; '1'.) I I,' t 
cases. It can be rephrased more accurately il-f. field work is not 
/ , \ I \, t I 
which allows the Government to claim ~erme~ a "legislative act~" - ,, 
blanket immunity. Instead, a "legislative act" would be one 
whose legality cannot be judged apart from an inquiry into 
legislators' motives. Use of means in the field can be so judged. 
12. 
Whichever view is taken, the cases make it clear that 
where legislative motive need not be shown in order to prove 
illegality, there is no immunity. 
The Government asks the Court to overturn nearly a 
century of doctrine and hold that all remote actions advancing 
the ends of any "legislative act" - in the sense of motive - are 
immune, are part and parcel of the "legislative act." Such a 
holding would permit Congress and all its employees to violate 
the Constitution and laws with impunity. That is why it always 
has been rejected. 
II 
THE GOVERNMENT'S FALLBACK POSITIONS 
A. McClellan Immune 
The Government argues that the record shows nothing more 
than that Senator McClellan "authorized in general t e r ms Br ic k' s 
investigatory activity." Br. at 34. From this the SG argue s 
that McClellan must be immune, because even if he had instruc t ed 
B -:- i, l\ 
~k to violate the Fourth Amendment, he would be immune. As ,... 
support, the SG cites KiJ.pourn, in ~11hich Members were immune for 
"instructing" the Sergeant-at-Arms to conduct an illegal arrest; 
Doe v. Mc~j.J-1 9-Q, in which Members were immune for "instructing" 
the Printer to print the defamatory report; and ~owell, in which 
Members were immune for "instructing" the Doorkeeper to keep 
Powell out. 
These citations seem rather disingenuous, for in each 
13. 
"instructions" consisted of a vote on the floor of 
Congress - an archetype of the "legislative act" held immune 
under the Speech or Debate Clause. Here, in contrast, 
respondents' complaint charges that Brick was acting at the 
behest of McClellan alone, without a vote in or knowledge by the 
... -- ~-
rest of the commi"ttee. App. at 31 (1[ 19). This alleged 
individual action, taken outside the course of the "legislative 
activity," would not appear to be immune. Dombrowski v. 
~9stl9~Q, ~~p~~' strongly suggests that such individualized -
Le.!.., apart from the legislative process - conspiring to commit 
r.J-1.5> e-: 
Fourth Amendment violations is not immune. That dismissed a 
1\ 
Fourth Amendment complaint as to the S~nator,_not because his 
instructions were immunized, but because the record contained 
insufficient evidence of his involvement. 
B. 1nsufficiency of the Pleadings 
The SG invokes pombrowski, which dismissed the case as 
-----------to the Senator because "[t]he record [did] not contain evidence 
of his involvement in any activity that could result in 
) 
liability," 387 U.S. at 84, and argues that dismissal against all 
McClellan, Adlerman (General Counsel), and O'Donnell (Chief 
Counsel) is called for here as well. The SG notes Judge 
Leventhal's statement that "the record at present is silent on 
the involvement of defendants McClellan, Adlerman, and 
,..--
O'Donnell." Petn at 45a. Thus, says the SG, the case is 
controlled by ~ombrowski and dismissal is called for. 
14. 
pombrowski is a bit Delphic on this issue. Affidavits 
concerning Eastland's involvement apparently were in the record; 
probably they simply did not show explicit authorization of the 
Fourth Amendment violation. (It is not clear whether there had 
been any discovery.) If so, pomp!Q~~~i might not control here, 
since a~cSurely affidavit alleges that the federal defendants 
directly participated in the planning of the Fourth Amendment 
violations. App. at 55-56. As in any case, establishment of 
that fact would have to await discovery. 
On the other hand, if Dombrowski stands for the 
proposition that the plaintiff must attach some non-party's 
affidavit or other "evidence" of his factual a!legations to his 
complaint in order to withstand a summary judgment motion ~~foie 
discovery, then dismissal would be called for here, since there -
is no "evidence" of McClellan's, Adlerman's, or O'Donnell's 
involvement. I cannot believe, however, that QQ~b!o~ski stands 
for such a proposition. It would mean that even where Speech or 
Debate immunity does not apply, a plaintiff is denied discovery 
unless he can establish his case without it. Surely _Dqmbrowski 
should not be read as creating such a Catch-22. If dismissal is 
compelled at this stage, the holding of non-immunity will be a 
hollow victory for plaintiff. 
Judge Leventhal's approach seems more reasonable. -We 
1\ 
recognized that the allegation in the complaint made out a 
non-immune violation and that since the case thus far had 
revolved around the issue whether the Speech or Debate Clause 
15. 
permitted the action based on that allegation to go forward at 
all, there had been no opportunity for discovery to substantiate 
it. Petn at 45a. He cautioned, though, that discovery and proof 
of the allegation could not involve "legislative acts" or the 
motivations for them. He also added that a renewed summary 
judgment motion would be available if respondents failed to 
adduce any supporting facts. 
C. ~ricLDid No!__Vio]:a~Safe-Ke~ping_O!_der 
The SG argues that any violation of the safekeeping 
order - assuming one occurred - was Ratliff's alone, not 
Brick's. Hence, there was no Fourth Amendment violation by a 
federal officer. The SG emphasizes that Brie~ plqxed no role in -
the selection of the copies, etc. This issue will be considered -in more detail below, when Judge Wilkey's opinion is discussed. 
The Government also contends that Brick could not be 
held liable for transporting any materials, under Qoe v. M~~i 1Ja n 
and USSF. This point, too, will be discussed in connection with 
Judge Wilkey's opinion. 
D. Release to IRS 
The SG argues that CADC should not have remanded for 
further proceedings on the allegation that documents may have 
been shown to the Internal Revenue Service. Resps filed two 
affidavits to this effect five years after commencing this 
action; they never amended their complaint to reflect these 
allegations. Hence, there was no distinct court order on the 
issue on which CADC could act. The SG insists that resps must 
) 
16. 
amend their complaint before this issue will be in the case. · 
The amended complaint does contain an allegation that 
Brick exhibited the documents to persons unknown, causing 
embarrassment and damage, App. at 31-32, t 19, as well as an 
allegation that McClellan used the subcommittee's investigative 
power to harass respondents, App. at 35, t 28(b}. Judge 
Leventhal acknowledges, however, that there is no specific 
allegation of dissemination outside the halls of Congress. Petn 
at 14a n. 25. Apparently all ten CADC judges thought the actual 
allegations sufficient to embrace the IRS claims. There does not 
seem to be any reason for this Court to second-guess them on this 
pleading question. 
Under Do~; Judge Leventhal seems clearly correct in 
holding that dissemination outside of Congress - if otherwise 
actionable - is not protected by Speech or Debate immunity. (It 
may be, of course, that release to the IRS was not actionable, as 
the SG argues. That question is not before the Court.} 
III 
WILKEY-LEVENTHAL DISPUTE 
Judge Leventhal was willing to find that respondents' 
complaint alleged non-immune acts because it made out a "more 
~ than merely colorable" charge of Fourth Amendment violations by 
the federal defendants. Judge Wilkey rejected that conclusion, 
declaring that no Fourth Amendment violations were charged. This 
fairly narrow dispute generated the 130 pages of ~~ ~~~~ opinion 
___ ,------------~--
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~~~~~~A~""""'- . 
hinges on the actions of the investigate~below. Everything 
Brick, since his activities are the only ones that could tie the 
alleged conspirators into Fourth Amendment violations. 
A. Violation of the Safekeeping_0~9er 
Judge Leventhal held that Brick "took active steps to 
access to the seized materials and cart back from Kentucky 
copies of the McSurelys' documents .. " Petn at 
25a. Without deciding whether or not the facts established that 
Brick did violate the Fourth Amendment, Judge Leventhal held the 
claim "more than merely colorable." Petn. at 22a. 
~w - - _,-. 
With respect to the violation of the three-judge court's 
safekeeping order, Judge Leventhal not~d that "we can state with 
fair certainty that plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case 
to the effect that the purpose of the 'safekeeping order' of the 
three-judge court was to preserve the seized items both for t he 
McSurelys' benefit and for the orderly administration of the 
judicial process ... , and that Brick's investigative activity 
outside the scope of the channels established by the court 
Petn at 28a. Judge Leventhal points out 
did not empower Ratliff, the state 
when Brick showed up in Kentucky, twice visited the walk-in 
vault, and examined and selected various documents, he viola t ed 
~ the order. Subsequent ratification by the three-judge court 
' could not eradicate the violation, since it appeared that Brick 
initially had acted outside the law. The same is true of the 
I 
18. 
later Subcommittee subpoenas, according to Judge Leventhal. 
Judge Wilkey rejects this whole analysis. He reads the 
order of the three-judge court as a "preservation" order, not a 
secrecy order. Petn at 69a. Judge Wilkey argues that the order 
has to be read as a preservation order, since it nowhere refers 
to secrecy; moreover, the three-judge court never indicated that 
it thought Brick's activity had violated its order. That being 
true, Brick violated nothing, since the documents were preserved 
as ordered. 
If the issue were before the Court for decision, I think 
Judge Wilkey's view of the record would be more plausible. There 
is no indication that the three-judge court wQuld have ~onsidered 
Brick's activity unlawful prior to its subsequent ratification. 
The order itself does not speak to secrecy. Moreover, as the SG 
argues, Br. at 39-40, the safekeeping order may not have imposed 
any duties on Brick. Ratliff claims to have believed he had 
authority to act as he did, so that Brick may have had no duty to 
seek court permission. Judge Leventhal, however, points out that 
custodial permission, though obviating the use of force, may not 
validate an unwarrantec inspection. 
Judge Leventhal, however, is not deciding the issue, 
while Judge Wilkey is. Judge Leventhal merely holds that there 
is a Fourth Amendm€nt argument to be made, one which is not 
facially ridiculous, to the effect that the Brick inspection was 
"unwarranted." Discovery or trial would shed more light on the 
issue of the scope of Ratliff's authority under the order. That 





Judge Leventhal's second ground for concluding that ~ 
• 
respondents had made out a "more than merely colorable" Fourth 
Amendment claim was Brick's concession that he had inspected a~ 
transported to Washington documents - including the "Dearest 
Cucumber" letter - that were irrelevant to the Subcommittee's -inquiry. Because of this concession, Judge Leventhal concludes 
that Brick's activity with respect to the letter was not a 
subject "on which legislation could be had," USSF, 421 u.s. at 
504 n. 15. Judge Leventhal observed that concession might be 
explained away after discovery or at trial, but that as it stood 
it barred any need to second-guess a legislat~ve judgment as to 
what was relevant to the inquiry, Do~ v. ~cMillan, 412 U.S. at 
313. Here, the legislator-aide had declared the material 
irrelevant. Hence, the activity involving it was not immune. 
Again Judge Wilkey disagrees. First, he argues that a ny 
\ action for transportation of the irrelevant matter would raise 
I only privacy claims, not Fourth Amendment violations. Hence, -------immunity would not be shattered. I think this takes too sweeping 
a view of the immunity. Doe v. ~cMi]..la!l suys that 
non-constitutional suits can be maintained as long as they do not 
relate to legislat ive acts. If the material is irrelevant to the 
legislative process, there is no immunity, and respondents are 
free to bring any action they can. 
Judge Wilkey's second, and stronger, arguernnt is that 
v 
He was in no 
20. 
position to determine the relevance of all the documents, so he 
took all the agreeably relevant stuff to washington, where 
subsequent issuance of subpoenas seemed to undercut hs 
concession. Moreover, personal letters, by indicating 
respondents' contacts and activities, could well have been 
relevant to Subcommittee inquiries into respondents' violent 
activities, if any. Since relevance could plausibly be imagined, 
there is no basis for judicial second-guessing, under QQ~ v. 
McMillan. 
Judge Leventhal points out, however, that no claim of 
legislative need for the letter was ever raised, Petn at 53a, 
implying that such a claim would end judicial Jnquiry. Once 
again, then, Judge Leventhal's position - that there is no clear 
claim of immunity at the threshhold - seems reasonable. The 
effect of Brick's concession and claims of legislative relevance 
can be evaluated and raised on remand. As of now, only absolute 
immunity to further inquiry is at stake. 
C. Calandra Doctrine 
1 
Judge Wilkey concludes that in any event there was no 
search or seizure by Brick under United States v. Calandr?J., 414 
U.S. 338 (1974). His theory is that any harm was done by the 
initial search and seizure carried out by state officials. 
Subsequent legislative use of the illegally obtained materials, 
like grand jury use of the material illegally seized in ~a~an9ra, 
\
does not work a second seizure. This point is reinforced by the 
"silver platter" cases, ~~g~, Weeks v. United St~~~§, 232 U.S. 
1 
383 (1914), holding that there is no illegality connected to 
transfer of evidence from one jurisdiction, which illegally 
seized the evidence, to another jurisdiction that did not 
participate in the illegality. 
Judge Leventhal seems to be correct in suggesting that 
Judge Wilkey - in assimilating this situation to Calandra -
21. 
missed the point of respondents' complaint. They allege, wholly 
apart from the illegality of the initial state seizure, that 
)
Brick's tmspection and copying amounted to a separate Fourth 
Amendment violation. Your opinion in Calandra noted that the 
wrong was "fully accomplished by the original search." 414 u.s. 
at 354. There simply was no claim that the g~and jury's passive 
receipt of the illegally seized evidence amounted to a second 
search, any more than it would have to be claimed that an attempt 
to use illegally seized evidence at a 1£Ja1 was a second search. 
In this case, however, respondents argue that Brick violated a 
court order and the Fourth Amendment; there was more than passive 
receipt by a grand jury or trial court. There was a fresh wrong 
committed by Brick. Thus, Qal9ndra and the silver platter cases 
are inapposite. 
Judge Leventhal's view is supported by ~~1a~Qra's 
distinction of §ilyertbQfD~LUmQ~r Co. v. Unit~Q_§1at~~' 251 u.s. 
385 (1920). Q~landra notes that in §ilverthorne a grand jury 
subpoena, premised solely on a prior seizure already ruled 
invalid was held to violate the Fourth Amendment. Hence, the 
legality of a subsequent use by a grand jury can depend on the 
22. 
status of the materials at the time of the subsequent use. 414 
U.S. at 532 n.8. So here, the validity of the subsequent use by 
Brick and the Subcommittee depends on the status of the 
materials, i.e., whether they were under a "protective" court 
order. Thus, there could be a fresh violation here, 
distinguishing this case from Ca1andr9 and the silver platter 
cases, which · involved no second round of violations by the 
sovereign jurisdiction seeking to use the evidence, as did 
Sily~~!bQrn~. This also renders irrelevant United States v. 
§perwin, 539 F.2d 1 (CA 9 1976). 
Judge Wilkey's ~alandra point really turns on his 
conclusion that there was no separate ~ourth Amendment violation 
by Brick. That question, in turn, hinges on the scope of the 
safekeeping order and Brick's cooperation with Ratliff. Those 
questions were considered above. As noted above, Judge 
Leventhal's conclusion that they are matters for further proof 
seems reasonable. (Note, too, that the SG, who made an argumen t 
similar to Judge Wilkey's in the cert petn, now raises the issue 
,· 'I:'J•,,t ''/ 
only in a footnote. Br. at 38 n. 2. This is because respondent s 
1\ 
allege that there was more than a merely passive "takeover" of 
documents from the state. Compare Dombrowski v. Eastl9~Q, 387 
u.s. at 84.) 
In sum, Judge Leventhal seems to have the better of tbe 
argument. Respondents do seem to have alleged facts that - if 
proven without resort to legislative acts - could suffice to 
strip away the immunity under present Speech or Debate doctrine. 
To deprive them of their opportunity to prove their allegations 
because of that immunity would be Catch-22. 
IV 
JUDGE DANAHER'S OPINION 
Quite frankly, I cannot quite figure •ut what Judge 
Danaher is talking about. He seems to be saying that there is 
23 . 
absolute official immunity for congressional investigations apart 
from the Speech or Debate Clause, but the source of that immunity 
is none too clear. He appears to rely on Imbler, but JmbJf-~, of 
course, left the question of absolute immunity for investigation 
activity open. No one advances Judge ~anaher~s position here. 
3!1/ 
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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: Bob DATE: 3/2/78 
RE: McClellan v. McSurely, No. 76-1621 
I continue to believe that Judge Leventhal's 
resolution of this case was more reasonable. I can offer 
no controlling considerations leading to this conclusion, 
but I think it follows from the procedural posture of this 
case. 
Judge Leventhal does not purport to resolve the 
issue as to whether there was a Fourth Amendment 
violation. He merely says that the lo~ Dombrowski 
2. 
threshold of a more than colorable claim was passed, ana 
that the question of violation vel non remains for retrial 
or summary judgment. Note that the panel of CA DC that 7 
c,,.,,·d~t'cll/, fn-o/ /_ M _1 ~ .., 
~ the McSurelysAfor contempt of Congress cone~~~~-
that there hao been a Fourth Amendment violation. Note, 
~~~~~-~--~~~----~---------------
too, that the Government has conceoeo for purposes of its 
presentation to this Court that there was a Fourth 
Amendment violation. 
Judge Wilkey constructs his argument that there 
was no Fourth Amendment violation largely from testimony 
given in the three-judge court trial ana the contempt 
proceeding. (There has been no testimony in this case as 
yet.) Yet Judge Leventhal pointed out that the record o) 
ana orders resulting fro~ the three-judge court proceeding 
were not even filed with the courts below by the parties. 
Judge Wilkey obtained them after the oral argument en 
bane. Petn at 52a n.84. Thus, the proposition that there 
was no Fourth Amendment violation was not even briefed or 
argued below. 
Much of the testimony upon which Judge Wilkey 
relies is, of course, that of the various defendants. He 
calls it undisputed, but the fact is that this litigation 
has not reached a procedural stage in which Resps have 
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3 • 
declarations in McClellan's affidavits to the effect that 
neither he nor his aides participated in any conspiracy. 
That was as far as the proceedings went below. And they 
also disagree with Judge Wilkey's (and the Government's) 
assertions that Brick was a completely passive recipient 
of the documents in question. They argue -- as CADC found 
in the contempt proceeding -- that he went to Pikeville as 
part of a previously existing conspiracy with state 
officials and took an active role in screening the 
material, as well as in deciding to "violate" the 
safekeeping order. Brick's testimony itself could support 
Resps' view. Appendix 101-104. 
It is possible to read the safekeeping order as 
Judge Wilkey reads it, but that is an issue for proof. 
Judge Wilkey seems to have taken it upon himself to put 
Resps to their proof before Petrs did so. Moreover, he 
did it after they had an opportunity to rebut his 
assertions. 
As for the subsequent order of the three-judge 
court denying Resps' motion for an injunction against the 
Committee subpoena, it really does not speak to the 
court's view of Brick's activities before issuance of the 
subpoena. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 
421 U.S. 491 (1975), made it clear that the only way to 
4 . 
resist a subpoena is by resisting a contempt charge. 
Hence, the order connected with the subpoena could have 
followed from the court's conclusion that regardless of 
any prior illegal activities, no injunction could issue 
against the subpoena. We have only Judge Wilkey's 
unlitigated arguments, constructed from evidence in other 
proceedings, to establish the three-judge court's view of 
the meaning of its own order and its response to Brick's 
activities. Resps should get a chance -- albeit it is a 
very slim one -- to adduce evidence with respect to these 
factual matters. 
It is true that, in a sense, the testimony upon 
which Judge Wilkey relies is "of record." But its 
significance in terms of the issues in ihis case has never 
been litigated. It seems a rather disorderly way to try a 
case to have an appellate judge bring in pieces of 
evidence from other proceedings and insist that plaintiffs 
have been put to their proof, when in fact the litigation 
has not reached the stage where even the defendants have 
been able to make such a motion. 
While there may be some additional expense 
connected with forcing defendants to move again for 
summary judgment, I cannot foresee any particular hazards 
except those that ought to be imposed if justice is to be 
5. 
done. That is, there is a danger that discovery will turn 
up evidence that a conspiracy did exist, but if it did, 
defendants rightfully will be held liable. I cannot 
envision any other hazards. (Judge Leventhal was careful 
to note that discovery was limited to areas not within 
Speech or Debate immunity.) As for the expense discovery 
would entail, it is no greater than that faced by any 
litigants who legitimately are subject to suit. 
As a practical matter, I cannot believe that any 
remaining discovery process would be protracted, or even 
successful. And there is no reason why the court below 
could not set up an expedited summary judgment proceeding 
to knock plaintiffs out of the box quickly. I believe a 
hint as to the use of such procedures is contained in your 
approach to the Butz case. 
In sum, disposition of this suit along Judge 
Wilkey's lines does not seem to embrace an orderly -- or 
even fair -- view of the presentation of a lawsuit. 
~· • 
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(Preconference Notes 
I cannot accept the SG's argument that the Speech 
or Debate Clause (the Clause) affords absolute immunity for 
deliberate constitutional violations outside of the 
legislative process itself. I therefore turn to what I view 
as the real issue in this case: whether the plaintiffs 
(McSurelys) have stated a cause of action against the 
defendants (McClellan and his aides). I find Judge Wilkey's 
opinion more persuasive on this issue than Judge Leventhal's. 
It is important to bear in mind that the case is 
not postured merely on the basis of complaint, answer and a 
few supporting affidavits. There are affidavits, testimony 
of witnesses, and the record of the proceedings before a 
three-judge District Court in Kentucky. There also is a 
stipulation of the key facts. I see no issue for a jury on 
a disputed fact that is material to my view of a correct 
decision of the case. 
1. There has been no Fourth Amendment violation by 
any of the defendants. 
The complaint does allege such a violation. But 
the undisputed facts satisfy me to the contrary. 
These defendants had nothing to do with the 
initial, unlawful seizure of McSurely's documents. 
2. 
In the suit instituted by McSurelys in the federal 
court (three-judge court in Kentucky, herein called the DC), 
the Kentucky statute under which the documents were seized 
was held to be invalid. In addition, the court's order of 
September 14, 1967, provided as follows: 
" ••• All [records and documents] now in the 
custody of [Ratcliff] . • • be held by him in 
safekeeping until final disposition of this case by 
appeal or otherwise." 
It was not until after the judgment and order of 
the DC that either Senator McClellan or his staff took any 
action with respect to the documents. Not until October did 
Brick go to Kentucky, where he was then allowed by Ratcliff 
to inspect and take photocopies back to Washington. 
Ratcliff testified - without being disputed (as I understand 
it) that he had "permission" from one of the federal judges 
~ 
to allow Brick to have access to the documents (Pet. 63a). 
On October 30, following a motion by McSurelys to 
bar Senate subcommittee access to the document, the 
three-judge court entered a further order (i) denying 
McSurelys' request that the documents be delivered to them, 
(ii) denying their motion for an injunction against the 
release of these documents to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, and (iii) providing, finally, as follows: 
"The parties to this action and officers of 
this Court are directed to cooeerate with the 
Senate Committee in making ava1lable such of 
the materials, or copies thereof, as the Committee 
considers pertinent to its inquiry: but until time 
for appeal is expired, this will be done in such 
manner as to keep intact those materials that may 
be pertinent to the appeal of this case." (Pet. 
64a-65a) 
It defies all reason to suggest, in light of the 
DC's order of October 30, that its prior order of September 
14 imposed any duty on Ratcliff other than "safekeeping" 
(certainly there was no order of "secrecy"), or that the 
three federal judges who were intimately familiar with the 
entire situation thought that Ratcliff had violated their 
order. It would be even more absurd to argue that these 
judges thought Brick had violated the Fourth Amendment by 
making copies of documents in the official custody of the 
Commonwealth's Attorney of Pike County. 
I agree with Judge Wilkey that wholly "new law" 
would have to be made - without precedent or logic to 
support it - to hold that "the transfer from one 
investigative agency to another [of these documents] is a 
'separate, independent search and seizure'". 
In these circumstances, I would view it as a 
substantial miscarriage of justice to put these defendants 
to the expense and hazards of a trial of this frivolous 
case. To be sure, Judge Leventhal stated that following 
discovery depositions, it would be open to defendants to 
move again for summary judgment. But the facts upon 
3. 
which I rely already are of record. They frame the legal 








MEMO_BANDUM FOR MR . ~STICE ~OW~LL 
FROM: Bob DATE: 3/2/78 
RE: Final Salvo in McSurely, No. 76-1621 
After re-reading Judge Leventhal's opinion and 
puzzling over Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967), 
last night, I think that I have been converted to your. 
view as to the defendants other than Brick. That is, with 
the making of the summary judgment motion based on 
immunity, it was incumbent upon the McSurelys to come 
forward with some evidence of the other defendants' 
involvement in the Fourth Amendment violations, aside from 
mere information and belief. 
2. 
Judge Leventhal's view of Qombrowski, wh:i.ch I 
have followed up to this point, seems to be that the 
summary judgment motion as to }mmunity did not give rise 
to any duty on the plaintiffs' part to adduce evidence as 
to liabili!Y. Thus, Judge Leventhal notes at Petn 45a 
that the case has thus far revolved around the issue of 
immunity, and that defendants are now free to make a 
summary judgment claim as to the evidence of liability. 
In Judge Leventhal's view, then, the mere allegation was 
sufficient to survive the summary judgment motion because 
the allegation went to liability and was not called into 
question by the summary judgment motion on immunity. See 
also Petn at 5la-52a. 
I puzzled over Dombfpwsk.!. for some time last 
night, and I now believe that Judge Leventhal's apparent 
view of that case is incorrect. From all that appears in 
Dombrowski, the summary judgment motion there also went 
only to immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause. 
Nevertheless, the Court reached the issue of the amount of 
evidence tying Eastland into the alleged Fourth Amendment 
violation. It appears to have done so, not because there 
had been a questlon on summary judgment as to liabillli, 
but because Eastland's im!f1unity could not be lifted unless 
there was a plausible allegation that he had participated 
in the use of unlawful means to gather information. This 
3. 
explains why, in discussing Eastland's involvement, the 
Court reverted to discussion of the scope of Speech or 
Debate immunity, rather than dweJ l i.ng on the usual summary 
judgment considertions of material dispute, etc. 
If the issues of immunity and liability do 
converge to this extent, then Judge Leventhal's belief 
that the motion grounded on immunity did not raise the 
issue of the substantiality of plaintiffs' claim of 
McClellan's involvement was incorrect. When McClellan 
filed his mot.ion and affidavlt denying the conspiracy and 
rai.sing the immunity issue, it was incumbent upon the 
McSurelys to respond with more than a mere allegation of 
involvement in the use of unlawful means; otherwise, the 
claim of Speech or Debate immunity -- which obviously was 
squarely raised by the summary judgment motion -- would 
have to prevail. (I checked back over the record last 
night, and it does not appear that plaintiffs filed a 
cross-motion for summary judgment. Thus, it would not be 
possible to say that they themselves had put the 
substantiality of their liability claims at issue.) 
This is not Judge Wilkey's view of the case. He 
does not touch upon the correct reading of QQmbr2wski, but 
seems instead to accept Judge Leventhal's. I am fairly 
confident, however, that my reading of Dombro~ki is 
4. 
correct, and the moreso because it 1.s supported by your 
"judge's intuition" that the McSurelys' bare allegation is 
not enough to keep the defendants other than Brick in the 
case at this stage. I still do not see a way to get Brick 
out of the suit, however, except by pursuing Judge 
Wilkey's approach. And I adhere to the view that his 
approach is incorrect. 
TO: LFP, Jr. 
FROM: Bob 
DATE: 3/2/78 
Attached is a copy of two pages from the three-judge 
court opinion, McSurely v. Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (ED Ky. 
1967), which may bolster somewhat the surface plausibility of 
the McSurelys' claim that the safekeeping order could be 
read as a secrecy order. 
The underlined passages suggest that the court was 
vitally concerned with the chilling effect ~{he McSurelys' 
speech worked by the seizure of their documents. It could 
plausibly be argued that any court so concerned about the 
worked by 
chilling effect/the initial seizure would 
believe that its order to "keep safe" entailed a duty to 
refrain from showing the illegally seized stuff to other 
governmemt agencies. Moreover, as Judge Leventhal points out, 
Ratliff himself must have thought some sort of perrnssion was 
necessary for release, since he attempted to obtain such 
permission. PETN at 50a. (f~ a:f ?l~-S4.~ ~~~~) 
And to repeat once again, CADC in the contempt case 
interpreted the order exactly the way the McSurelys do in 
this case. Hence, I do not believe that this Court is 
in a pos.tion, at this stage, to say that the McSurelys are out 
of court. All the arguments on that point have yet to be made. 
It is true that the October 30 order was a public record, 
but as I have indicated before, it does not necessarily under-
cut the McSurelys position. More importantly, until Judge Wilkey 
made it a point of contention, they were not aware that the time 
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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
DATE: March 9, 1978 
RE: Proposed Per Curiam in McSurely, No. 76-1621 
Attached is a very rough draft of the analysis 
section of a proposed per curiam. I thought it better not 
to spend a lot of time fashioning the facts section until 
we had decided if the opinion would work out. I'm 
submitting the analysis to you at this point to see if you 
approve of the approach and to point out potential 
problems with this disposition. 
I think that II.A., the section dealing with the 
Fourth Amendment violation, holds together pretty well. 
Dombrowski is strong authority for dealing quite harshly 
with unsupported allegations, even after virtually no 
discovery. It should be noted, however, that reaffirming 
Dombrowski along these lines will make it virtually 
impossible for a plaintiff ever to maintain a suit against 
the Member or the staff in Washington. As soon as the 
action is filed, a motion for summary judgment can be 
made, and plaintiff will be put to his proof. Unless he 
has the cooperation of a "whistle blower," it is hard to 
see how, at that stage, he could adduce sufficient facts 
2. 
to hold defendants who were not out in the field actually 
committing the violations. Of course, since plaintiff 
will be able to test the legality of the action -- and 
recover any damages -- by suing the aide who was out in 
the field, this result may not be undesirable. The old 
theory of the Speech or Debate Clause was that aides were 
not immune, so that the legality of all action could be 
tested by making the executing aide the "hostage of the 
law." 
To take the three Washington defendants out of 
this case, it is also necessary to dispose of respondents' 
claim that their documents were disseminated to the IRS. 
This issue is covered in II.B., and there are more serious 
problems with respect to it. All ten judges of the Court 
of Appeals agreed that this claim could go back to the 
District Court, so that even following Judge Wilkey's 
approach would not avail us anything in this regard. He 
spoke only to the Fourth Amendment claims, and we really 
have no problem there, as indicated above. 
I've tried to use the Dombrowski approach for the 
dissemination claim, and it works on the surface. If you 
stop to think about it for a minute, however, it is not as 
tight as the Fourth Amendment analysis. The point is 
supposed to be that if the plaintiffs cannot come forward 
3 • 
with some evidence linking a particular defendant to the 
alleged wrongdoing, the immunity is not lifted as to that 
defendant, and he is not exposed to the burdens of the 
litigation. (Thus, since there are no facts linking 
McClellan to the alleged Fourth Amendment violation in 
Pikeville, legslative immunity precludes taking his 
deposition--forgetting for the moment that he is dead.) 
Hence, summary judgment must be granted. 
The problem with applying this analysis to the 
dissemination claim is that respondents could take 
potentially fruitful discovery (of IRS) without having to 
depose the defendants, who are covered by the immunity. 
There are a few answers to this point. First, since on 
the strength of the facts as they stood before the 
District Court (where the respondents had not yet 
discovered the IRS connection) , summary judgment should 
have been granted anyway. But it seems quite harsh to 
hold this Court's direction of summary judgment 
retroactive to the time of the District Court hearing and 
to treat the record as though only the facts known at that 
time appeared in it. 
Second, one could say that respondents should 
have instituted a separate Freedom of Information Act 
proceeding to see whether the IRS had any of their 
4. 
Pikeville documents in its files. It seems a bit unusual, 
however, to set up a Freedom of Information Ac~ suit as a 
substitute for discovery. 
Finally, one could say that even permitting 
discovery to go forward as to non-immune persons, i.e., 
the IRS, is a burden of litigation -- further expense, 
delay, etc. -- that the immune parties should not have to 
bear unless there is some evidence in the record tying 
them into the alleged violation at this point. This seems 
to be the most promising view, but for some reason it did y not occur to any of the judges below. They apparently 
believed that there was enough on this claim to let the 
case go on just a bit longer. And to hold that a summary 
judgment motion cuts off the right to depose or 
interrogate non-immune persons means that the plaintiff - .... --will have to do all his investigation and collect all his 
affidavits before filing his complaint. If he cannot find 
individuals who will cooperate without the compulsion of 
the discovery rules, he will never be able to pierce the 
immunity of the defendants. If you conclude that it is 
not a bad result for only the man in the field to be held 
accountable for any violations, this may not seem a bad 
result. 
lfp/ss 3/9/78 
March 9, 1978 
No. 76-1621 McSurley 
This memo will comment on your draft of March 8, 
of the "analysis section" of a proposed opinion. I agree 
enthusiastically that II.A. "holds together pretty well". 
I will comment below on II.B. 
First, some general comments and suggestions. 
Now that we are reasonably confident (I am quite 
clear) that the analysis in II.A., relying on Dombrowski, 
is sound, I would like to expand the rough draft into a 
memorandum. I would like the memorandum to be written in a 
form that could readily be converted into a Court opinion. 
As I was the only Justice who advanced the Dombrowski 
resolution of this case, I have no great optimism that we 
will win a Court. But there was no Court for any other 
resolution, and I would like to try to educate my Brothers. 
The loose talk of a two or three page PC simply 
will not wash, so far as I am concerned. 
Thus, let us proceed with a draft along the 
following lines: 
I. The facts and proceedings below, stated with 
appropriate conciseness. 
II. Address, and d i spatch, the SG's claim to 
immunity even for deliberate unconstitutional conduct. 
This section of the memorandum need not be over two or 
three paragraphs, but it should be crisp and explicit -
with appropriate citations. I would introduce the 
paragraph with a quotation from the SG's brief that shows 
how extreme his position really is. This should be 
buttressed by a footnote quoting one of more of 
Easterbrook's statements in oral argument. 
To be sure, responding to this outlandish argument 
is almost like kicking a baby. But this baby deserves it! 
III. This can be your present II.A., subject to 
these observations: 
~In view of the heavy reliance on Dombrowski, 
jL if there is any quotable language from the opinion that can 
be added to the present discussion, it might be helpful. I 
have not reread Dombrowski, but I do recall that it is not 
exactly expansively written. 
~In United States Servicemen's Fund we held, 
as you note, that a facially proper subpoena is an 
indispensable part of leg~ating. My recollection is that 
A 
McClelland's affidavit makes clear that the subpoenas he 
authorized in this case were facially proper. Indeed, I 
think this was recognized by the Court of Appeals. Perhaps 
it would be helpful to include, in a note, recognition of 
2. 
what the record shows with respect to the propriety of the 
subpoenas. 
(iii) Similarly, on page 4, in the final 
paragraph of II.A., concluding that the three Washington 
defendants should have been dismissed, do you think our 
memorandum would be more persuasive if we quoted - in the 
text or a note - from McClelland's affidavit and from 
respondent's answering affidavit. If we do this in a note 
(which I am inclined to favor) I also would like to repeat 
the concession by counsel for respondents that the only 
3. 
answer he had was "on information and belief", with a cross 
reference to note 3. 
~With respect to whether there was a Fourth 
Amendment violation by Brick, the draft refers to what a 
different pane~~1tA~said about Brick's activity. We 
" also should give equal billing to what the three-judge 
court said on October 30 that several of us at the 
Conference (Chief Justice, Stewart, Rehnquist and I) think 
only can be read as exonerating Brick. In other words, I 
would like to give Brick a "fair shake" on this issue, 
especially since I would accept the three-judge court's 
view as to what was intended by its September 14 order 
rather than that of CADC several years later. 
IV. I am inclined to leave the IRS claim in the 
case, provided we can do so without weakening the holding 
as to the washington defendants. There is a difference 
between interrogating nonimmune persons and interrogating 
Senators and their aides, but I think we should make this 
" 
4. 
quite clear. Although I am inclined to doubt that there is 
substance to the IRS claim, I do view it differently from 
the main claim. 
ss 
L.F.P., Jr. 
p~: JT /i VI- ~~ -/4,·:rcLy 
~ ~ ~ J .k...-,J... ..-.3A 1 ,~k.J.. 
Y~·r~~~~~ 
~;_.,.~~~~~ 
t-r;r ~ d-~ ~----....r..r 
~~u-. 
FROM: Bob 
MEMO~NDU~ FOR MR . JUSTICE POWELL 
DATE: March 9, 1978 
RE: Proposed Per Curiam in ~cSur~.!Y, No. 76-1621 
Attached is a very rough draft of the analysis 
section of a proposed per curiam. I thought it better not 
to spend a lot of time fashioning the facts section until 
we had decided if the opinion would work out. I'm 
submitting the analysis to you at this point to see if you 
approve of the approach and to point out potential 
problems with this disposition . 
I think t~at II.A., the section dealing with the 
Fourth Amendment violation, holds together pretty well. 
Dombrowski is - strong authority for dealing quite harshly 
with unsupported allegations, even after virtually no 
discovery. It should be noted, however, that reaffirming 
Dombrowski along these lines will make it virtually 
impossible for a plaintiff ever to maintain a suit against 
the Member or the staff in Washlngton. As soon as the 
action is filed, a motion for summary judgment can be 
made, and plaintiff will be put to his proof. Unless he 
has the cooperation of a "whistle blower," it is hard to 
see how, at that stage, he could adduce sufficient facts 
·• ... 
2. 
to hold defendants who were not out in the field actually 
committing the violations. Of course, since plaintiff 
will be able to test the legality of the action -- and 
recover any damages -- by suing the aide who was out in 
the field, this result may not be undesirable. The old 
theory of the Speech or Debate Clause was that aides were 
not immune, so that the legality of all action could be 
tested by making the executing aide the "hostage of the 
law." 
To take the three Washington defendants out of 
this case, it is aJ.so necessary to dispose of respondents' 
claim that their documents were disseminated to the IRS. 
This issue is covered in II.B., and there are more serious 
problems with respect to it. All ten judges of the Court 
of Appeals agreed , that this claim could go back to the 
District Court, so that even following Judge Wilkey's 
approach would not avail us anything in this regard. He 
spoke only to the Fourth Amendment claims, and we really 
have no problem there, as indicated above. 
I've tried to use the Dombrowsk.!. approach for the 
dissemination claim, and it works on the surface. If you 
stop to think about it for a minute, however, it is not as 
tight as the Fourth Amendment analysis. The point is 
supposed to be that if the plaintiffs cannot come forward 
3. 
with some evidence linking a particular defendant to the 
alleged wrongdoing, the immunity is not lifted as to that 
defendant, and he is not exposed to the burdens of the 
litigation. (Thus, since there are no facts linking 
McClellan to the alleged Fourth Amendment violation in 
Pikeville, legslative immunity precludes taking his 
deposition--forgetting for the moment that he is dead.) 
Hence, summary judgment must be granted. 
The problem with applying this analysis to the 
dissemination claim is that respondents could take 
potentially fruitful discovery (of IRS) without having to 
depose the defendants, who are covered by the immunity. 
There are a few answers to this point. First, since on 
the strength of the facts as they stood before the 
District Court (where the respondents had not yet 
discovered the IRS connection) , summary judgment should 
have been granted anyway. But it seems quite harsh to 
hold this Court's direction of summary judgment 
retroactive to the time of the District Court hearing and 
to treat the record as though only the facts known at that 
time appeared in it. 
Second, one could say that respondents should 
have instituted a separate Freedom of Information Act 
proceeding to see whether the IRS had any of their 
" . 
4. 
Pikeville documents in its files. It seems a bit unusual, 
however, to set up a Freedom of Information Act suit as a 
substitute for discovery. 
Finally, one could say that even permitting 
discovery to go forward as to non-immune persons, i.e., 
the IRS, is a burden of litigation -- further expense, 
delay, etc. -- that the immune parties should not have to 
bear unless there is some evidence in the record tying 
them into the alleged violation at this point. This seems 
to be the most promi.sing view, but for some reason it did 
not occur to any of the judges below. They apparently 
believed that there was enough on this claim to let the 
case go on just a bit longer. And to hold that a summary 
judgment motion cuts off the right to depose or 
interrogate non-immune persons means that the plaintiff 
will have to do all his investigation and collect all his 
affidavits before filing his complaint. If he cannot find 
individuals who will cooperate without the compulsion of 
the discovery rules, he will never be able to pierce the 
immunity of the defendants. If you conclude that it is 
not a bad result for only the man in the field to be held 
accountable for any violations, this may not seem a bad 
result. 
lfp/ss 3/,78 
This memo will comment on your draft of 
of the! "analysis~'section" of a proposed opinion • 
• Now that we are reasonably confident 
clear) that the analysis in II .A., ~relying on Dombrowski, 
is sound~'! would like to expand t .. J:l~' rough dra.ft ~into a 
memorandum. ~!~ would like the memorandum to be written in 
..;. ,w,, .• 
form that could readily be converted into a Court opinion. 
'iii;; 
•" 
As {,r ~~w~,s ~~,~he only Justice , who advanced the Dombrow~ki. ~r· 
resolution of this case,, I have no great optimism 
will wi~fa Court. But there was no Court for any 
resolution, and I would' like to try to educate my 
two or three page PC 
will not wash, 
Thus, let us proceed with a 
following lines: 
The facts and 
appropriate 
"' .~1 '•i,; 
2. 
"' . JI."r~ Address'' r'~ and dispatch, the SG's claim to 
' ' ~~t·":t'~-~ 
l),: \C 'JJ 
immunity even for deliberate unconstitutional conduct. ~'11· 
ThisAsection of the memorandum need not be over two or 
I ~ -·~~-
three paragraphs, but it should be crisp and explicit 
~ 
with appropriate citations. I would introduc~ the 
paragraph with a quotation from the SG's brief 
how extreme his posit i on really is. 
a footnote quoting .'~~~ of more of 
rfr '~' ~; 
statements in ora~:.~''':ar.gument. 
l!.J 
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be add~~ to the present discussion, it m:!ght be ~he1pful. I 
'""·~ 
hav~· not reread Domb_f~ski, but I do r~call that'~, t is not 
·:rj.·;:.'i.\; l.i ! ;J 
exact ~xpansively written. 
(i1) In United Stat~s Se£vic~en's Fund we 
. ' ~ •l 
as you note~ tliat a ,_., facially proper subpoena is an, 
indispensable part of legilating. 
" "" ,. 
McClelland's affidavit makes clear that the subpoena 
authorized in t ,hfs cas'e were facially ,proper. 
think this the Court of Appeals ; Perhaps 




wha~ the record shows with respect to the propriety 
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also should give equal billing to what the ~ti~~e-judge 
court s_<:~/d on October 30 that several of us at the 
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FROM: Bob 
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
DATE: March 14, 1978 
RE: First Draft in McSurely, No. 76-1621 
Attached is a first draft in this case. I tried 
to follow through on the various points we discussed. 
There were two major exceptions. 
First, a more detailed look at the record made it 
even harder than ever to give Judge Wilkey's view of the 
October 30, 1967 order a "fair shake." On this record it 
appears that at the time of that order, the three-judge 
court was not even aware nor were the McSurelys -- of 
the extent of Brick's activities in inspecting and 
transporting the documents. Thus, the order cannot be 
read as a retroactive ratification of Brick's actions. 
This does not mean, as the draft points out in various 
places, that there was a Fourth Amendment violation. It 
means only that it would be premature to jump aboard Judge 
Wilkey's band wagon. 
Second, I was unable to write the dissemination 
point so as to keep that claim alive as to the Washington 
defendants, while not undercutting the grant of summary 
judgment in their favor on the Fourth Amendment claim. It 
is true that respondents could verify their dissemination 
2 
claims without deposing immune parties, but it's at least 
conceivable that they could do that on the other claim, 
too. Moreover, if we are going to look at the record in 
as harsh a manner as we did on the Fourth Amendment claim, 
footnote 22 should end the ball game. 
While ruminating about this problem, however, it 
occurred to me that there was a genuine question whether 
the Court of Appeals even had the issue properly before 
it. It certainly is not clear from reading the Leventhal 
opinion. Therefore, I decided to try writing this section 
to follow the Government's suggestion of a vacate and 
remand as to the dissemination claim. That approach seems 
to get us out of the hole, if you agree that there is some 
doubt as to whether the Court of Appeals regarded the 
issue as actually before it. If you do not, we can go 
back to the original version I gave you last week. 
I gather from talking to clerks that other 
Chambers think we are in the process of writing a DIG 
memo. They're certainly in for a surprise. 
t9J. ~~ tft4 C4a-~ -c a ~0_) 
cY ~_d ~~~  4-'_A<-~~ r-
-a~~- t:J ~~~~~?~L 
~~~~p-zZ--7~-~~-~ 
c:JL-~~~1~'' ~ .  ;/~#~ 
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MEMJRANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: BOB DATE: March 22, 1978 
RE: McAdams v. McSurely, No. 76-1621 
Jim has finished his edit of the Chambers Draft in this 
case. Attached is a marked-up copy containing both Jim's 
changes and mine. Also attached is the copy that Jim marked 
up. 
I feel considerably better about this piece now that 
Jim has gone over it and agrees that our handling of the 
-l' 
I\ dissemination claim is above board. That was the section 
that most concerned me, as you know. After Jim's thorough 
delving into the opinions below and the record, I am now 
confident that we have dealt fairly with CADC. r . 
1st DRAFI' 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA'lES 
No. 76-1621 
Herbert H. McAdams, III, as Executor On Writ of Certiorari 
of the Estate of John L. McClellan, to the United States 
et al., Petitioners, Court of Appeals for 
v. the District of Co· 
Alan McSurely et ux. lumbia Circuit. 
·[March -, 1978] 
Memorandum to the Conference from Ma. JusTICE PowELL. 
I 
In 1967, Alan and Margaret McSurely were field organizers 
for the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., in Pi~e 
County, Ky. Alan McSurely also had served as a field orga-
nizer for the National Conference of New Politics and 
distributed litera.ture for Vietnam Summer. On the night of 
August 11, 1967, under authority of a warrant charging sedi-
tious activities against the Commonwealth of Kentucky and 
the United States in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 432.040 
(1g.,.._), Pike County officials arrested the McSurelys and 
seized a quantity of books, pamphlets, and letters found in 
their home. Shortly after the raid, Thomas Ratliff, Common-
wealth Attorney for Pike County, announced publicly that the 
seized material would be made available to any Congressional 
Committees interested in the McSurelys. 
On September 14, 1967. a three-judge District Court for the 
Eastern District of Kentucky, one judge dissenting, declared 
the Kentucky sedition statute unconstitutional on its face and 
enjoined state prosecution of the McSurelys. M cSurely v. 
Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (ED Ky. 1967). The court ordered 
that all th~ e_ei~~d materi(l-1 "be h~ld by [Ratliff] in safekeeping; 
I 7 t..,~ 
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until final disposition of this case by appeal or otherwise." 
App. 78. 
Soon after issuance of the District Court's order, Ratliff 
received a telephone call from Lavern Duffy, Assistant Counsel 
to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
Senate Committee on Government Operations. · The Subcom-
mittee, which was headed by Senator McClellan, was investi-
gating the causes of various riot.~ across the Nation, including 
one that had occurred in· Nashville, Tennessee, in April 1967. 
Some of the Subcommittee's information showed that the 
organizations with which the McSurelys were affiliated might 
have been involved in the Nashville riot. Hence, Duffy 
asked Ratliff whether the materials seized from the McSurelys 
were in his custody. Ratliff replied that they were, and on 
October 8, 1967, a Subcommittee investigator, John Brick, 
arrived in Pikeville, the county seat. 
That same evening Tha.deus Scott, a Commonwealth detec-
tive, visited Brick's motel room and gave "Brick photocopies 
of 234 of the seized documents. The next morning, Brick 
spent an hour examining the originals in a ·locked room at the 
Pike County courthouse. Apparently, Ratliff tried to reach 
the members of the three-judge court before permitting Brick 
to enter the locked room. He succeeded in reaching the dis.-
senting member of the court, but what transpired is not clear.1 
Brick also visited the Clerk of the District Court, who 
allowed him to inspect the case file of the McSurelys' three-
judge court action. Brick arranged to have the Clerk send 
1 At the McSurelys' subsequent trial for contempt of Congress, see n. 5, 
infra, Ratliff testified that "I had my permission" before he allowed Brick 
access to the stored materials. DefPndants' AppPndix 407, United States 
v. McSurely , Nos. 24,812, 24,813 (DC 1971) . The implication of this 
statement was that the dissenting judge gave "permission," but that is not 
· clear. Moreover, the scope of any permission remains unexplained. Ratliff 
conceded that he had not communicated with the cocustodian of the 
materials, United States Marshal Archie Kraft., before permitting Brick to 
inspect the materials. Id ., at 407-408. 
{ I 
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him a copy of the court's safekeeping order and the inventory 
of seized items. On October 12, 1967, Brick again entered the 
locked room at the county courthouse and spent four hours 
taking notes on the materials. He then returned to Washing-
ton, taking with him the 234 copies that Scott had given him. 
This material included one personal letter addressed to Mrs. 
McSurely, which concededly had no relevance to Brick's inves-
tigation. At Senator McClellan's direction, Brick prepared 
subpoenas duces tecum for some of the mate·rial in Ratliff's 
possession that Senator McClellan concluded would be rele-
vant to the investigation of the Nashville riot. 
The McSurelys moved before the three-judge court to 
prevent Ratliff from releasing the subpoenaed materials.2 On 
October 30, 1967, the court denied the motion and directed the 
parties to cooperate with the Subcommittee.3 Further litiga-
tion ensued,4 culminating in an order of the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit in July 1968, holding that since the time 
for appeal from the judgment of the District Court striking 
2 The McSurelys did not premise their opposition to the subpoenas upon 
any alleg'edly unlawful activity on Brick's pa.rt in inspecting and transport-
ing the documents. Indeed, they testified that they did not even become 
aware of Brick's actual role until December 5, 1967. Id., at 655-656, 
681-682, 704-705, 707-709. 
3 That order read in part as follows: 
"The parties to tills action and the officers of this Court are directed to 
cooperate with the Senate Committee in making available such of the 
materia.!s, or copies thereof, as the Committee considers pertinent to its 
inquiry; but until time for appeal is expi11ed, this will be done in such 
manner as to keep intact those materials that may be pertinent to the 
appeal of this case." 
I cannot sa.y whether this may be read as a retroactive ratification of 
Brick's inspection and transportation activities. There is nothing in the 
record before us to indicate that the three-judge court was apprised of 
those activities. See 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 117 n. 59, 553 F. 2d, at 
1293 n. 59. 
4 For a synopsis of that litigation's course, see the opinion below of 
Judge Wilkey, id., at 132-133, 553 F. 2d, at 1308-1309. 
'. 
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down the sedjtion statute had expired. there was no basis for 
continued court custody. The court ordered the seized mate-
rials returned to the McSurelys. McSurely v. Ratliff, 398 F. 2d 
817 (CA6 1968). and noted that questions as to the validity of 
the subpoenas still were open. According to Brick, the Sub· 
committee's photocopies were returned to Detective Scott on 
August 14, 1968. The originals and copies were returned to 
the McSurelys on November 8, 1968. Upon receipt of these 
materials. the McSurelys were served with new subpoenas. 
On March 4. 1969, McSurPlys appeared before the Sub. 
committee and refused to comply with the subpoenas. Their 
refusal resulted in a conviction for contempt of Congress,~ but 
in December 1972. the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the subpoenas were 
the fruit of two Fourth Amendment violations: (i) the original 
seizure by Kentucky officials. and ( ii) Brick's "unauthorized 
search and inspection of the documents" in violation of the 
three-judge court's safekeeping order. United States v. 
McSurely, 154 U. S. App. D. C. 141, 154-155, 473 F. 2d 1178, 
1191-1192 (1972). 
On the same day that they appeared before the Subcom-
mittee, the McSurelys filed this action," alleging that Senator 
McClellan. Brick. Jerome S. Adlerman (the Subcommittee's 
General Counsel). Donald F. O'Donnell (the Subcommittee's 
Chief Counsel). and individual Members of the Subcommittee 
had conspired to violate the McSurelys' constitutional rights. 
They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and $50,000 
damages from ea.ch defendant. The action was stayed to per-
mit the contempt trial to proceed. McSurely v. McClellan,. 
138 U.S. App. D. C. 187. 426 F. 2d 664 (1970). In Septem-
5The variom: testimony refPrred to in thi~; was given at the· ~ 
contempt, trial. See. e. g .. n. 1, supra. 
6 Listed with the i\IeSurel~·s as plaintiff,: in this initial complaint were-
three :u;sociat.iom: with which they were connected: the Southern Conference 
Educational Fund, the Southern Stud"ent Organizing Committee, and the· 
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her 1971, while the appeal of their contempt conviction was 
pending, the McSurelys filed an amended complaint, naming 
Ratliff, McClellan, Brick, Adlerman, and O'Donnell as defend-
ants. The amended compl&int alleged in essence that the 
federal defendants had conspired with Ratliff to carry out an 
illegal raid in 1967, and to inspect, tran,sport. and use the seized 
materials in violation of the McSurelys' constitutional and 
other rights. On October 26, 1971, petitioners moved to 
dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment on the 
basis of legislative immunity, failure to state a claim, and 
collateral estoppel by virtue of the contempt conviction.7 The 
motion was denied and petitioners appealed.8 
In 1974, while petitioners' appeal was pending in the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, respondents obtained 
documents thought by them to indicate that the Subcommittee 
7 Ratliff did not join this motion. 
8 Normally the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not. appeal-
able because it is not a final decision for purposes of § 28 U. S. C. § 1291. 
See genera.lly 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice ,r 56.21 [2], at 56-1275 to 
56-1286 (2d ed. 1976). The Court of Appeals, however, adopted the 
reasoning of the panel opinion, wl1ich held that this particular denia.I had 
"sufficient indicia of finality," 172 U. S. App. D. C. 364, 371, 521 F. 2d 
1024, 1031, quoting 81'own Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 308 
(1962), to qualify as appealable, even t.hough it was not a decision that 
ended the action. The panel observed that. the Speech or Debate Clause, 
upon which the summary judgment motion was focused, protects Members 
of Congress and their aides from the burdens of defending themselves as 
well as from the consequences of the litigation. 172 U.S. App. D. C., a.t372, 
521 F. 2d, a.t 1032, citing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, 85 (1967). 
Reasoning that the asserted right to be free of the burdens of a la.wsuit 
would be irretrievably lost if the case proceeded to trial, the panel con-
cluded that an appeal from the final judgment would come too late to pro-· 
vite meaningful review of that claim. Hence, as to the assertion. of immu-
nit.y from inquiry, the denial of summary judgment. was held a "final 
decision" for purposes of § 1291. 172 U. S. App. D. C., at 372, 521 F. 
2d, a.t 1032. Neither side challenges tha.t analysis here, and I see no reason 
to depart from it. See also Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 
(1949);. 
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had established an information-sharing relationship with the 
Internal Revenue Service. These documents were lodged with 
the Court of Appeals, together with affidavits suggesting that 
petitioners might have exhibited the allegedly wrongfully 
seized materials to agents of the Internal Revenue Service. 
In 1976, the Court of Appeals, en bane, a.ffirmed in part, 
reversed in part, and rema.nded.9 Judge Leventhal wrote for 
himself and four others, as did Judge Wilkey. Senior Judge 
Danaher, who had sat on the panel, joined Judge Wilkey's 
opinion, but wrote a separate opinion as well. The court 
unanimously reversed the refusal to dismiss that part of the 
complaint relating to the original seizure of the McSurelys' 
materials by Kentucky authorities. The court also agreed 
unanimously that summary judgment should have been 
granted as to the portion of the complaint charging unlawful 
use of the material within Congress itself. 180 U. S. App. 
D. C. 101, 104, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1280 (1976). Respondents do 
not dispute those actions here. 
·The Court of Appeals, again unanimously, affirmed what it 
designated as the denial of summary judgment as to those 
portions of the complaint alleging dissemination of the mate-
rial outside of Congress. lbid. 10 By an evenly divided vote, 
9 While the case was in the Comt of Appeals, Brick and Adlerman died. 
180 U. S. App. D. C., at 104 n. 1, 553 F . 2d, at 1280 n. 1. The Court of 
Appeals did not decide whether the act.ions against them survived, leaving 
that. issue for the Dist.rict Court on, remand. In August 1977, respondent 
moved in the District Court to substitute the survivors or estates for Brick 
and Adlerman. Petitioners oppose that motion, arguing that respondents' 
delay caused· the action to abate. They nevertheless named Brick and 
Adlerman as pet.itioners in case this oppoSition should fa.il. See Fed. Rule 
App. Proc. 43 (a.). We need not pass on the questions e.ither of survival or 
aba.t.ement of the a.etions. 
Sena.tor McClellan died while the case was pending before this Court. 
His executor was substituted under Rule 48 ( 1) of this Court. 
10 Judge Leventhal's opinion and the short per curiam opinion stating 
the judgment both indicated that the dissemination claim was to proceed 
\tpon ter.mmd. Judge Wilkey's opinion agreed with that disposition_ 
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it affirmed the denial of summary judgmen.t on the allegations 
that Brick had violated the McSurelys' rights by inspecting 
the documents subject to the safekeeping order and transport-
ing copies back to Washington.11 Judge Leventhal, writing 
for himself and four others, concluded that the allegations 
and facts of record stated Fourth Amendment and invasion 
of privacy claims. Judge Wilkey, writing for the other five 
members of the court, disagreed and would have reversed and 
remanded only in the allegation of dissemination outside of 
Congress. Judge Danaher would have ordered the case dis-
missed on the basis of official immunity. We granted cer-
tiorari. -U.S.- (1977). 
II 
A 
In this Court, petitioners have chosen to rely principally 
Although Judge Danaher joined .Judge Wilkey's opinion, his sepa.ra.te opin-
ion seems to call for a different resolution of the dissemination claim, since 
he would have directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint. entirely, 
on the basis of official immunity. 
11 All 10 judges below appear to ha.ve agreed that the McSurelys alleged 
seven categories of wrongdoing: 
"(1) The unlawful search and seizure of the McSurelys' books and 
papers by Kentucky authorities; 
"(2) the inspection by Brick of those unlawfully seized materials; 
"(3) the transport. by Brick of copies of 234 documents to Washington; 
" ( 4) the inspection of some or all of the::;c> 234 copies by the staff of the 
Subcommittee; 
"(5) the usc of the copies, as the basis for issuance of subpoenas for some 
of the documents ; 
"(6) the procurement of Contempt of Congre8.s citations against. the 
plaintiffs by consciously withholding from the Senate the facts relating to 
the challengc>d subpoenas; 
"(7) the dissemination of ::;orne> or all of the 234 copies obtained by Brick 
to persons or agencies outside of the Subcommittee--particularly the 
Internal Revenue Sc>rvice." 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 108, 553 F. 2d, at 
1285 (footnote omited) . 
At issue here :ue allegations (2), (3), and (7). 
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upon an argument that was rejected by all 10 judges of the 
Court of Appeals. They contend that the protection of the 
Speech or Debate Clause extends "to [the use of] unlawfui 
means to achieve legitimate objectives." 12 In their view, 
unlawful activities carried out in the course of an otherwise 
legitimate investigation should be completely cloaked by a 
legislative immunity tha.t "precludes judicial inquiry even into 
conduct that would be illegal or unconstitutional if performed 
by private persons." u Indeed, for purposes of this argument, 
petitioners concede tha,t Brick's conduct was "a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment." 14 They insist, however, that legis--
lative immunity from suit is meaningful only when a Member 
or a legislative aid is alleged to have engaged in conduct that 
would be actionable if engaged in by a private citizen. since 
an "immunity that would protect only when no wrong was 
alleged to have been committed would be no immunity at 
all." 15 
While this extreme position may have some superficial plau-
sibility, its logic would lead to acceptance of untrammeled 
legislative power-.16 Moreover, it has been rejected by prior 
12 Brief for Petitioner::; 15. 
18 !d., at 14. 
14 At oral argument, petitioners made their concession on this issue quite 
explicit: 
"QUESTION: Aren't ~ ·ou eoncrding for thr purpose of argument that 
therr was wrongdoing'? 
"MR. EASTEHBHOOK: Wr art' roncrding for thr purposes of this 
argument that rBrick's activity] wn,: nctionable in ~;orne way. 
"QUESTION: That.'~ what T thought.. 
"QUESTION: And nl~o a violation oft he Fourth Amrnclmrnt. 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Yr~, we are conrrding for purpo~es of this 
ttrgument." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. See also id., at 29. 
15 Brief for Petitioner 15. 
10 In petitioner::; ' view, legi,;lative immunity "probably" rxtends even to 
tlrlibernte theft and murder, ~o long as the~· occm in the coun;-e of [(I 
t'ongre~;;ional inve;:;tigation. This was made clear at oraJ a.rgument: 
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decisions of this Court. In Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 
U. S. 82 (1967), this Court squarely held. that legislative 
immunity did not shield a congressional aide cha.rged with 
violating the plaintiff's Fourth Amen,dment rights in the, 
course of an otherwise legitimate investigation.17 Similarly, 
"But essentially our :lpproach reHts on the contention that the immunity 
is triggered by the purposes of the activity in which the Senator or the 
Senate a.ide was engaged. We believe that this approach was consistent 
with a11d indeed required by the considerations that led to the establishment 
of the constitutional privilege. 
"QUESTION: How far does tha.t. reasoning ta.k~ you? Let.'s say its 
purposes were very clearly to aid the legislative process by aiding the 
congressional committees, and in pursuance of that pristinely protected 
purpose he simply burglarized n house and stole things out of a locked 
drawer or srtfe. Is he protected under the Speech or Debate Clause for 
that? I am talking now, by "he" I mean an aide to the committee. 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Mr. Justice Stewart, that question raises a 
number of complexities. My answer to it ultimately is, yes, probably he 
is protected. 
"QUESTION: Including murder, I suppose. Well, maybe not there. 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: That, too falls within my yes, probably 
answer, but I would likP, if I ca:n-this one, the an:;wer is not intuitively 
appealing, I must concede." Tr. of OraJ Arg. 14-15. See aJso id., at 16-17. 
17 Petitioners attempt to distinguish Dombrowski on the ground that 
the congressional aide involved in tha.t case was n.ot enga.ged in investiga" 
tive activity on behrtlf of Congress. They argue tha.t he merely "con-
spired with state officials to plan and carry out a. raid to gain evidence 
for use in a sta.te prosecution." 'Brief for Betitioners, at 29·. In their 
view, summa.ry judgmPnt in his favor was reversed simply because the 
Speech or Debate Clause furnishes no prqtection to activities not. ca.rried 
out in t.he course of a, congressional investigation. Petitioners' characteri-
zation, of the facts in that. case is erroneous. As we observed in Gravel v. 
United States, 408 U. S. 606, 620 (1972), the aide in Dombrowski "was 
gathering information for a hearing." Moreover, the record in, Dom-
browski makes clea.r that the aide traveled to Louisiana at the behest of 
Senator Eastland · and in pursuance of the investigative functions of a 
Senate Subcommittee. Record in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 0 . T. 1966, 
No. 118, pp. 35, 40-41, 87, 91-94. 
Dombrowski can be read a:; suggesting that the scope of legislative 
immunity for a.icles i::; narrower than that for the Member. 387 U. S., at 85. 
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our decision in Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 628-
629 ( 1972) , held that the Speech or Debate Cla.use did not 
immunize an aide from grand jury questioning concerning pos~ 
sible criminal conduct in the course of Senate information~ 
gathering activity. As we declared in Gravel, "no prior case 
[has] held tha.t Members of Congress would be immune if 
they executed an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out 
an illegal arrest, or if, in order to secure information for a 
hearing, themselvee sei~ed the property or invaded the privacy 
of a citize~. Such a.cts are no more essential to legisla.ting 
than the [conspiracy] held unprotected in United States v. 
Johnson, 383 U. S; 169 (1966)." Gravel, supra, at 621 (foo~ 
note omitted). Conduct in the course of informal investiga~ 
tive activity simplY'<Jbes not fall within the Speech orl5ehate 
Cia.use if it clearly exceeds the lawful powers of Congress. 
Our decision in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's 
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) . is not to the contrary. There the 
Court addressed the "power to investigate and to do so through 
compulsory process." !d., at 504 (emphasis added). We 
refused to recognize an action to enjoin implementation of a 
facially proper subpoena, holding the subpoena "an indispen~ 
sa.ble ingredient of lawmaking," "8 id., at 505. We had no 
This suggestion , howevE'r, was laid to rest in Gravel v. United States, 408 
U. S. 606 (1972) , which held "that the Speech or Debate Clause applies 
not only to a Member but also to his aides insofar as the conduct of the 
latter would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member 
himself." Jd. , at 618. Our decision in Eastland v. United States Service-
men's F-und, 421 U. S. 491, 502 (1975) , viewed the distinction in 
Dombrowski between Member and aide not as one deriving from a 
difference in the scope of their legislative immunities, but as one relating 
to the activities in which they were alleged to have engaged by the 
complaint. 
18 In this case the Court of Appeals reversed the denia1 of summary 
judgment as to the cla.ims relating to the issuance of subpoenas: 
' 1The Subcommittee here employed proper process for information 'on 
which "le~isla.tion could be had." ' We note that the subpoenas called for· 
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occasion, however, to consider the effect of lawless activity in 
the course of informal investigative conduct. Such activity 
simply is not a part of "thB due functioning of the [legislative] 
process." United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501, 516 
(1972) (emphasis in original). 
In arguing that an immunity which evaporates with the 
allegation of actionable conduct is no immunity at all, peti-
tioners misapprehend the sweep of our prior decisions dealing 
with investiga.tive activity. When Congress employs facially 
proper means of information-gathering-such as the subpoena 
in Servicemen's Fund-the Speech or Debate Clause precludes 
both inquiry into legislative motive and lawsuits for damages 
resulting from the investigation. But when Members of 
Congress or their aides resort instead to crfrcii;a"I or oth,.W'wise 
unlawful methods of obtaining informa.tion, they exceed the 
power duly vested in Congress and can expect no condonation 
by virtue on the Speech or Debate Clause. ·This ''focus on 
means permits the court to afford relief 'without proof of a 
legislative act.' " 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 112, 553 F. 2d, at 
1288 (opinion of Leventhal. J.), quoting Gravel, 408 U. S., at 
621. I therefore conclude that legislative immunity does not 
shield a Member or his aide from being called to account for 
material,; that. were at l~ast arguably r~l~vant to it:; investigation, but did 
not call for th~ production of Mr~. ~lcSur~ly',; l~tter or any other 
demonstrably irrelevnnt privatP corr~spond~nc~ . Und~r thel;e circum-
stances Servicemen's Fund prrvrnts fnrthPr inquiry into plaintiff'~; charge 
'tha.t the Subcommitter's purpose was to hara:;s and intimidatr them in the 
exercise of their First Amendment. rights. Th~ Subcommittee's issuance of 
subp~nas is privil~ged activity, notwithstanding plaintiff':; bare allegation 
that the real purpose b~hind th~ subp~na;; was to 'cover-up' the earlier 
tl,; / 
~~~-:tr 
~ A • t .e-~ crV 
improper conduct by Brick, and th~ further ~~~~rtion that had there b~en ""l~~~i!i 
full disclosure the Subcommittee would not have i~,;ued th~ subpoenas, and .. 
the Senate would not. have approved th<> contempt cita.tion." 180 U. S. 
App. D. C., at 122, 553 F. 2d, at 1298 (footnotes omitted). 
No question is raised here conceming the correctness of ihe Court of 
~ppeals' judgment. on this is:;ue. 
(~ 
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Fourth Amendment or other violations committed m the 
course of their investigative work in the field. Dombrowski, 
supra; cf., Gravel, supra. 
B 
Petitioners further contend that on the record in this case, 
respondents' complaint should be dismissed because they have 
not made the requisite showing of liability. It is clear that 
when a defendant entitled to invoke Speech or Debate immu-
nity moves for summary judgment on that basis, it is incum-
bent upon the plaintiff to adduce evidence affording "more 
than merely colorable substance" to allegations of actionable 
conduct. Dombrowski·, 387 U. S., at 84. Otherwise, the 
cloak of immunity is not lifted, and summary judgment must 
be granted for defendant. This follows from the established 
doctrine that Speech or Debate immunity protects Members 
of Congress and their aides "not only from the consequences 
of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending 
themselves." !d., at 85. Since petitioners moved for sum-
mary judgment on the basis of the Speech or Debate Clause, 
the courts below were required to determine whether the Dom-
browski threshold-evidence affording "more than merely 
colorable substance" to the allegations of unimmunized con-
duct-had been passed with respect to each defendant?0 
10 Respondents were put on notice quite explicitly that by making the 
summary judgment. motion petitioners were calling upon them to adduce 
some evidence tending to connect each defendant. to the alleged wrong-
doing. The petitioners made that. point repeatedly at the hearing on the 
summary jndgmf'Ilt motion. For example, counsel for petitioners declared 
at ono point as follows : 
" ... [P]art and pa.rtia.l rsic] of t.he defense of legislative immunity, is the 
immunity of having to suffer the burden~; of extensive litigation. 
"This is what. the Supreme Court held in Dombrowski against East-
land, . . . . And the only reason that Dombrowski against Eastland was 
permitted to go into some discovery-and I under:stand that case has been 
dismis;;ed for want of prosecution-the only reason was, there was on the 
f I 
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Respondents have satisfied the Dombrowski standard as to 
allegations of Brick's misconduct. It is stipulated that Brick 
inspected the documents subject to the safekeeping order in a 
locked vault in Pikeville and that he transported copies of 
selected ones to Washington. The court below divided evenly 
as to whether, in light of the three-judge court's safekeeping 
order, the stipulated facts state a claim under the Fourth 
Amendment. On the present state of the record, however, 
record a discrepancy of factual evidence. The documents seemed to show 
some discrepancy about a date on some subpoena which lent some support 
in argument, and the Supreme Olurt said , in view of this factual dispute, 
we need to resolve it a little further before we can consider whether or not 
legislative immunity is sufficient to protect [the Member's aide] ." Tr. of 
Hearing Oct. 28, 1971, &t· 15-16. 
More succinctly, counsel for petitioners stated: 
' 1 ••• I think the burden should be placed on the plaintiffs to come forward 
with any evidence they may have to suggest and demonstrate that these 
defendants were not acting within the scope of their legislative duties. 
That would present an issue in which we were forewarned . That is the 
function of the motion for summary judgment." /d., at 18. 
Counsel for respondents indicated that he under&tood the burden peti-
tioners sought to cast upon him, although he disputed their right to do so: 
"Now comes Mr. Goldbloom [counsel for petitioners] and says, prove to 
me by facts disputing Senator McClelland's [sic] affidavit that it is not 
true, before you can take depositions. How can I do that? And this is 
what the trouble is with this whole posture. I am going to file an affidavit 
which says he is wrong. I have to say it on information and belief. And 
then he is going to come into court and say, it is just on information and 
belief." /d., at. 43-44. See also Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Sum-
mary Judgment, Oct. 26, 1971, at 3-4; Supplemental Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or 
in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, Nov. 23, 1971, at 4--5; Reply 
of Defendants McClellan, Adlerman, O'Donnell, and Brick to Plaintiffs' 
Letter to the Court, Dated Sept. 12, 1972, Oct. 13, 1972, at 10. 
Thus, there can be no question that respondents were on notice as to the 
importance of adducing such evidence as they had with respect to eac.Q 
defendant. 
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there is no basis for concluding that respondents failed to 
state a claim, if only for invasion of privacy.20 Some of the 
facts at issue in the dispute as to the validity of the Fourth 
Amendment cla.im were obtained only after oral argument en 
bane. 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 126 n. 84, 553 F. 2d, at 1302 
n. 84. There has been no opportunity to weigh the various 
characteriza.tions of Brick's activity or the meaning of the 
three-judge court's safekeeping order. Moreover, the record 
also contains testimony by Brick that he carried to Washing~ 
ton a copy of at least one document that he believed to be 
of no relevance to the Subcommittee's investigation of the 
riots. 21 Congress possesses no general power to investigate 
2o At oral argument., counsel for petitioners acknowledged the possibility 
that the complaint may state a. cause of action under state tort law: 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: . . . There is the po._<:Sibility that under Dis-
trict of Columbia or Kentucky law there is a common-la.w tort lurking in 
the background of this case. That's the reason why we elected not to 
make strongly here any argumc,nts about the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, precisely because there may be allegations of other bases of 
liability based on common la.w." Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. 
21 Brick testified as follows: 
"Q. Did you tell Mr. Dotson or any of the folk with whom you met 
there that there was some of that stuff that you didn't. think tha.t you 
needed? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Did you give it back to them? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Did you need that letter signed Dea.rest Cucumber or address 
Dearest Cucumber? 
"MR. BRESS: Objection. Irrelevant. 
"THE COURT: He may a.nswcr the question. 
"THE WITNESS: No. Didn't you say signed Dearest Cucumber and 
when in fact it says addressed to De::trest Cucumber. 
"MR. STAVIS: No, I didn't. 
"THE WITNESS: Was the question, did I need that letter? · 
"BY MR. STA VIS: 
· "Q. Yes. For the performance of your duties. 
"A. No sir. 
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private affairs, even by subpoena; the subject of the inquiry 
must always be one on which legislation could be had. Serv-
icemen's Fund, 421 U. S., at 504 n. 15. Therefore, Brick's 
copying and transportation of concededly irrelevant material 
· is sufficient to lift legislative immunity for purposes of a sum-
mary judgment motion. Brick's testimony on that subject 
ultimately may be explained away, or the inclusion of a single 
irrelevant letter may be deemed de minimis. But his tes-
timony, together with the other factors mentioned above, 
is sufficient to carry respondents across the Dombrowski 
threshold. 
The posture of the other three federal defendants, however, 
is decidedly different. The opinion of J~u.thaJ. noted 
that although "plaintiffs have alleged Brick's involvement in 
possible actionable conduct with sufficient factual particularity 
to permit trial to proceed as to him, the record is silent on -- _, _.) 
"Q. As a ma,tter of fact, in respect to the performance of your duties, 
you didn't need most of the items in tha,t list, did you'? 
"A. Some of them. There were many others in the locked vault in 
the Court House that I would have obtained under the subpoena. 
''Q. That wha.t? 
"A. That I would have obtained under the subpoena had not the Sub-
committee stopped all action when the defendants went into Court. 
"Q. Did you-when I was asking my questions about this list of 234 
items, there were lots of these items that you didn't need at all, correct? 
"MR.. BRESS: Objection. Irrelevant. 
"THE COURT: I believe he has already answered the question. 
"BY MR. BRESS: 
''Q. Wlmt was your answer? 
11 A. Some, yes. 
1'Q. Some that you did? 
"A. It was-
"Q. Lots? 
"A. I object to the use of the word lots. 
"Q. A great many, a great many? 
"A. Oh, I will say many. Let me explain. I didn't select any of these 
ttii I told you." App. 101~102. 
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the involvement of defendants McClellan, Adlerman and 
O'DOili1el 1in a1ry activity that could result in lia~ility.' " 
180 U. S. App."D. C., a.t 123, 553 F. 2d, at 1299, quoting Dom-
browski, supra, at 84. I agree. In response to defendants' 
summary judgment motion and Senator McClellan's affidavit 
denying any conspiracy or activities outside the scope of legis-
lative- activity, respondents could aver only on information 
ana 5elief that the defendants joined in the conspiracy to drive 
respondents out of Pikeville and exceeded the bounds of legis-
lative activity.22 Dombrowski teaches that mere allegations 
are not enough.28 There must be facts of record tending to 
connect the defendant to the alleged misconduct. Having 
found, properly, that the record was silent as to the involve-
22 Senator McClellan's affida.vit denied "any conspiracy, collaboration or 
any other pnrticipation of any sort in the allegedly illegal police raid 
allegedly planned and conducted by dE'fendan,t. Ratliff." App. 49. He also 
denied that he or his aides had exceedoo t.he legisla.tive authority of the 
Subcommittee. ld., at 50. While his affidavit contains no specific denja] 
of a Fourth Amendment. violation by Brick with respect to the inspection 
of documents in fikE'ville, the gE'nE'ral deninl of exceooing legislative autl)pr-
ity must be read as embra.ci~ JS"'5ihy fair to read the affidavit 
that way,~ sihce' the specific theory of a separate. Fourt.h Amendment viola-
tion by Brick-t.hough supportable on the allegations of the amended' 
complaint-a.pparently did not emerge clearly until the case reached the 
Court of Appeals. 
To this denial, respondE'nts could reply only "on information and belief 
[that] the defendant· McClellan, together with defendants Adlerman, 
O'DonneU, and Brick, joined in the conspiracy of the defendant Ratliff' 
to force us out of Pikeville . . .. " App. 55-56. See also n. 19, supra. 
Tnef also 'Contested McClellan's genE'ral denial of exceeding legislative· 
authority, App. 56, but again no facts were adduced. 
28 Nor may the involvemenJQft.he Member or some of his aides be· 
inferred solely from the involvement of other aides. In Dombrowski, smn-· 
mary judgment. for Sena.tm Eastland was upheld despit~ an allegation of 
conspiracy and the existence of facts linking his Subcommittee's chief 
counsel to possible Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, the mere fact 
. that Brick may have engaged in conduct outside the l:!cope of legislative·: 
~ i~~~-n.it:y does not suffice to link the other: defendants to that conduct, 
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ment of McClellan, Adlerman, and O'Donnell in any activity 
that could result in liability, it was the duty of the court 
below to reverse the denial of their motion for summary 
judgment. 
I recognize that this standard imposes a not insubstantial 
burden upon plaintiffs who seek to lift the veil of legislative 
immunity. This is justified, however, by the purposes served 
by the Speech or Debate Clause. As noted above, it is in-
tended to protect Members of Congress and their aides from 
"the burden of defending themselves a.gainst unsubstantiated 
claims." Dombrowski, supra, at 85. Even where an injunc-. 
tion is not sought, Members are forced "to divert their time, 
energy, and attention from their legislative tasks to defend 
the litigation." ld., at 503. Thus, the Clause requires that 
motions founded on legislative immunity @ "be given the 
most expeditious trea.tment by district courts because one 
branch of Government is being asked to halt the functiohs 
of a coordinate branch." Servicemen's Fund, s~pra, at 511 
n. 17. 
III 
I turn now to respondents' claim that petitioners made 
available some of the seized materials to the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS). The Speech or Debate Clause does not 
immunize the dissemination of allegedly actionable material 
"beyond the reasonable bounds of the legisla.tive task." Doe 
v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 315 (1973). Again, however, a 
motion for summary judgment grounded on Speech or Debate 
immunity requires a pla.intiff to adduce evidence lending 
"more than merely colorable substance" to an assertion of 
unlawful dissemination. Dombrowski, supra, at 84. 
Respondents argue that they have carried this burden with 
respect to their claim that petitioners exhibited to the IRS 
the documents Brick obtained in Pikeville. In 1974, they 
lodged with the Court of Appeals recently obtained material. 
'76-1621-lVIEMO 
18 McADAMS v. McSURELY 
establishing that the Subcommittee had permitted agents of 
the IRS to inspect portions of the Subcommittee files. Spe-
cifically, respondents pointed to a letter of March 5, 1969/4 
in which Renator McClellau informed the Secretary of the 
Treasury that the Subcommittee had taken certain steps in 
September 1968, toward arranging meetings with Intenfal 
24 This letter reads as follows: 
"UNITED S'l'A'l'ES SENA'l'E 
Committee on 
Government Operat.ions 
Senate Permanent. Subcommittee 
on Investiga.tions 
Washington, D. C. 20510 
March 5, 1969 
"Dear Mr. Secreta.ry: 
"In accordance with Execut.ive Order 11337, dated March 27, 1967, a 
resolution was duly adopted by the Committee on Government Opera-
tions on September 18, 1968, with regard to the organizations listed on th~ 
attached pages. It. should oe nokd th~tt this request. was made on Decem-
ber 16, 1968, prior to the expiration of Executive Order 11337. This iS' 
to reaffirm the same request. pursuant to Executive Order 11454 dated 
February 7, 1969, and Treasury Decisionu133. 
"Pursuant to this resolution, I hereby designate the following individ-
uals, members of the Subcommittee i't<t.ff, to make such examinations: Mr·. 
Philip R. Manuel, Mr. John E . Drass, Mr. Fred P. Miller, Mr. Perman 
H. Clay, Mr. James H. Dillon, ::md Mr. Walter S. Fialkewicz. Il1 this· 
connection, it will be appreciated if tho files could be assembled in the' 
district office of jurisdiction. In order to facilitate the work of the staff;. 
it would be further appreciated if the staff designeR.~ be permitt.cd to con•· 
suit with Internal Revenue Agents and Auditors familiar with the contentt 
· of the respective files. 
"Your cooperation in this matter will be greatly appreciated. 
"Honorable David M. Ke1medy 
Secretary of the Treasury 
Washington, D. C.'.' 
A~p., at 70 .. 
"Sincerely yours, 
John J . McClellan 
Chairman 
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Revenue agents for the purpose of exchanging information 
about organizations under investigation. Respondents also 
emphasized an IRS memorandum 25 showing August 28, 1968, 
as the date on which the possibility of a cooperative relation-
ship between Subcommittee and Service was first explored. 
Respondents argue that these materials tend to establish that 
the defendants exhibited to the Internal Revenue agents the 
Pikeville documents, which were not returned to respondents 
U.ntil November 8, 1968.26 
2 ~ The memorandum reads in pertinent. part as follows: 
"FACT SHEET 
EsTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL SERVICE STAFF 
"Allegations have been made that the Internal Revenue Service estab-
lished the Special Service Staff from instructions received from White 
House officials. This simply is not tnte. The facts are these: 
"August £8, 1968. Mr. Philip Manuel, an investigator with the Perma-
nent Committee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Government 
Operations, contacted the Service to say that he had a group of seven 
investigators working for him on mattrrs pertaining to certain organiza-
tions and other groups; that he had prepared a letter for the Chairman 
of the Committee, Honorable John J. McClellan; and that he expected 
the request to be signed shortly. His call was to alert us to the fact that 
he wanted the Committee investigators to be permitted to discuss these 
matters with our District officials rather than to conduct inspection of 
returns in the National Office." App., at 73. 
26 Although the documents were not returned to the McSurelys until 
November, Brick testified that he returned the Subcommittee copies to 
Kentucky authorities on August 14, 1968-two weeks before the initial 
exploration of possible coopera.tion between the Subcommittee and the 
Service. He also declared that the Subcommittee had made no additional 
copies: 
"Q. And did they-did there come a time when you returned those 
documents? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. During the time that you had possession of the documents, were 
they publicly-publicized, distributed or seen by anybody outside of the 
'Committee? 
"A. No, sir, and not by anybody inside of the Committee, either:. 
'-'Q.. Wh~~ wete· the docwnents maintained.? 
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The Court of Appeals, however, apparently did not view 
respondents' amended complaint as presenting this belated 
claim of dissemination outside the Subcommittee: 
"The claim of dissemination of some or all of the 234 
documents to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was 
not made in the amended complaint. This claim arose 
because of the disclosure of certain IRS documents, 
obtained as a result of a Freedom of Information Act suit, 
which indicated contacts, beginning on August 28, 1968, 
between members of the Subcommittee staff and the IRS 
concerning formal access to each other's files." 180 U. S. 
App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d, at 1285 n. 25 (em-
phasis added). 
The court noted further, ibid., that the complaint "also" made 
two other allegations that could have been related to the 
"A. In my personal file undE>r lock and key and the key was always 
in my pocket and that was by ordE>r of Senator McClellaJJ,. 
"Q. Did Senator McClellan look at those records? 
"A. No, sir. He looked at one. 
"Q. Did therE> come a time when you-aJter the expiration of certain 
litigation betwec'n the McSurelys and the officials in Kentucky, did you 
then return that batch of documrnts to the authorities in Kentucky? 
"A. I did. I ~E>turned thrm to Thadeus Scott on August. 14, 1978. 
"Q. And is the receipt that has been markrd listing the 230-some docu-
ments, is that the recE>ipt that you got whrn you returned them? 
"A. That is the receipt I prepared and he signffi, yffi. 
"Q. Did you retain any of the documents thPrr.aftN or did you make 
any copy of any documrnts and retain them in your file? 
"A. I never made a single copy of those documents. I retained none. 
I have not now and the SubcommitteE> has none. All thE> documents were 
returned to Mr. Thadeus Scott. I have never used a Xerox machine on 
those documents, although it has been said here a number of times that 
I did. I did not." App. 97-98. 
This testimony wa:; incorporatffi in Senator McClellan's affidavit accom-
panying the summary judgmE>nt motion. /d .. a.t 50. Respondents dis-
pute it, although they have adduced no facts tending to disprove it. See-
n. 27, infra. 
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dissemination claim. First, there was a charge that Brick had 
exhibited the McSurely documents "to persons whose names 
are unknown to plaintiffs." App. 31-32. Second, the com-
plaint alleged that McClellan has "used the instrumentality 
of the [Subcommittee] investigation to carry out a personal 
vendetta between himself and a certain personage of promi-
nence named in some of the private correspondence of the 
plaintiff Margaret McSurely." App. 35. The court pointed 
out, however, that there was "no specific allegation that Brick 
embarrassed plaintiffs or that McClellan pursued his purported 
'vendetta' by dissemination outside the Subcommittee itself. 
The claim of dissemination outside the Halls of Congress 
apparently rests on access by the IRS officials." 180 U. S. 
App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d, at 1285 n. 25.27 In sum, 
27 The Court of Appeals' discussion of the parties' dispute and the two 
allegations in the amended complaint is as follows: 
"On November 25, 1974, plaintiffs filed a supplemental affidavit lodging 
these recently disclosed materials with t.he court. The federal defendants 
countered on January 24, 1975, arguing that even if the IRS had gained 
access to the Subcommittee files at ~orne point after August 28, 1968, the 
McSurelys could not have been harmed· thereby because the 234 copies 
were returned to Commonwealth betective Scott. on August. 14, 1968 (and 
received by the McSutelys on November 8, 1968), and Brick had testified 
at the McSurelys' contempt trial tha.t he made no copies and that neither 
he nor the Subcommittee retained nny of the documents, D. A., II, 730. 
Plaintiffs, in their reply to defendants' response, filed January 31, 1975, dis-
pute both that the documents were turned over to Scott on August. 14, 
1968, and that no copies were made. Since we affirm the District Court's 
denial of summary judgment on this claim, we leave the resolution of this 
que<:.tion to the District Court on remand. 
"Plaintiffs' amended complaint also alleges that Brick exhibited copies 
of the 234 items to unknown pel'8ons causing plaintiffs damage and embar-
rassment, and that McClellan 'used the instrumentality of the [Subcom-
mittee] investigation to carry out a personal vendetta between himself and 
a certain personage of prominence named in some of the private corre-
spondence of the plaintiff Margaret McSurely.' Amended and Suppf. 
Com pl. ,.f~ 19, 28 (b) (ii), App. 45, 50. However, there is no specific alle-
@iation that Brick emba,rrassed plajn,tiffs or that McClellan pursued his pur-
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the court's conclusion that the dissemination claim "was no~ 
made in the amended complaint," its distinction between that 
claim and the other two claims actually made in the com-
plaint, and its ultimate conclusion that the claim of dissemina-
tion rested solely on the newly developed theory indicate that 
the Court of Appeals did not believe that the amended com-
plaint encompassed this claim.~8 
In light of this apparent conclusion, it is difficult to under-
stand the court's declaration in the same footnote that it was 
affirming "the District Court's denial of summary judgment 
on this claim," as well as the sta,tement to that effect in the 
per curiam opinion announcing th~ judgment. If the com-
plaint did not encompass the new dissemination claim, there 
had been no occasion for the District Court to pass on its 
sufficiency, nor for the Court of Appeals to affirm any judg-
ment thereon. Respondents' belated injeetion, of the dissemi-
nation theory into the case. standing alone, would not amount 
to an amendment of the complaint, and no motion to amend 
was made. Because there had' been no trial', there had been 
no admission of evidence to which the pleadings could be held 
to conform under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15 (b). Thus, it is 
unclear whether any issue regarding dissemination of the 
McSurely materials outside Congress was properly before the 
Court of Appeals. 
For this reason, we must vacate the judgment of affirmance 
as to that claim. We need express no opinion as to the merits 
of the dissemination theory.29 On remand, the Court of 
ported 'vendetta~· by d1ssemination outside of the Subcommittee itself. The 
claim of dissemination outside of the Halls of Congress apparently rests on 
a~cess b;¥ IRS officials."' 180 U. S. App. D . C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d, 
at 1285 n. 25. 
28 The panel opinion was no cl<>ar<>r on this issue. See 172 U. S. App. 
D. C., at 373-374, and n. 29, 521 F . Zd , at 1033-1034, and n. 29. 
29 Nor is there any r<>ason for u:s to address the question whether legisla-
tive immunity or some other form of immunity would protect Members 
of Congress and their aides from inquiries concerning the sharing of infor-
~ation with executive agencies. 
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Appeals may determine whether the dissemination claim is 
embraced by respondents' amended complaint, or it may take 
such other steps with respect to this claim as it deems proper. 
IV 
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar 
as it reversed the refusal of the District Court to dismiss the 
portions of the complaint relating to the original seizure of the 
McSurelys' materials. I also would affirm the portion of the 
judgment directing the entry of summary judgment for peti-
tioners as to claims concerning use of the materials within 
Congress. With respect to the claim concerning Brick's inspec .. 
tion of the documents and transportation of copies, I would 
affirm as to Brick, but reverse as to McClellan, Adlerman, and 
O'Donnell, and remand with directions to enter $Ummary 
judgment for them on that claim. Finally, I would vacate the 
Courl of Appeals judgment insofar as it purports to affirm the 
denial of summary judgment on the dissemination issue and 
remttnd for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
'<>' ,, 
It' 
MEMORANDUM. TO THE CONFERENCE: 
·•• .x''l1-
~~_~.·': ~~ '•i ;: t~.. ?:~~:·. 
''",,·~~hi~ is the Speech or Debate ''cJ ause case that.,,[v, 
d 1 scussed,~~.at,\J ength ill ... our March 3 Conference. . . ·~,;;1!!,~.11" , , 
4 ' ,;· !{J ~·,(· ~ f:)t; ;;., . ' '" ! .~ 't.· 
As you "wil, '~ remember, there ' was no "Court" for any 
final reso1ut5.on of' the case. Indeed, the last entry in my 
notes reads as foJlows: "We discussed this case for nearly 
two hours without any two of us agreeing as to a basis for "''. 
its disposition". Against that background, ,,_I was not 
enchanted when the Chief asked me to write · Per Curiam. 
But someone had to write something. 
It .. f ~ •• 
~if~ 
··"·~ '~In the absence of anything approaching a 
consensus, I concluded that it was best for me to write a 
memorandum that reflected DIY own considered judgment afte 
a more careful examination of the opinions below, the ' 
record, and briefs. For the reasons stated in footnote 
I think there is no serious question of appealability. 
Part II-A, I address, ~ and dispatch with brevity, the 
Solicitor General's ~ rather remarkable argument - indeed 
principal one·,~:.. that ' even murder is protected under the 
Speech or Debate clause. We all were in accord on this 
issue. ~{ll., ·~ ,1 · 
:(;: :t~iit'·:.:'\ 1< ·~ .... ~· - >!f.if 
,,J; 
In I consider the Solicitor General'~ 
fall-back position - it really should have been his primary 
position - that summary judgment should have been granted 
~ for failure to make "more than a merely colorable" claim of 
liability. Further study fully confirms {at least for me) 
the view I expressed at Conference to the effect that the 
case should have been dismissed as to McClellan, Alderman 
and O'Donnell. I think Dombrowski compels this ln view of 
the fact tha·t the only substantive allegations against 
these three defendants iwere made solely on "information 
belief" · 
I_, r·· 
As to Brick, I reached a different conclusion. 
Although I think the question is quite close, there appears 
to be sufficient evidence in the record to justify an 
affirmance of CADC with respect to him. Putting it 
differently, there is enough to carry respondents across 




'{!. ... _ -- ,.:~~' 
,t,~4~ There · \t7as some sentiment at" the Confe ~ence to DIG 
this case. ~ This controversy commenced in J 967 f~. thi .s i. s the .··1'l.·· 
third '·case . ';lr.ising out of t~e. seizure C?f McSurely ... 's ·";1 .,. "It:!':J 'if",·};, 
documents.; 1.t has ~ been in l1t1gation s1nce 1969, and)~·· ~¥1 
already several '''of · the parties have died {leaving questions 
of survival, •as well as proble~s in the ' settlement of . 
estates). It therefore~ is desirable to settle as much of 
the law of the case at this time as we can, rather than 
allow CADC's judgment to stand with the consequent remand 
for continued litigation as to all parties. ~ 
~ r•· '• · '\!i~',. 
,, ~if· I ·'vlll · 
'\' in any event, the memorandum '·'(,reflects my views. · 
If they ~re not received hospitably · the ~case should be 




MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
DATE: April 3, 1978 
RE: Justice White's Ruminations in McSurely 
This afternoon you mentioned to me that Justice 
White had said that Brick should not be entitled to Speech 
or Debate immunity, but that he might be entitled to 
official immunity under a. Barr v. Matteo analysis. This 
did not jibe with my recollection of Justice White's 
opinion in Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), so I 
checked back. 
Attached is the penultimate page of the White 
opinion in McMillan. As you can see, it equates the scope 
of official immunity with that of Speech or Debate 
immunity, holding that the official immunity -- like 
Speech or Debate immunity -- applies only when the 
congressional employees are engaged in protected 
legislative acts. Hence, I see no basis for a different 
theoretical approach to McSurely springing from the White 
opinion in McMillan. From all that appears in that 
2. 
opinion, the two inquiries are functional equivalents. 
It would be possible to declare that informal 
investigative activity is simply not a legislative act, so 
that Speech or Debate immunity does not apply. That idea 
does not find support in anything said in Doe v. McMillan. 
Opinion of the Court 412 U.S. 
shadow of BJard of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 
U. S. 564 (1972), and Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 
U. S. 433 (1971), where the Court advised caution 
" [ w ]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or 
integrity is at stake because of what the government is 
doing to him .... " !d., at 437. We conclude that, for 
the purposes of the judicially fashioned doctrine of im; 
munit}:. the Public Printer and the Superintendent of 
Documents are no more free from suit in the case before U§_ 
than would be a legislative aide who made copies of the 
materials at issue and distributed them to the public at 
the direction of his superiors. See Dombrowski v. East- . I If 
land, 387 U.S. 82 (1967), The scope of inquiry becomes 
()quivalent to the inquiry in the context of the Speech. 
. or Debate Clause, and the answer is the same: The 
business of Congress is to legislate; Congressmen and 
aides are absolutely immune when they are legislating. 
But when they act outside the "sphere of legitimate 
legislative activity," Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at 
376, they enjoy no special immunity from local laws pro-
tecting the good name or the reputation of the ordinary 
citizen. 
Because we think the Court of Appeals applied the 
immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause and of the 
doctrine of official immunity too broadly, we must reverse 
its judgment and remand the case for appropriate fur-
ther proceedings.1 5 \Ye are unaware, from this record, 
of the extent of the publication and distribution of the 
report which has taken place to-date. Thus, we have 
little basis for judging whether the legitimate legislative 
needs of Congress, and hence the limits of immunity, 
1 5 With respect t o t he Distri ct of Columbia respondents, t he Court 
of Appeals found that they were acting within the sr.ope of their 
authority under applicable law and, as a result, were immune from 
suit. We do not disturb the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 
this respect. 
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'Jl'M£rittgton. '!B. <!J. 2ll,?J!$ 
Re: 76-1621 - McAdams v. McSurely 
Dear Lewis, 
April 4, 1978 
This is an initial effort to respond to your Memorandum 
in this case and in so doing to arrive at my own conclusions. 
At the outset, it is important to recall that the questions 
presented in the petition for certiorari filed by the United 
States did not include an attack on the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals that because the record sufficiently supported a 
claim of a Fourth Amendment violation by Brick, his motion for 
summary judgment was properly overruled insofar as it rested 
on a denial of any constitutional violation. Assuming the 
constitutional infraction by Brick, however, the United 
States nevertheless insists that he and all of those alleged 
to be in concert with him are absolutely immune from liability 
under the Speech or Debate Clause for any damages caused by 
the constitutional wrong. 
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The Court of Appeals agreed with the Government that 
investigative activity in the field, as well as the more for-
mal processes of hearings and subpoenas, may properly be 
deemed legislative and within the protection of the Speech or 
Debate Clause. But the court went on to hold that the employ-
ment of unlawful means to implement otherwise proper legisla-
tive objects is not essential to legislating and that if Brick 
violated the Fourth Amendment, neither he nor anyone who con-
spired with him in such illegal conduct was immune. 
I am not completely sure how much practical difference 
it makes, but I prefer the view that the Speech or Debate - .,......,_ 
Clause does not cover field investigations at all. Although 
I see no reason why Brick would not enjoy the protection of 
official immunity while engaged in his investigative duties--
and that defense still remains open to him in this case::: l' 
resist extending the Speech or Debate Clause beyond the formal \ 
investigative mechanisms. Perhaps it is tenable to construe 
the Clause as reaching investigative activities in the field 
but to stop short of protecting illegal conduct; however, 
this is not the line this Court has drawn in other cases, and 
it does not appear to be the line the Court of Appeals adhered 
to in this case when it reversed the judgment of the District 
Court and entered summary judgment with respect to the internal 
use made by the Committee of the documents delivered by Brick. 
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It may be difficult to imagine many kinds of unlawful 
conduct that might be deemed a protected part of the legis-
lative process, but it is clear that a Senator guilty of such 
otherwise illegal activity would be immune. Under Eastland v. 
United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), the 
Clause protects formal means of investigation such as hearings 
and the use of subpoenas to require the attendance of witnesses 
and the production of evidence. Senators and their staffs are 
immune from liability for damage that may be inflicted by 
such procedures. If a witness refuses to appear or answer or 
to produce the specified documents and then successfully de-
fends a contempt proceeding on the grounds that the subpoena 
or the questions propounded exceeded the power of Congress 
under the controlling statute or resolution, or under the 
Constitution, his subsequent damage suit should be immediately 
dismissed once it is determined that the complaint charged 
I --- ,, 
seeks to impose liability for a legislative act. It is also -pertinent to recall that Senator Gravel was not subject to 
prosecution for having put into the public record a classified 
document, the publication of which the law forbade. 
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I do not think that informal investigations have such 
inherent connections with the legislative process and would 
prefer not extending legislative immunity to congressional 
investigators. I see no reason for their having any more 
immunity, or any less, than that enjoyed by other federal 
investigators. If a Senator or his aide is sued for breaking 
into a house and seizing evidence for use in an otherwise 
proper investigation authorized by the appropriate committee, 
he is entitled to an early ruling on his Speech or Debate 
Clause claim, if such a claim is presented, as it was here. 
But if it is then decided that he is not immune---as on such 
facts I think it should be, because the Clause does not pro-
tect investigative conduct--the policy of the Clause has been 
fully vindicated and has no further role to play in the case. 
Under the view of the Court of Appeals, however, the 
determination of the Speech or Debate Clause immunity issue 
depends on whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation. 
The issues at least overlap, if they are not wholly congruent. 
(The same would be true in this case of the defense of official 
immunity if the conference vote in Butz v. Economou stands up.) 
I take it that neither you nor the court of appeals would grant 
judgment on the motion of any defendant as to whom the record 
Re: 76-1621 
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demonstrates a genuine issue of fact with respect to the 
constitutional violation. But you would insist, and so would 
I, that if the defendant's summary judgment affidavits con-
tain adequate denials of the alleged conduct (and I don't 
think it inconsistent with immunity policies to require the 
defendant to at least deny the conduct that would remove his 
immunity and subject him to liability), the plaintiffs must 
respond with first-hand proof in affidavit form that lends 
more than colorable substance to the claim of constitutional 
wrong. This amounts to nothing more than a careful application 
_......__....,_~ 
of F. R. Civ. P. 56. The Court of Appeals thought this stan-
dard had been satisfied with respect to Brick; but because 
the proceedings had concentrated on "whether or not the Speech 
or Debate Clause erects a complete barrier to this action," 
the court was unable to rule that the other federal defendants 
were entitled to summary judgment. The court left it to them 
to "make a renewed motion for summary judgment on the ground 
that the McSurelys have failed to adduce substantial facts 
'which afford more than colorable substance'---to the assertion 
of concert with Brick in conduct that survives the legislative 




April 4, 1978 
The argument becomes ery fact-b~~is point; but 
to get the matter on the table, I would for two reasons be --content with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that at this 
juncture none of the federal defendants were entitled to 
summary judgment. Because you would affirm as to Brick, my 
remarks will be directed to the other three federal defendants. 
First, it is doubtful that plaintiffs were ever on notice -
hat they had to present evidence that the Senator, Alderman, 
and O'Donnell were accessories to Brick's actions or risk dis-
missal of the action. This is because the Government's argu-
ment and affidavits were to the effect that the undisputed 
facts demonstrated that all of the defendants were acting 
within the scope of their legislative functions which, in the 
Government's view, encompassed even the inspection and trans-
portation of documents in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
There is nothing in the documents filed by the Government in 
support of its motion which should have put plaintiffs on no-
tice that they had to meet the additional point that even 
assuming that Brick was not engaged in legislative acts, the 
Senator and the other defendants nevertheless were not in any 
1 • way responsible for their commission. This was the primary 
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The argument becomes ery point; but 
to get the matter on the table, I would for two reasons be -- -content with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that at this 
juncture none of the federal defendants were entitled to 
summary judgment. Because you would affirm as to Brick, my 
remarks will be directed to the other three federal defendants. 
First, it is doubtful that plaintiffs were ever on notice -
hat they had to present evidence that the Senator, Alderman, 
pnd O'Donnell were accessories to Brick's actions or risk dis-
missal of the action. This is because the Government's argu-
ment and affidavits were to the effect that the undisputed 
facts demonstrated that all of the defendants were acting 
within the scope of their legislative functions which, in the 
Government's view, encompassed even the inspection and trans-
portation of documents in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
There is nothing in the documents filed by the Government in 
support of its motion which should have put plaintiffs on no-
tice that they had to meet the additional point that even 
assuming that Brick was not engaged in legislative acts, the 
Senator and the other defendants nevertheless were not in any 
way responsible for their commission. This was the primary 
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' econdly even assuming that the Government's motion 
did put in issue the factual basis for plaintiffs' allega-
tions concerning the roles of the Senator, O'Donnell and 
Alderman, these defendants still were not entitled to summary 
judgment because they failed to present facts which would con-
stitute a defense to the charges. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress 
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-160 (1970). No affidavits of any kind ,, 
were submitted in support of the motion by O'Donnell, Alder-
man or Brick. The only affidavit was that of Senator McClellan, 
and it basically did no more than state that the acts complained 
of were done as part of a properly authorized investigation. 
1 Significantly, the Senator did not dispute plaintiffs' alle-
gations that he was responsible for and involved in Brick's 
allegedly illegal inspection and transportation of the rele-
vant documents as well as the subsequent dissemination of 
copies of the documents. All that he denied was "any con- Jlv-,_ 
~~ 
spiracy, collaboration or any other participation of any sort ~ 
in the allegedly illegal police raid allegedly planned and 
conducted by defendant Ratliff." App. at 49, ~[ 11. As a 
)
result of the Court of Appeals' decision, however, no question 
1(~ concerning the federal defendants' complicity in the initial 
police seizure of the documents remains in the case, but 
only issues relating to their complicity in the subsequent 
Re: 76-1621 
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inspection, transportation, and dissemination of the documents. 
As to these matters, Senator McClellan was completely silent. 
Nor does Senator McClellan's affidavit say anything concerning 
the involvement of Alderman or O'Donnell. 
As I understand your Memorandum, you would construe the 
Senator's denial of any activities outside the scope of legis-
lative authority as encompassing a denial of plaintiffs' 
allegations of Fourth Amendment violations or other illegal 
conduct. But it has been the contention of the federal de-
fendants throughout this action that all the misdeeds charged 
in the amended complaint were within the scope of their in-
vestigative functions and accordingly, under this erroneous 
view of the law, protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. 
Thus, the Senator's assertion that he acted within the scope 
of his legislative functions is consistent with the commission 
of Fourth Amendment violations charged by plaintiffs. Against 
-~ 
this background, I would not read his broad assertion of im-
munity for illegal acts occurring in a field investigation as 
a denial that any of the alleged conduct actually occurred. 
Furthermore, since the entry of summary judgment precludes 
further factual development and clarification by means of 
examination of witnesses, I am not sure that affidavits sub-
mitted in support of such motions should be so broadly con-
strued. In ordinary summary judgment practice they are not 
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With respect to Part III of your Memorandum, I hold a 
somewhat different view of the dissemination issue. As I 
understand it, you would remand the claim of dissemination 
to the IRS to the Court of Appeals because it failed to pass 
on the question of whether this claim was within the scope of 
the amended complaint. But I doubt that Judge Leventhal con-
cluded that such a claim should not be dismissed on grounds 
of Speech or Debate Clause immunity while at the same time 
believing that the claim was wholly beyond the scope of the 
complaint. Although the matter may not be entirely free from 
doubt, I believe that the opinion below is better read to con--- ---- -- -strue the complaint as including the claim of dissemination 
to the IRS. 
Paragraph 19 of the amended complaint alleges that Brick 
"exhibited [the McSurely documents] to persons whose names 
are unknown to the plaintiffs .... " Footnote 25 of the Court 
of Appeals opinion, which I agree with you is the key to the 
matter, begins by stating that "[t]he claim of dissemination 
of some or all of the 234 documents to the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) was not made in the amended complaint." I think 
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that the complaint did not encompass dissemination to the IRS 
but only that it did not mention the IRS in haec verba. In-
deed, this very same footnote goes on to state that "[p]laintiffs' 
amended complaint also alleges that Brick exhibited copies of 
the 234 items to unknown persons .... The claim of dissemi-
nation outside the Halls of Congress apparently rests on access 
by IRS officials." The conclusion I draw from this, particularly 
the last sentence, is that the Court of Appeals did not view the 
claim of dissemination to the IRS as being outside the scope of 
the complaint, but rather as being the only specific claim 
pressed by plaintiffs which supported the broad allegation of 
dissemination set forth in ~f 19 of the amended complaint. More-
over, I see little point in straining to find that the Court of 
Appeals acted in a self-contradictory fashion, because there 
can be no serious doubt that the allegation of dissemination 
in the amended complaint is broad enough to encompass dissemi-
nation to the IRS. 
I also have difficulty with your suggestion on p. 22 and 
n. 29 that the question of whether dissemination to the Execu-
tive Branch is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause is an 
open one. The Court of Appeals unanimously, and in my view, 
Re: 76-1621 
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correctly, concluded that McMillan and Gravel foreclosed any 
contention that dissemination of materials to an agency of 
the Executive constitutes a legislative act. United States v. 
Brewster also leans strongly in this direction. "In no case 
has this Court ever treated the Clause as protecting all con-
duct relating to the legislative process--only acts generally 
done in the course of the process of enacting legislation 
[are] protected." 408 U.S. 501, 515, 514 (1972). Although 
legislators will have frequent dealings, as they properly 
should, with the Executive Branch, the fact of the matter is 
that such contacts are not legislative acts. 
I should say that my views are not set in concrete, and 
it may be that I could join a quite different approach. As 
presently advised, however, I would affirm. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
No. 76-1621 
10:;. '~. 
Thanks for your thoughtful memorandum of April 4. 
You have touched upon several of the more troubling aspects 
of this case, and I will take this opportunity to amplify 
my analysis of them. 
I 
You express the view that the Speech or Debate 
Clause does not cover field investigations at all. If w'e ' 
had a case that clearly presented that issue I woul.d be 
inclined to go along with you. In this case, however, I 
have thought it unnecessary to go beyond the "facially 
proper means" approach, which essentially was that of Judge 
Leventhal below. As you observe, there probably are few 
cases in which your approach and mlne would produce 
different results, but I am reluctant to embrace the 
broader rationale without clear need to do so or a clear 
idea of the implications of such a conclusion. I do not 
think the principle emerges clearly from Gravel or Doe v 
McMillan. · --- --
I will adc a footnote stating that because of my 
proposed disposition of this case, it is unnecessary to 
determine whether even properly conducted field 
investigation would fall outside the protectjon of the 
Speech or Debate Clause. 
As you correctly stated it, the argument 
concerning the disposition of the Fourth Amendment claims 
against McClellan, Adlerman, and O'Donnell is "very 
fact-bound." We simply seem to view the facts differently, 
but I will attempt to set out in greater. detail the reasons 
for my views. 
You off~r two reasons for accepting the Court of 







not entitled to summary judgment. The first reason is that 
"it is doubtful that plaintiffs were ever on notice that 
they had to present evidence that the Senator, Aalerman, 
and O'Donnell were accessories to Brick's actions •••• • 
(Your Memo at 6.) It seems to me that the record clearly ~'l'~'t •• 
shows the contrary. At page 13 of my Memorandum to the 
Conference, in the footnote, I quote a colloquy at the 
summary judgment hearing in which defense counsel states 
that the burden is upon plaintiffs "to come forward with 
any evidence they may have to suggest and demonstrate that ~ 
these defendants were not acting within the scope of their 
legislative duties." (Emphasis added.) 
Further, ~ I cited in the same footnote several 
documents filed by defendants in support of their motion '' 
that appear quite clearly to call upon plaintiffs for ·· 
· whatever evidence they have with respect to each 
' defendant. For example, in their Supplemental Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss or in the Al ternati. ve for Summary Judgment, Nov. 
23, 1971,
1
,,. at "?'it i,s ~sta .ted: . 
;~· .. ,, .. 
The affidavit of Senator McClellan filed in 
support of the pending motions fully establishes 
the circumstances by which the Senate Committee 
conducted its investigation and served the ' 
subpoenas out of which this litigation arises: • 
~a~n~othing in the M~§urelys• affid~~!!­
furnis!}es any fa9ts to demonstrate J:!:!at Brick '- ~~.·1~( " 
Adlerman..L or O'Donnell were acting o~tsid~the · ... , 
perimeter of their legislative functiQn!." 
(Emphasis added.) 
I cannot see how defendants could have put plaintiffs on 
notice more specifically that they had to come forward 
with whatever "more than merely colorable" evidence they 
had with respect to each defendant. ~ .• 
Your second reason for accepting the Court of 
·>;.· Appeals view on the summary judgment issue is that the 
three "Washington" defendants failed to present facts • 
· · which would constitute a defense to the charges. (Your 
Memo at 7.) I think our disagreement here highlights one 
of the most unusual aspects of this case - one that is not 
made clear by the briefs. In the Court of Appeals, and in 
.. my Memorandum to the Conference, Brick was kept in the , 
case because plaintiffs were held to have alleged a 
~nd_, ~parate violat.i.on of the Fourth Amendment Q.y_ ~.· 






noted in footnote 22 of my Memorandum, however, this 
"second violation" theory of the case apparently did not 
emerge until the matter was before the Court of Appeals. 
I say this because my examination of the District 
Court record did not disclose any suggestion that Brick's 
activity in and of itself amounted to a separate violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, plaintiffs argued that 
since the Kentucky search and seizure had been ruled 
unconstitutional at the time of the Subcommittee takeover 
of the documents, the rule of Dombrowski v. Eastland did ,,,, 
not apply and that the subpoenas-were the fruit of the 
original Kentucky seizure. This i.s the !?!!lx Fourth 
Amendment theory set forth in the amended complaint. App. 
32-33. Thus, in the District Court the theory was not 
that Brick's inspection of the documents in Pikesville was • 
r:"'.r 
a second violation of the Fourth Amendment, rendering the 
Calandra doctrine inappJicable (the view of Judge 
Leventhal and my t1emorandum); rather, the theory there was ,,,, ,., •: 
that Brick's inspection, the takeover, and the subsequent ~J 
subpoenas were the fruits of the original tllegal search 
and seizure. The first mention of a separate Fourth 
Amendment violation by Brick appears to have been in the 
Court of Appeals opinion in the contempt case, which came 
down after the filing of all the oocuments in the District 
Court. Apparently, plaintiffs developed thi.s theory 
during the contempt appeal and introduced it 'in this case 
for. the first time before the Court of Appeals}. 
,, 
In these' circumstances, it could hardly be "''~;·;, 
expected that McCJellan's affidavit would declare 
specifically that there had been no Fourth Amendment 
~. violation by Brick. Defendants had never been presented 
with that theory of the case. Since the amended complaint 
was viewed expansively (perhaps more so than it merited), 
it would seem unduly harsh to read the defense affidavlt 
narrowly as failing to negate a theory not then advanced. 
Rather, I think it must be taken as putting in issue all .• 
the allegations that subsequently were read into the E~. 
amended complaint. It denies, on behalf of all the ' 
defendants, any activity outside the scope of legislative 
authority. App. 50. In my view, that denial is 
sufficiently explicit in view of McSurleys' theory of 
case at the time. 
,, 
I do not think that the failure of the other 
defendants to file affidavits is of any impor.tance. As 
McClellan's affidavit covers them, separate affidavits 
would be repetitive. 
,, ,,, 
4-
As to the dissemination claim, I still think my 
reading of Judge Leventhal's footnote 25 is correct. It 
seems to me that the Court of Appeals was contrasting 
those claims that were in the complaint with the IRS 
allegation which wasnot. Judge Leventhal's opinion on 
this point is far below his usual .l standard of clarity. 
;f';t .. , ~;~ 
I nevertheless agree that your reading is a 
plausible one. Indeed, the original draft of my 
Memorandum came out exactly that way. I therefore wouJd 
have no objection to reading the Court of Appeals opinion 
in that manner, but my disposition still would be 
different from yours. If we read the amended complaint as 
alleging dissemination outs ide of the Subcommittee, then ·-
we are faced with Brick's testimony that the copies were ~ n 
all returned to Kentucky officials before the earliest 
date when any information exchanges between the . ~ 
Subcommittee and the IRS could have ·begun, as well as the 
denial by both Brick and McClellan that any copies were 
retained. (My Memo at 19-20 n.26) Under the analysis 
used in Part II of my Memo, these denials cast upon 
plaintiffs the burden of coming forward with something 
more than mere information and belief concerning ' 
dissemination of their mciterials outside of Congress. 
Since they failed to do that, even in the Court of Appeals 





.. -~ ~· -l>:; 
/{I, 
o\l! ' 
~'~.,.,\)~~ this were .~r'a garden variety 1a~1 su'i. t r ~ would 
have taken far Jess •interest in the questions we are now 
discussing. This Court normally is reluctant to review 
arguably close decisions below as to whether . summary f•r .. " 
judgment motions should have been sustained. ' But this _~~is} 
. no garden variety litigation between private parties. · 
• This is an example of legal warfare, conducted now for ~ 
full decade, against a Subcommittee of the United States 
Senate. As stated on page 17 of my Memo (circulated March 
24), the purposes served by the Speech or Debate Clause 
are i.ntended to protect members and their aides from "the ' 
burden of defending themselves against unsubstantiated 
claims", Dombrowski at 85, and thus the Clause requires 
that motionsfounded on legislative immunity be "given the 
most expeditious treatment by distri.ct courts because one 
branch of government is being ask to halt the functions of 




In our interestjng and helpful convers~tion 
Saturday, you questioned whether the Clause : rather 
general official immunity - applied to the alleged 
activities in Pikesville. I am adding a footnote to my 
Memorandum that for me recognizes this possi.bllity (even 
though the case has never been so viewed by the parties or 
courts below), and indicating that it makes no difference 
as to the proper outcome. The policy reasons identified 
in Dombrowski and Servicemen's Fund app1 y in most cases ': 
withequal force when a government official ls sued for ' 
conduct taken within the scope of his authority. 
·~ :1! ~ ."'}~, \ ,;;· ' .... "''J ll' 
~··· .. ,~-..,~~p•"•h,.'' ~ 
!• · r.~mus~' say ~. that your memorandum of Apr i1 4 gives 
me more than a ,.,•J.i tt.le concern as to the position you and I ~ 
have taken ge-rie r ally i.n .Butz. In my letter to you of 
February 3, ,,., cornmentj.ng on your ci.rcuJation in Butz, I ~ 
; referred to Bi l~~R.ehnqui st 's sound. observation- that "any 
legal neophyte" .ican· f ~ame a compla1nt of constitutional 
dimensions, and unless the courts put such a plaintiff td · 
a degree of specificity ,not customart1y observed on • 
summary judgment mot i ens, substanti a1 ,.inter.ference t•d th 
the functioning of government officials wi . l ~ iesult. In 
my let'ter'" .. t9 you, I paid;·.·· .~·.>··i. . .. , ·: ' . 
'/.; ~ 
"Court~ should be alert to limit public officiai ·~~ 
exposure to the inhibiting force of a protracted 
t r.ial by •requiring a convincing showing in order 
to withstand a motion for summary judgment." ., 
~ ' 1: 
·~ ' !I ' ' 
I unq(;!rstood then .. that you were generally in 
accord •1 But ~ I' am cons.iderabl y shaken by your apparent 
disposition to give the McSurelys the benefit of every 
doubt and deny - at least as I view it - a ~irnilar reading 
to the McClellan affidavit, the colloquy between counsel, 
and the other indications that at least as to the Senator 
and the two co-defendants here in Washington nothing of 
substance has been turned up in the ten-year McSurely 
crusade. · 
'I have thought that the important public pOlicies 
served by the Clause and by the doctrine of official 
immunity require - as the Court has stated in pombrowskl 
and Servicemen's - a more demanding standard wi~espect 
to summary judgment and discovery where these policies 




litigants. I would find it difficult to jojn a Butz 
opinion that would not encourage courts to accord more 
protection of these policies than your letter appears to 
reflect. 
I do appreciate your talking to me and devoting so 
much thought to my Memo of March 24. Maybe this 
ventilation of the issues will be helpful to our Brothers 
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Memorandum to the Conference from MR. JusTICE PowELl-. 
I 
In 1967, Alan and Margaret McSurely were field organizers 
for the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., in Pike 
County, Ky. Alan McSurely also had served as a field orga-
nizer for the National Conference of New Politics and 
distributed literature for Vietnam Summer. On the night of 
August 11, 1967, under authority of a warrant charging sedi~ 
tious activities against the Commonwealth of Kentucky and 
the United States in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 432.040 
(19--), Pike County officials arrested the McSurelys and 
seized a quantity of books, pamphlets, and letters found in 
their home. Shortly after the raid, Thomas Ratliff, Common-
wealth Attorney for Pike County, announced publicly that the 
seized material would be made available to any Congressional 
Committees interested in the McSurelys. 
On September 14, 1967, a three-judge District Court for the 
Eastern District of Kentucky, one judge dissenting, declared 
the Kentucky sedition statute unconstitutional on its face and 
enjoined state prosecution of the McSurelys. M cSurely v. 
Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (ED Ky. 1967). The court ordered 
·that all the seized material "be held by [Ratliff] in safekeeping 
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until final disposition of this case by appeal or otherwise." 
App. 78. 
Soon after issuance of the District Court's order, Ratliff 
received a telephone call from Lavern Duffy, Assistant Counsel 
to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
Senate Committee on Government Operations . . 'The Subcom-
mittee, which was headed by Senator McClellan, was investi-
gating the causes of various riot'3 across the Nation, including 
one that had occurred ·in Nashville, Tennessee, in April 1967. 
Some of the Subcommittee's information showed that the 
organizations with which the McSurelys were affiliated might 
have been involved in the Nashville riot. Hence, Duffy 
asked Ratliff whether the materials seized from the McSurelys 
were in his custody. Ratliff replied that they were, and on 
October 8, 1967, a Subcommittee investigator, John Brick, 
arrived in Pikeville, the county seat. 
That same evening T~adeus Scott, a Commonwealth detec-
tive, visited Brick's motel room and gave Brick photocopies 
of 234 of the seized documents. The next morning, Brick 
spent an hour examining the o1'iginals in a locked room at the 
Pike County courthouse. Apparently, Ra.tliff tried to reach 
the members of the three-judge court before, permitting Brick 
to enter the locked room. He succeeded in reaching the dis-
senting member of the court, but what transpired is not clear.1 
Brick also visited the Clerk of the District Court, who 
allowed him to inspect the case file of the McSurelys' three-
judge court action. Brick arranged to have the Clerk send 
1 At the McSurelys' subsequent tnal for contempt of Congress, see n. 5, 
infra, Ratliff testifird that "l had my permission" before he allowed Brick 
access to the stored material>:. DrfPndants' Appendix 407, United States 
v. McSurely, Nos. 24,812, 24,813 (DC 1971). The 1mplication of this 
statement was that the d1ssentmg .Judge gave "permission," but that is not 
dear. Moreover, the scope of any permisswn r!'mains unexplained. Ra.tliff 
conceded that he had not communicated' with the cocustodian of the 
materials, United Stat<'s Marshal Archw Kraft, before perm1tting Brick to 
inspect the materials. ld ., at 407-408. 
T > 
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him a copy of the court's safekeeping order and the inventory 
of seized items. On October 12, 1967, Brick again entered the 
locked room at the county courthouse and spent four hours 
taking notes on the materials. He then returned to Washing-
ton, taking with him the 234 copies that Scott had given him. 
This material included one personal letter addressed to Mrs. 
McSurely, which concededly had no relevance to Brick's inves--
tigation. At Senator McClellan's direction, Brick prepared 
subpoenas duces tecum for some of the material in Ratliff's 
possession that Senator McClellan concluded would be rele-
vant to the investigation of the Nashville riot. 
The McSurelys moved before the three-judge court to 
prevent Ratliff from releasing the subpoenaed materials.2 On 
October 30, 1967, the court denied the motion and directed the 
parties to cooperate with the Subcommittee.3 Further litiga-
tion ensued/ culminating in an order of the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit in July 1968, holding that since the time 
for appeal from the judgment of the District Court striking 
2 The McSurelys did not premise their opposition to the subpoenas upon 
any allegedly unlawful activity on Brick's part in inspecting and transport-
ing the documents . Indeed, they testified that they did not even become 
aware of Brick's actual role until December 5, 1967. !d., at 655-656, 
681-682, 704-705, 707-709. 
3 The court'~; order rPad in part as follows: 
"The parties to tlus action and the officers of this Court are directed to 
cooperate with the Senate Committee in making available such of the 
materials, or copies thereof, as the Committee considers pertinent to its 
inquiry; but until time for amwal is expi11ed, this will be done in such 
manner as to keep intact those materials that may be pertinent to the 
appeal of this case." 
I cannot say whether this ma.y be read as a retroactive ratification of 
Brick's inspection and transportation activities. There is nothing in the 
record before us to indicate that the three-judge court was apprised of 
those 1wtivities. See 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 117 n. 59, 553 F. 2d, at 
1293 n. 59. 
4 For a synopsis of that litigation 's course, see the opinion below of 
Judge Wilkey1 id.1 at 132-133, 553 F . 2d, at 1308-13090 
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down the sedition staltite had expired, there was no basis for 
continued court custody. The court ordered the seized mate-
rials returned to the McSurelys, M cSurely v. Ratliff, 398 F. 2d 
817 (CA6 1968), and noted that questions as to the validity of 
the subpoenas still were open. According to Brick, the Sub-
committee's photocopies were returned to Detective Scott on 
August 14, 1968. The originals and copies were returned to 
the McSurelys on November 8, 1968. Upon receipt of these 
materials, the McSurelys were served with new subpoenas. 
On March 4, 1969, McSurelys appeared before the Sub-
committee and refused to comply with the subpoenas. Their 
refusal resulted in a conviction for contempt of Congress,;; but 
in December 1972, the Court of Appeais for the District of 
Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the subpoenas were 
the fruit of two Fourth Amendment violations: (i) the original 
seizure by Kentucky officials, and (ii) Brick's "unauthorized 
search and inspection of the documents" in violation of the 
three-judge court's sa.fekeeping order. United States v. 
McSurely, 154 U. S. App. D. C. 141, 154-155, 473 F. 2d 1178, 
1191-1192 (1972). 
On the same day that they appeared before the Subcom-
mittee, the McSurelys filed this action.n alleging that Sena.tor 
McClellan, Brick. Jerome S. Adlerman (the Subcommittee's 
General Counsel). Donald F. O'Donnell (the Subcommittee's 
Chief Counsel) , and individuai Members of the Subcommittee 
had conspired to violate the McSurelys' constitutional rights. 
They sought decla,ratory and in,junctive relief and $50,000 
damages from ea.ch defendant. The action was stayed to per-
mit the contempt trial to proceed. M cSurely v. McClellan, 
138 U.S. App. D. C. 187, 426 F. 2d 664 (1970). In Septem-
r. The variou:o: testimony refl:'rred to in this memorandum was given al t.he 
contempt trial. Sec. e. y., n. 1, supra. 
6 Listed with the McSurelys as plaintiffs in this initial complaint were 
three associations wJt.h which they were connected: the Southern Conference 
Educational Fund, the Southern Student Organizing Committee, and the 
Students for a Democra-tic Society. 
'· ' 
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her 1971, while the appeal of their contempt conviction was 
pending, the McSurelys filed an amended complaint, naming 
Ratliff, McClellan, Brick, Adlerman, and O'Donnell as defend-
ants. The amended complaint alleged in essence that the 
federal defendants had conspired with Ratliff to carry out an 
illegal raid in 1967, and to inspect, tran,sport, and use the seized 
materials in violation of the McSurelys' constitutional and 
other rights. On October 26, 1971, petitioners moved to 
dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment on the 
basis of legislative immunity. failure to state a claim, and 
collateral estoppel by virtue of the contempt conviction.7 The 
motion was denied and petitioners appealed.8 
In 1974, while petitioners' appeal was pending in the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, respondents obtained 
documents thought by them to indicate that the Subcommittee 
7 Ratliff did not join this motion. 
8 Normally the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not. appeal-
able because it is not a final deci8ion for purposE's of § 28 U. S. C. § 1291. 
See generally 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice ,[56.21 [2], at 56-1275 to 
56-1286 (2d ed. 1976) . The Court of Appeal::;, however, adopted the 
reasoning of the panel opinion, which lwld that this particular denia.! had 
"sufficient indicia of finality," 172 U. S. App. D. C. 364, 371, 521 F. 2d 
1024, 1031, quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 308 
(1962), to quahfy as appealable, even though it was not. a dPcision that 
ended the action. The p..'lnel ob.~e-rvPd that t.he Sp<>ech or Debat(' Clause, 
upon which the sumrnary judgment motion wa~ focused, protects Members· 
of Congress and their aides from the burdl.'lns of de-fending themselves as 
well as from the conseque-nces of the litigation. 172 U.S. App. D. C., a.t. 372, 
521 F. 2d, a.t 1032, citing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82,85 (1967). 
Reasoning that the asserte-d right io he free of the burdens of a. la,wsuit 
would be irretrievably lost 1f tlw cmw proce-eded to trial, the pm1t>l con-
cluded that an appeal from the final JUdgment would come too 1'1.te to pro.. 
vite meaningful review of that clmm. Henct>, as to the assertion of immu-
nity from inquiry, the demal of summary judgment was held a "final 
decision" for purposes of § 1291 172 U. S. App. D. C., at 372, 521 F. 
2d, at 1032. Neither side chatlengl\'S that analysis here, and I sre no reason 
to depart from ill. See aliso Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 
~£9419:». 
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had established an information-sharing relationship with the 
Internal Revenue Service. These documents were lodged with 
the Court of Appeals, together with affidavits suggesting that 
petitioners might have exhibited the allegedly wrongfully 
seized materials to agents of the Internal Revenue Service. 
In 1976, the Court of Appeals, en bane, affirmed in part, 
reve'rsed in part, and remanded.u Judge Leventhal wrote for 
himself and four others, a.'> did Judge Wilkey. Senior Judge 
Danaher, who had sat on the panel,· joined Judge Wilkey's 
opinion, but'wrote a separate opinion as well. The court 
unanimously reversed the refusal to dismiss that part of the 
complaint relating to the original seizure of the McSurelys' 
materials by Kentucky authorities. ·The court also agreed 
unanimously that summary · judgment should have been 
granted as to the portion of the complaint charging unlawful 
use of the material within Congress itself. 180 U. S. App. 
D. C. 101, 104, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1280 (1976). Respondents do 
not dispute those actions here. 
The Court of Appeals, again unanimously, affirmed what it 
designated as the denial of summary judgment as to those 
portions of the complai11t alleging dissemination of the mate-
rial outside of Congress. lbid.10 By an evenly divided vote, 
9 While the case was in the Court of Appeals, Brick and Adlerman died. 
180 U.S. App. D . C., at 104 u . 1, 51)3 F. 2'd, aL 1280 n. 1. Th<' Court of 
Appea.Js did not aecidl' wh<'tTH'r thr actiOI1~ agaim;t tlwm survivrd, lea,ving 
that. issue for the District Court on r<'mand. In Augu:;t 1977, respondent 
moved m the District Court to ~uh~titutr tll<' tiUrvivors or e;;tates for Brick 
and Adlerman. PetitionPr~ oppo~<' that motion, arguing that respondents' 
' delay caused the actlon to abnt<'. Thry ncvrrthelrss named Brick a11d 
Adlcrman as pet.if10ners m cn~<' thi:-l oppoHition should fail. See Fed. Rule 
App. Proc. 43 (a). Wr nrcd not pa~:; on the questions ejther of survival or 
· aba.t.ement of the a.ctions. 
Senn.tor McClellan d1ed while tlw case was pendmg before this Court. 
His executor was substituted under Rule 48 (1) of thi,; Court. 
10 Judge Leventhal's opinion and thr ~hort per cu1·iam opinion stating 
the judgment both indicated that the dissemination rlaim was to proceed 
\lpon remand. Judge Wilkry '~' opinion agreed with that disposition.. 
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it affirmed the denial of summary judgmen.t on the allegations 
that Brick had violated the McSurelys' rights by inspecting 
the documents subject to the safekeeping order and transport-
ing copies back to Washington.11 Judge Leventhal, writing 
for himself and four others, concluded that the allegations 
and facts of record stated Fourth Amendment and invasion 
of privacy claims. Judge Wilkey, writing for the other five 
members of the court, disagreed and would have reversed and 
remanded only in the allegation of dissemination outside of 
Congress. Judge Danaher would have ordered the case dis-
missed on the basis of official immunity. We granted cer-
tiorari. -U.S.- (1977). 
II 
A 
In this Court, petitioners have chosen to rely principally 
Although Judge Danaher joined Judge Wilkey's opinion, his sepa.rate opin-
ion seems to call for a clifferent resolution of the dissemination claim, since 
l1e would have directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint entireTy, 
on tJw basis of official immunity. 
n All 10 judges below a.ppear to have agreed that the McSurelys alleged 
seven categories of wrongdoing: 
"(1) The unlawful search and seizure of the McSurelys' books and 
papers by Kentucky authorities; 
"(2) t.he inspection by Brick of those unlawfully seized materials; 
"(3) the transport by Brick of copies of 234 documents to Washington; 
" ( 4) the inspection of some or all of these 234 copies by the staff of the 
Subcommittee; 
"(5) the use of the copies, as the basis for issuance of subpoenas for some· 
of the documents; 
"(6) the procurement of Contempt of Congress citations against the· 
plaintiff;; by consciously withholcling from the Senate the facts relating to· 
the challenged subpoenas; 
" (7) the dissemination of ~orne or all of the 234 copies obtained by Brick 
to persons or agencies outside of the Subcommittee-particula.rly the-
lnternal Revenue Service." 180 U. S. App. D. C., at '108, 553 F . 2dl, a.1t 
1285 (footnote omited). 
At iss~ro here are all~fttions ~2), (3,), ami €,'1), •. 
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upon an argument that was rejected by all 10 judges of the 
Court of Appeals. They contend that the protection of the 
Speech or Debate Clause extends "to [the use of] unlawful 
means to achieve legitimate objectives." 12 In their view, 
unlawful activities carried out in the course of an otherwise 
legitimate investiga.tion should be completely cloaked by a 
legislative immunity that "precludes judicial inquiry even into-
conduct that would be illega.l or unconstitutional if performed 
by priva.te persons." 13 Indeed, for purposes of this argument, 
petition,ers concede that Brick's conduct was "a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment." 14 They insist, however, that legis-
lative immunity from suit is meaningful only when a Member 
or a legislative aid is alleged to have engaged in conduct that 
would be actionable if engaged in by a private citizen, since 
an "immunity that would protect on;ly when no wrong was 
alleged to have been committed would be no immunity at 
all." 15 
While this extreme position may have some superficial plau-
sibility, its logic would lead to acceptance of untrammeled 
legislative power:10 Moreover, it has 'been rejected by prior 
1 2 Brief for Petitioners 15. 
11lfd., a.t 14. 
14 At oraJ a.rgument, petitioners made their concession on this issue quite 
·explicit: 
"QUESTION: AilE'Ji't you conceding for the purpose of argument that 
there was wrongdoing? 
"MR.. EASTER13ROOK: We a.rc conreding for the. purposes of this 
!trgumcnt. thnt. [Brick's n.ei"lvity] wrtf' actionable in some wa.y. 
"QUESTION: That'" wha.t I thought. 
"QUESTION: And nlso a. violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
"MR.. EASTERBROOK: YcR, we are conceding for purposes of this 
;argument." Tr. of OmJ Arg. 26. See also id., at. 29. 
1 " Brief for Petitioner 15. 
lG In petitioners' view, legislntive immunity " probably" extends even t& 
deliberate theft :md murder, ~o long as they occur in the cour~·c of a. 
' congres.;;ional investigation. Thi~ \vas made clear a.t ·oral [~rgument: 
· "MR EASTERBROOK : ...•• 
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decisions of this Court. In Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 
U. S. 82 (1967), this Court squarely held that legislative 
immunity did not shield a congressional aide charged with 
violating the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights in the 
course of an otherwise legitimate inw_stigation.17 Similarly, 
"But essentially our approach rests on the contention that the immunity 
is triggered by the purposr:s of the activity in which the Senator or the 
Senate aide waR Pngagrd. We bPiieve that this approach was con:sistent 
with nnd indeed required by the considerations that led to the esiablishment 
of the constitutional privilegP. 
"QUESTION: How far doe;; that reasoning take you? Let's say its 
purpose:; were very rlenrl~· to aid the legislative proce;,;s by aiding the 
congressional committees, and in pur:suance of that. pristinely protected 
purpose hP simply burglarized a house and stole things out of a locked 
drawer or safe. Ii< he protPet~d under the Speech or Dt>bate Clause for 
that? I am talking now, b~· "hr" I mean an aidr to the committee. 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Mr . .Justice Stewart, that que::;tion raises a 
number of complexities. My answer to it ultimately is, yes, probably he 
is protected. 
"QUESTION: Including murder, I suppose. Well, maybe not, there. 
"MR. EASTERBROOK : That. too falls within my yes, probably 
answer, but I would like , if I can-thi::; one, the answer i::; not intuitively 
appealing, I must concede." Tr. of Oral Arg.14-15. See also id., at 16-17. 
17 Petitioner:; attempt to distinguish Dombrowski on the ground that 
the congrC~;sional aide involved in that case was not engaged in investiga,. 
tive activit.y on behalf of Congress. They argue that. he merely "con-
spired with state officials to plan and carry out a, raid to gain evidence 
for use in a ::;tat(\ prosecution." Brief for Pctitionl:'rs, at 29. In their 
view, summary judgment in hil; favor was reversed simply because the 
Speech or DC~bate Clause furmshes no protection to activities not carried 
out. in the course of a congrC~;Sional investigation. Petitioners' characteri-
zation of the fact~ in that. case. is erroneous. As we observed in G1"avel v. 
United States, 408 U. S. 606, 620 (1972), t.he aide in Domb1"owski "was 
g~thering information for a hearing." Moreover, the re.cord in Dom-
browski mak~ clea.r that the aide traveled to Louisiana, at the behest. of 
Senator Eastland a.nd in pursuance of the investigative functions of a 
Sena.te Subcomnllttee. Record in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 0. T. 1966, 
No. 118, pp. 35, 40-41, 87, 91-94. 
Dombrowski can be read as suggesting that the scope of legislative 
itnm_unit:y for aides is narrower than that for the Member.. :387 U.S., at 85. 
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our decision in Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 628-
629 ( 1972), held that the Speech or Debate Clause did not 
immunize an aide from grand jury questioning concerning pos-
sible criminal conduct in the course of Senate information-
gathering activity. As we declared in Gravel, "no prior case 
[has] held that Members ~f Congress would be immune if 
they executed an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out 
an illegal arrest, or if, in order to secure information for a 
hearing, themselves seized the property or invaded the privacy 
of a citizen. Such acts are no more essential to legislating 
than the [conspiracy] held unprotected in United States ·v. 
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966)." Gravel, supra, at 621 (foot-
note omitted). Conduct in the course of informal investiga-
tive activity simply does not fall within the Speech or Debate 
Clause if it clearly exceeds the 'lawful powers of Congress. 
Our decision in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's 
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), is not to the contrary. ·There the 
Court addressed the "power to investigate and to do so through 
compulsory process." ld., at 504 (emphasis added). We 
refused to recognize an action to enjoin implementation of a 
facially proper subpoena, holding the subpoena "an indispen~ 
sable ingredient of lawmaking," 18 id., at 505. We had no 
·This suggestion, howewr, wa.~ laid to rest in Gravel v. United States, 408 
U. S. 606 (1972), which hPld "that the Speech or Debntc Clause applies 
not only to n Member but also to hi~ aides insofar as the conduct of the 
latter would be a protected legislative act if perfonned · by the Member 
himself." !d., at 618. Our deci~ion in Eastland v. United States Setvice-
men's Fund, 421 U. S. 491, 502 (1975), viewed the distinction in 
Dombtowski betwern Mrmbrr and aide not. aR one drriving from a 
difference in the seopr of t hrir legi~la tive immunities, but as one relating 
to the activities in which they were alleged to htwc 'engaged by the 
complaint. 
18 In this ease the Court of Appeals revcr~ed ihe denial of summary 
judgment as to the claims rrlnting to the is;;uance of subpoenas: 
· "The Subcommittee here employed proper proce~s for information· 'on 
which "legislation could be had ."' We note that ·the subpoenas called for 
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occasion, however, to consider the effect of lawless activity in 
the course of informal investigative conduct. Such activity 
simply is not a part of "th~ due functioning of the [legislative] 
process." United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501, 516 
(1972) (emphasis in original). 
In arguing that an immunity which evaporates with the 
allegation of actionable conduct is no immunity at all, peti-
tioners misapprehend the sweep of our prior decisions dealing 
with investigative activity. When Congress employs facially 
proper means of information-gathering-such as the subpoena 
in Servicemen's Fund-the Speech or Debate Clause precludes 
both inquiry into legislative motive and lawsuits for damages 
resulting from the investigation. But when Members of 
Congress or their aides resort instead to criminal or otherwise 
unlawful methods of obtaining information, they exceed the 
power duly vested in Congress and can expect no condonation 
by virtue on the Speech or Debate Clause. This "focus on 
means permits the court to afford relief 'without proof of a 
legislative a.ct.' " 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 112, 553 F. 2d, at 
1288 (opinion of Leventhal, J.), quoting Gravel, 408 U. S., at 
621. I therefore conclude that legislative immunity does not 
shield a Member or his aide from being called to account for 
materials that were at lem;L arguably relevant, to it:; investigation , but. did 
not call for the production of :Mr;:: . McSurely's letter or any other 
demonstrably irrelevant private correspondr.nce. Undrr these circum-
stancE'S Servicemen's F·und prrvmt:o: furthrr inquiry into plaint iff's charge 
tha.t the Subcommittee's purpo:;e was to hara:;s nnd iutimida!e them in the 
exercise of their Fit·:;t Amrnclment. rights. The Subrommittrr ';; i;;suance of 
subpoenas is privileged nct.ivity, notwith:;tnnding plnintiff ':; bnrr aUegation 
t.hat the real purpose behind the subporna;; wac; to ' rover-up' the earlier 
improper conduct by Brick, nnd thr furthrr a:;,;rrtion that had there been 
full disclosure the Subcommittee would not hn vr i,;:;ued thr ,;ubpoenas, and· 
the Senate would not have approved the contempt cita,tion." 180 U. S. 
App .. D . C., at 122, 553 F. 2d, at 1298 (footnote.-; omitted). 
·No f(uestion is rnisoo ht>rE> concerning the correctnc;;s of tJw Court mii' 
Appeals~ iudgment o.un this is:>ue~ 
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Fourth Amendment or other violations committed m the 
course of their investigative work in the field. Dombrowski, 
supra; cf. Gravel, supra.19 
B 
Petitioners further contend that on the record in this case, 
respondents' complaint should be dismissed because they have 
not made the requisite showing of liability. It is clear that 
11l The issue in this case was joined on whether petitioners were entitled 
to immunity by virtue of the Speech or Debate Clause. The case was 
considered below, and argued here, primarily on this issue. This focus on 
the Clause is appropriate with respect to defendants McClellan, Alderman, 
and O'Donnell. It is not alleged that any of them performed any investiga-
tive act outside of Washington. No issue remains as to the validity of the 
subpoenas issued by Senator McClellan's Subcommittee. See n. 18, 8Upra. 
And, as Judge Leventhal's opinion noted, "the record [also] is silent" as to 
the involvement of these three defendants "in any activity that could result 
in liability." P. 15, infra. This leaves only the general allegations of the 
amended complaint and respondents ' affidavits as to conspira,cy and exceed-
ing legislative authority. Disposition of these, as presenting a Speech or 
Debate issue, is appropriate. 
The situation may be different with respect to Brick. His "possibly 
actionable conduct" (infra, p. 15) for the most part consisted of inves-
tigative acts in Pikesville. It could be argued that such informal 
investigative activity, whether facially proper or not, simply is not a 
legislative act within the ambit of the Speech or Debate Clause. If that 
claim were made, the only immunity upon which Brick might rely would 
be the judicially fashioned immunity accorded public officials who act 
within the scope of their authority. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 
318-324 (1972). Taking this view of Brick's claim, however, would not 
significantly change the analysis of the case. We held in McMillan that 
the official immunity accorded congressional employees generally will apply 
in the same instances as Speech or Debate immunity, i. e., when the 
employees are performing "legislative acts." !d., at 324. 
Since I would hold that the alleged illegal conduct in the course of 
Brick's informal investigation would not be a legislative act for purposes of 
the Speech or Debate Clause, the question of judicially created official im-
munity is answered as well: there can be none where there is no legislative 
act. We need not determine whether even properly conducted field in.ves-
tigation would fall outside the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause. 
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when a defendant entitled to invoke Speech or Debate immu-
nity moves for summary judgment on tha.t basis, it is incum-
bent upon the plaintiff to adduce evidence affording "more 
than merely colorable substance" to allega.tions of actionable 
conduct. Dombrowski, 387 U. S., at 84. Otherwise, the 
cloak of immunity is not lifted, and summary judgment must 
be granted for defendant. This follows from the established 
doctrine that Speech or Debate immunity protects Members 
of Congress and their aides "not only from the consequences 
of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending 
themselves." ld., at 85. Sin.ce petitioners moved for sum-
mary judgment on the basis of the Speech or Debate Clause, 
the courts below were required to determine whether the Dom-
browski threshold-evidence affording "more than merely 
colorable substance" to the allegations of unimmunized con-
duct-had been passed with respect to each defendant.20 
~0 Respondents were put on notice quite explicitly that by making the 
summary judgment motion petitioners were calling upon them to adduce 
some evidence tending to connect each defendant. to the alleged wrong-
doing. The petitioners made that. point repeatedly at the hearing on the 
sumrnary judgment. motion. For example, coum;el for petitioners declared 
at one point as follows: · 
" ... rPJart and pa.rtial [sic] of the defense of legislative immunity, is the 
immunity of having to fmffer the burdens of extensive litigation. 
"This is what. the Supreme Court held in Dombrowski against East-
land . . . . And the only rraHon that Dombrowski againHt Ea!ltland was 
permitted to go into ;;ome di;:;covery-and I understand that case has been 
dismissed for wnnt of prosecution-the only reason was, there was on the 
record a discrrpancy of factual evidence. The documents seemed to show 
some discrepancy about. a dale on some subpoena which lent some support 
in argument., and the Supreme Court said, in view of this factual dispute, 
we need to resolve it a little further before we can consider whether or not 
legislative immunity is sufficient to protect [tl1e Member's aide]." Tr. of 
Hearing Oct.. 28, 1971, at. 15-16. 
More succinct.ly, counsel for petitioners sta.ted: 
" .. . I think the burden should be placed on the plaintiffs to come forward 
with any evidence they ma.y have to suggest and demonstrate tha.t these 
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Respondents have satisfied the Dombrowski standard as to 
allegations of Brick's misconduct. It is stipulated that Brick 
inspected the documents subject to the safekeeping order in a 
locked vault in Pikevill~ and that he transported copies of 
selected ones toW ashington. The court below divided evenly 
as to whether, in light of the three-judge court's safekeeping 
order, the stipulated f~;tcts state a claim under the Fourth 
defendants were not acting wit.hin the scope of their legislative duties. 
That would present an issue in which we were forewarned. That is the 
function of the motion for summary judgment." ld., at 18. 
Respondents made a. simila.r argument in a memora11dum supporting their 
motion: 
"The affidavit. of Senator McClellan filed in support of tlw pending 
motions fully e~tablishes the circumstances by which the Senate Committee 
conducted its investigation and served the subpol'nas out of which this 
litigation arises. Again, nothing in the McSurelys' affidavit furni.shes rrny 
facts to demonstmte that Brick, Adlerman, 01· O'Donnell were acting 
outside the perimeter of their legislative functions." Supplemental Memo-
randum of Points and Aut110ritil'o in Support of Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgme.nt, Nov. 23, 1971, at 5 
(emphasis nddrd). 
See aloo Memora11dum of Points and Authorities in Support. of Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary .T udgment, Oct. 26, 
1971, a.t, 3-4 ; Reply of Defendants McClellan, Adlerman, O'Donnell, and 
Brick to Plaintiff's Letter to the Court Dated Sept. 12, 1972, Oct. 13, 1972, 
:.tl; 10. 
Counsel for respondents indicated that he understood the burden peti-
tioners sought to cast upon him, although he disputed their right to do so: 
"Now comes Mr. Goldbloom [counsel for petitioners] and says, prove to 
me by facts disputing Senator McClelland's [sic] affidavit that it is not 
true, before you can take depositions. How can I do that? And this is 
what the trouble is with this whole posture. I am going to file an affidavit 
which says he is wrong. I have to say it on information and belief. And 
then he is going to come into court and say, it is just on information and 
belief." !d., at 43-44. 
Thus, there can be no question tha.t respondents were on notice as to the 
importance of adducing such evidence as they had with respect to each 
-defendant, 
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Amendment. On the present state of the record, however, 
there is no basis for concluding that respondents failed to 
state a claim, if only for invasion of privacy.~1 Some of the 
facts at issue in the dispute> as to the validity of the Fourth 
Amendment claim were obtained only after oral argument en 
bane. 180 U. S. App. D. C._, at 126 n. 84, 553 F. 2d, at 1302 
n. 84. There has ooen no opportunity to weigh the various 
characteriza.tions of Brick's activity or the meaning of the 
three-judge court's safekeeping order. Moreover, the reco·rd 
also contains testimony by Brick that he carried to Washing-
ton a copy of at least one document that he believed to be 
of no relevance to the Subcommittee's investigation of the 
riots. 22 Congress possesses no general power to investigate 
21 At oml argument, comJSel for petitioners acknowledged thf' po~:>Sibility 
that the compla,int ma.y state a cause of action under state tort law: 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: . . . There is the possibility that under Dis-
trict of Columbia or Kentucky law there is a common-law tort lurking in 
the background of this case. That's the reason why we elected not to 
make strongly here any arguments a,bout the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, precisely because there may be a.!legations of other bases of 
liability based on common law." Tr. of Oml Arg. 21. 
22 Brick testified as follows: 
"Q. Did you tell Mr. Dotson or any of the folk with whom you met 
there that there was some of that stuff that you didn't think that you 
needed? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Did you give it back to them? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Did you need that letter signed Dea.rest Cucumber or address 
Dearest Cucumber? 
"MR. BRESS: Objection. Irrelevant. 
"THE COURT: He may answer the question . 
"THE WITNESS: No. Didn't you say signed Dearest Cucumber and 
when in fact, it says addressed to Dearest Cucumber. 
"MR. STAVIS : No, I didn't . 
"THE WITNESS : Was the question, did I need that letter? 
"BY MR. STAVIS : 
('Q.. Y ~. For the perlorlOOllce Qf your duties. 
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private affairs, even by subpoena; the subject of the inquiry 
must always be one on which legislation could be had. Serv-
icemen's Fund, 421 U. S., at 504 n. 15. Therefore, Brick's 
eopying and transportation of concededly irrelevant material 
is sufficient to lift legislative immunity for purposes of a sum-
mary judgment motion. Brick's testimony on tha.t subject 
ultimately may be explained away, or the inclusion of a single 
irrelevant letter may be deemed de minimis. But his tes-. 
timony, together with the other factors mentioned above, 
is sufficient to carry respondents across the Dombrowski 
threshold. 
The posture of the ot.her three federal defendants, however, 
is decidedly different. The opinion of Judge Leventhal noted 
that although "plaintiffs have alleged Brick's involvement in 
possible actionable conduct with sufficient factual particularity 
"A. No sir. 
"Q. As a matter of fact, in respect. to the performance of your duties, 
you didn't need most of the items in that list, did you? 
"A. Some of them. There were many others in the locked vault in 
the Court House that I would have obtained under the subpoena. 
"Q. That what? 
"A. That I would ha.ve obtained under the subpoena had not the Sub--
committee stopped all action when the d·efendan.ts went into Court. 
"Q. Did you-when I was a.Sking my questions about. this Jist of 234 
items, there were lots of these items that you didn't need at all, correct?: 
"MR. BRESS: Objection. In:elevant. 
·"THE COURT: I believe he has alrea.dy answered the questi011 .. 
'·'BY MR,'. BRESS :· 
'·'Q. What was your answer? 
"A. Some, yes. 
''Q. Some that yoll did? 
"A. It was-
·"Q. Lots? 
"A. I object to the u:,;e of the word Jots. 
"Q. A great many, a grea.t many ? 
"A. Oh, 1 will say many. Let me explain. l didn't select any of thes~ 
<J&l tQJd ~ou ,~' · Al?P · l{}l-1.()2~ 
• 
.. 
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to permit trial to proceed as to him, the record is silent on 
the involvement of defendants McClellan, Adlerman and 
O'Donnell 'in any activity that could result in liability.' " 
180 U. S. App. D. C., at 123, 553 F. 2d, at 1299, quoting Dom-
browski, supra, at 84. I agree. In response to defendants' 
summa.ry judgment motion and Senator McClellan's a.ffidavit 
denying any conspiracy or activities outside the scope of legis-
lative activity, respondents could aver only on information 
and belief that the defendants joined in the conspiracy to drive 
respondents out of Pikeville and exceeded the bounds of legis-
lative activity.2~ Dombrowski teaches tha.t mere allegations 
23 Senator McClellan's affidavit deniPd "an~' conspiracy, collabora.tion or 
any other participation of any sort in the allegedly illegal police raid 
allegedly planned and conduct<>d by defenda1~t. Ratliff." App. 49. He also 
denied tha.t he or his aides had excPeded t.he legislative authority of the 
Subcommittee. /d., at. 50. While his aifidavit cont~lins no specific denial 
of a Fourth Amendment violat,ion by Brick with respect. to the inspection 
of documents in Pikeville, the general denial of exceeding legislative author-
ity must. be read as mnbracing one. It. is only fair to rmd th<' affidavit 
that way, since the SJWCific theory of a separate Fourth Amendment viola.-
tion by Brick-though supportablr on the allega.tions of the amended 
complaintr-apparent.ly did not emerge clearly until the case reached the 
Court of Appeals. 
Examination of the District Court rc•corcl d.iselo~P~ no suggestion by 
appellants that Brick's activity in and of it~elf amount<>d to 1L ~eparatP 
violation of the Fourth Amenclrnent . In~tPad, plaintiff~' theory of thP ca~e 
wa::; tha.t. since the Kentucky search a.nd seizure had bern ruled unconstitu-
tional at t.he time of 1hr Subrommitt<'r tak<'ovrr of the documents, tho 
subpoenas were the fruit of the original Kenturk~· :;pizure. This i:; the only 
Fourth Amendment tlwor~· ~et forth in 1hr amended compltdn1. App. 
32-33. Thus, in the Di»t.rirt Comt tlw theory wat< not. that Brick's 
inspection of the document;; in Pikesville wa~< n second violntion of thP 
Fourth AmendmPnt , the- i::>:>\IP dividing JudgP WiJkp~· and .Judge Leventhal; 
rather, the theor~· then wa::; that. Brick':,: in~peetion, takeover, and the 
subsc4nent subpoenas werr the fruit:; of the original ille-gal :senrch nnd 
seizure. 
Iu th~e circumstance~ , it hardly could be <>xperted that Senator 
McClPLlan's affidavit. would declare specifically that there had been U() 
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arc not enough.~ 1 There' mut;t be facts of record tending to 
connect the defendant to the alleged misconduct. Having 
found, properly, that the record was silent as to the involve-
ment of McClellan, Adlerman, and O'Donnell in any activity 
that could result in liability, it was the duty of the court 
below to reverse the denial of their motion for summary 
judgment. 
I recognize that this standard imposes a not insubstantial 
burden upon plaintiffs who seek to lift the veil of legislative 
immunity. This is justified, however, by the purposes served 
by the Speech or Debate Clause. As noted above, it is in-
tended to protect Members of Congress and their aides from 
"the burden of clt>fending thernselves against unsubstantiated 
claims." Dombrowski, supra, at 85. Even where an injunc-
tion is not sought, Members are forced "to divert their time, 
energy, and attention from their legislative tasks to defend 
the litigation." !d., at 503. Thus, the Clause requires that 
motions founded on legislative immunity to "be given the 
Fonrt.h Amendmrnt Yiolation b~· Brick. l~e;;pondrnto; hnd not been 
pre;;entrd with that tlwor~· of the ca;;P. Siner t.hp amrnded complaint ha!'-
heen virwrd expa n><ivrly, the SPna tor'~ affidavit eorre:<ponclingly must be 
tnkrn a.,; putting in is,;ue all thr allrgation..~ ,;ubsrqurntly read into the 
amendE'd complaint. It drnirs, 011 brhalf of all U1P respondents, any 
activity out;;ide the scopr of lrglslatJvp aufhority. 
To this denial, respondent::; could reply only "on information ru1d belief 
[that] the defrndan,t McClellan, together wit.l1 defendants AdlermaJ1, 
O'Donnell, and Brick, joined in the conspiracy of U1e defendant Ratliff 
to force us out of Pikeville . ... " App. 55-56. See also n. 19, supra. 
They also contested McClellan's general drnial of exceecling legislative 
authority, App. 56, but again no facts were adduced. 
2 ~ Nor may th<' involvemr-nt of tl1e Member or Home of hit-> aide::; br · 
inferred solely from the involvement of other aides. In Dombrowski, sum-
mary judgment for Senator Eastland was upheld despite an allegation of 
conspiracy and the existence of facts linking his Subcommittee's chief 
counsel to possible Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, the mere fact 
that Brick ma.y have engaged in conduct outside the scope of legislative: 
i~un.it~ does not suffice to link the other d~fendants tQ that conduct .. 
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most expeditious treatment by district courts because one 
branch of Government is being asked to halt the functions 
of a coordinate branch." Servicemen's Fund, supra, at 511 
n. 17. 
III 
I turn now to respondents' claim that petitioners made 
available some of the seized materials to the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS). The Speech or Debate Clause does not 
immunize the dissemination of allegedly actionable material 
"beyond the reasonable bounds of the legislative task." Doe 
v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 315 (1973). Again, however, a 
motion for summary judgment grounded on Speech or Debate 
immunity requires a pla.intiff to adduce evidence lending 
"more than merely colorable substance" to an assertion of 
unlawful dissemination. Dombrowski, supra, at 84. 
Respondents argue that they have carried this burden with 
respect to their claim that petitioners exhibited to the IRS 
the documents Brick obtained in Pikeville. In 1974, they 
lodged with the Court of Appeals recently obtained material 
indicating that the Subcommittee had permitted agents of 
the IRS to inspect portions of the Subcommittee files. Spe-
cifically, respondents pointed to a letter of March 5, 1969/~ 
2~ ThiH letter read as follows: 
"UNITlm STATES SENATE 
Committee on 
Government Operations 
Sena.te Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations 
Washmgton, D. C. 20510 
March 5, 1969 
"Dear Mr. Secretary: 
"In accordance with Executive Order 11337, dated March 27, 1967, a· 
resolution was duly adopted by the Comm1t.tee on Government Opera-
tions on September 18, 1968, with regard to the organizations listed on the· 
attached pages. It flhould be noted that. this request. was made on Decem-
'ber lfi1 196B. prior ttl» tl'm expiration of Rxecuti.ve Order 11337.. This i$ 
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in which Senator McClellan informed the Secretary of the 
Treasury that the Subcommittee had taken certain steps in 
September 1968, toward arranging meetings with Internal 
Revenue agents for the purpose of exchanging information 
about organizations under investigation. Respondents also 
emphasized an IRS memorandum "6 showing August 28, 1968, 
to reaffirm the same request pursuant to Execut.ive Order 11454 dated 
February 7, 1969, and Treasury Decision 6133. 
"Pursuant to this re;olution, I hereby designate the following individ-
uals, members of the Subcommittee staff, to make such examinations: Mr. 
Philip R. Manuel, Mr. John E. Drass, Mr. Fred P. Miller, Mr. Perman 
H. Clay, Mr. James H. Dillon, and Mr. Walter S. Fialkewicz. In, this 
connection, it will be appreciatrd if the files could be assembled in the 
district office of jurisdiction. In order to facilitMe the work of the staff, 
it would be further appreciated if the staff designees be permitted to con~ 
suit with Internal Revenue Agents and Auditors familiar with the content 
of the respective files. 
"Your cooperation in this matter will be greatly appreciated, 
1'Sii\Cerely yours, 
John J. McClellan 
Chairman 
"Honorable David M. Kennedy 
Secretary of the Treasury 
Washington, D. C." 
App., a.t 70. 
~u The memorandum rend~ in JWrt inE'nt pnri as follow~: 
"F AC1' SHEET 
Es'I'ABLISHMEN1' oF SPECIAL SERVICE STAFF 
"Allegations have been made that the Internal Revenue Service esta~ 
lished the SpeciaJ Service Staff from inst.ruct.ions received from White 
House officials. This simply is not tme. The fa.cts are these: 
"August 28, 1968. Mr. Philip Manuel, an investigator with the Penna~ 
nent Committee on Investigations, Sena.to Committee on GovE'rnment 
Operations, contacted the Service to say that he had a group of seven 
investiga.tors working for him on mntters pert.aining to certain organiza-
tions and other groups; that he had prepared a letter for the Chairman, 
of the Committee, Honorable John J. McClellan; and that he expected 
the request. to be signed shortly. His call was t.o alert. us to the fa.ct that 
he wanted the Committee mves6gators to be permitted to discuss these 
matters with our District officials rather than to conduct inspectiQn Qf 
returns in the National Oftire." App., a.t. 73. 
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as the date on which the possibility of a cooperative relation-
ship between Subcommittee and Service was first explored. 
Respondents argue that these materials tend to establish that 
the defendants exhibited to the Internal Revenue agents the 
Pikeville documents, which were not returned to respondents 
until November 8, 1968.27 
27 Although the document~ wen~ not returned to the McSurely~ until 
November, Brick testified that he returned the Subcommittee copies to 
Kentucky authorities on August 14, 1968-two weeks before the initial 
exploration of possible coopera.tion between the Subcommittee and the 
Service. He also declared that the Subcommittee had made no additional 
copies: 
"Q. And did they-did there come a time when you returned those 
documents? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. During the time that you had possession of the documents, were 
they publicly-publicized, distributed or seen by anybody outside of the 
Committee? 
"A. No, sir, n.nd not by anybody inside of the Committee, either. 
"Q. Where were the documents maintained? 
"A. In my personal file under lock nnd key nnd the key was always 
in my pocket and that was by order of Senator McClellan,. 
"Q. Did Sena.tor McClellan look at those recor~? 
"A. No, sir. He looked at one. 
"Q. Did there come a time when you-a.fter the expiration of certain 
litigation between the McSurelys and the officials in Kentucky, did you 
then return that batch of documents to the authorities in Kentucky? 
"A. I did. I returned them to Thadeus Scott on August 14, 1978. 
"Q. And irs the receipt t.hat has been marked listing the 230-somc docu-
ments, is that the receipt that you got when you ret.urned them? 
"A. That is the receipt I prepared and he signed, yes. 
"Q. Did you retain any of the documents there.after or did you make 
any copy of any documents and retain them in your file? 
"A. I never made a single copy of those documents. I retained none. 
I have not now and the Subcommittee has none. All the documents were 
returned to Mr. Thadeus Scott. I have never used a Xerox machine on 
those documents, although it ha~ been rsnid here a number of times that 
I did. I did not." App. 97-98. 
This testimony was incorporated in Senator McClellan 's affidavit. accom-
pa.nying tho suromat'y judgment, motion . ld., a,t, 50. Respondents dis. 
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The Court of Appeals, however, apparently did not view 
respondents' amended complaint as presenting this belated 
claim of dissemination outside the Subcommittee: 
"The claim of dissemination of some or all of the 234 
documents to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was 
not made in the amended complaint. This claim arose 
because of the disclosure of certain IRS documents, 
obtained as a result of a Freedom of Information Act suit, 
which indicated contacts, beginning on August 28, 1968, 
between members of the Subcommittee staff and the IRS 
concerning formal access to each other's files." 180 U. S. 
App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d, at 1285 n. 25 (em-
phasis added). 
The court noted further, ibid., that the complaint "also" made 
two other allegations that could have been related to the 
dissemination claim. First, there was a cha.rge that Brick had 
exhibited the McSurely documents "to persons whose names 
are unknown to pla.intiffs." App. 31-32. Second, the com-
plaint alleged tha.t McClellan has "used the instrumentality 
of the [Subcommittee] investigation to carry out a personal 
vendetta between himself and a certain personage of promi-
nence named in some of the private correspondence of the 
plaintiff Ma.rgaret McSurely." App. 35. The court pointed 
out, however, that there was "no specific allegation that Brick 
embarrassed plaintiffs or that McClellan pursued his purported 
'vendetta' by dissemination outside the Subcommittee itself. 
The claim of dissemination outside the Halls of Congress 
apparently rests on access oy the IRS officials." 180 U. S. 
App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 558 F. 2d, at 1285 n. 25. 28 In sum, 
pute it, although they have adduced no facts tending to disprove it. See 
n. 28, infra. 
28 The Court of Appt>nb' di:scuHsiou of the pn.rliC's' dispute nnd the tw() 
:allegations in t.he amendt>d complainl •iH as follows: 
"On November 25, 1974, plaintiff:; filt>d a supplemental affidavit lodging· 
' i.b.~se J:ecentl.y djsclQsed. ffiiltt>rials with the cQurt. The federal defendants. 
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the court's conclusion that the dissemination claim "was not 
made in the amended complajnt," its distinction between that 
claim and the other two claims actually made in the com• 
plaint, and its ultimate conclusion that the claim of dissemina-
tion rested solely on the newly developed theory indicate that 
the Court of Appeals did not believe that the amended com• 
plaint encompassed this claim."0 
In light of this apparent conclusion, it is difficult to under-
stand the court's declaration in the same footnote that it was 
affirming "the District Court's denial of summary judgment 
on this claim," as weli lls the statement to that effect in the 
per curiam opinion announcing the judgment. If the com ... 
piaint did not encompass the new dissemination claim, there 
countered on January 24, 1975, arguing that even if the IRS had gained 
access to the Subcommittee files at some point after August 28, 1968, t.he 
McSurelys could not have been harmed then•by because the 234 copies 
were returned to Commonwealth Detective Scott on August. 14, 1968 (and 
received by the McSlirelys oil Novembrr 8, 1968), and Brick had testified 
at the McSurelys' contempt trial tha.t he made no copies and that neither 
he nor the Subcommittee retained any of the documents, D. A., II, 730. 
Plaintiffs, in their rei)ly to defendants' response, filed January 31, 1975, dis-
pute both that the documents were turned over to Scott on August 14, 
1968, and that no copies were made. Since we affirm the District Court's 
denial of summary judgment on t.his claim, we leave the resolution of this 
question to the District Court on remand. 
"Plaintiffs' amended complaint also alleges that Brick exhibited copieg 
of the 234 items to un.known persons causing plaintiffs damage and embar-
rassment, and that McClellan 'used the instrumentality of t.he [Subcom-
mittee] investigation to carry out a personal vendetta between himself ana 
a certain personage of prominence named in some of the private corre-· 
spondence of the plaintiff Margaret McSurely.' Amended and Suppl.. 
Com pl. 1]'1]' 19, 28 (b) (li) , App. 45, 50. However, there is no specific alle-
gation that Brick embarrassed plaintiff's or tha.t McClellan pursued his pur-
ported 'vendetta' by dissemination outside of the Subcommittee itself. The· 
claim of dissemination outside of the Halls of Congress appa.rently rests on 
access by IRS officials.'' 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d·, 
at 1285 n. 25. 
'20 The pa.nel opinion waB no clr:urr on this issur. See 172 U. S. App. 
D .. C.,, at 3'Z3-374, and n. 29, 521 F . 2'dl, a.t 103.3.-l034» at1d. n. 29. 
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had been no oocasion for the District Court to pass on it5 
sufficiency, nor for the Court of Appeals to affirm any judg-
ment thereon. Respondents' belated injection, of the dissemi-
nation theory into the case, standing alone, would not amount 
to an amendment of the complaint, and no motion to amend 
was made. Because there had been no trial, there had been 
no admission 6f evidenc<• to which the pleadings could be held 
to conform under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15 (b). Thus, it is 
unclear whether any issue regarding dissemination of the 
McSurely materials outside Congress was properly before the 
Court of Appeals. 
For this reason, we must vacate the judgment of affirmance 
as to that claim. \V e need express no opinion as to the merits 
of the dissemination theory."0 On remand. the Court of 
Appeals may determine whether the dissemination claim is 
embraced by respondents' amended complaint, or it may take 
such other steps with respect to this claim as it deems proper. 
IV 
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar 
as it reversed the refusal of the District Court to dismiss the 
portions of the complaint relating to the original seizure of the 
McSurelys' materials. I a.lso would affirm the portion of the 
judgment directing the entry of summary judgment for peti-
tioners as to claims concerning use of the materials within 
Congress. With respect to the claim concerning Brick's inspec-
tion of the documents and transportation of copies, I would 
affirm as to Brick, but reverse as to McClellan, Adlerman, and 
O'Donnell, and remand with directions to enter summary 
judgment for them on that cla.im. Finally, I would vacate the 
Court of Appeals judgment insofar as it purports to affirm the 
denial of summary judgment on the dissemination issue and 
remand for further prooeedings consistent with this opinion. 
30 Nor is there any reason for 11s to addre~:o: the que~tion whether legisla~ 
tive immunity or some other form of immunity would protect Members 
of Congress and their aides from inquiries concerning the sharing of infol'-
ma~ion, w~th executive agencies. · 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE W>< . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
April 6, 1978 
RE: No. 76-1621 McAdams v. McSurely 
Dear Byron: 
After reading the most interesting exchange between 
Lewis and yourself in the above, as one who has been nun-
characteristically silent up to now 11 , I think your approach 
has the better of the argument and I'd be inclined to join 
an opinion along those lines. 
Sincerely, 
I ' 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.:in.prtm:t ~ltltri ltf tqt 'Jttittb ;ibtftg 
..-ufrhtghtn, ~. ~· 20.?'!~ 
April 7, 1978 
Re: 76-1621 - McAdams, etc. v. McSurely 
Dear Lewis: 
I am in general agreement with your memo 
of April 6. I am not prepared to open the door to 
harassment of Members of the House and Senate. 
Interviews with some of the best of those who 
retired from Congress in the past few years reflect 
their unwillingness to put up with not only "slings 
and arrows" from the media but from brigades of 
"causists", many of them bent on tearing the entire 
system apart. 
Members of Congress and Judges should have at 
least the comprehensive immunity we have given the 
press -- and a lot more. People can "fire" 
Congress Members-- hey can't "fire" newspapers! 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
P.S. (Justice Powell only) My request to you 
at the Conference to "write a P.C." was, 
of course TIC -- tongue in cheek. You have 
developed an excellent analysis. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.iu.prtutt oro-uri ltf tJrt ~tb ~tatrg 
jtulrhtgton. ~. or. 2ll.;t,.~ 
April 11, 1978 
Re: No. 76-1621 - McAdams v. McSurely 
Dear Lewis: 
I, too, have in your words been "uncharacteristically 
silent up to now," but have read with both interest and 
enlightenment the correspondence between you and Byron in this 
case. I most certainly agree with you as to the purposes to be 
served by legislative immunity. As you trenchantly put it, 
this case "is no garden variety litigation between private parties. 
This is an example of legal warfare, conducted now for a full 
decade, against a Subcommittee of the United States Senate." 
Unfortunately this would not appear to be a unique case. 
Congressmen and other governmental officials, because of the 




lawsuits. With this background in mind, the Court has said: 
"It is the purpose and office of the doctrine 
of legislative immunity, having its roots as 
it does in the Speech or Debate Clause of the 
Constitution, •. that legislators engaged 
'in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity' 
. • should be protected not only from the 
consequences of litigation's results but also 
from the burden of defending themselves." 
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 u.s. 82, 84-85 (1967). 
The present difference in our thinking, I guess, is 
the proper means of achieving the purposes of legislative immunity. 
As I understand your memoranda, you would protect the legislative 
official from unmeritorious lawsuits by modifying the summary 
judgment standard of Fed. Rules of Civ. Proc. 56. In the normal 
lawsuit, a defendant who seeks summary judgment in his favor 
must affirmatively show "that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that [he] is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Where the defendant is a Congressman or 
congressional aide, however, you, I gather, would require the 
plaintiff, once the defendant denies the allegations, to come 
forward with "evidence affording 'more than merely colorable 
substance' to the allegations of unimmunized conduct." Though 
- 3 -
I agree entirely with your objective, my present feeling is that 
fhis "procedural" means of protecting government officials from 
unmeritorious claims would turn out to be both unworkable and 
unwise. 
To begin with, I am not sure that the announcement of a 
heightened summary judgment standard will greatly increase the 
number of unmeritorious claims that will be disposed of on 
summary judgment. As Byron's disagreement with you demonstrates, 
"evidence affording more than merely colorable substance" will be 
interpreted and applied differently by each judge. In your 
view, this language is a heightened standard for summary judgment 
and would call for summary judgment here. In Byron's view, 
rowever, this language merely represents "a careful application 
of F.R. Civ. P. 56" and, applied to this case, does not call for 
summary judgment. Even in a case as seemingly weak as the 
instant one, many judges are likely to take Byron's view and 
require the case to be tried. 
Your language, as with all broad standards, will be "stretched" 
according to the proclivity of the particular district court 
judge before whom it comes. According to Professor Wright, 
even as Rule 56 is currently written, there is "much confusion" 
as to the exact showing required to defeat a motion for 
summary judgment7 the necessary showings vary depending on 
- 4 -
"the differing views various judges have as to the utility and 
application of this procedural device." Wright, Law of Federal 
Courts, 495-496 (1976). I fear that your standard may be even 
more open-ended in its worcling and will be subject to the same 
varying interpretations. 
Even assuming that every lower court judge will apply the 
standard that you propose with a vigor equal to yours, I wonder 
how many litigants will find themselves unable to meet it in 
practice. In my memorandum in Butz, I observed that "any legal 
neophyte" can frame a complaint of constitutional dimensions; 
if you give that legal neophyte one or two experiences in the 
courtroom, I would venture to extend the observation to defeating 
motions for summary judgment even where a heightened variety of 
scrutiny is applicable. In this case, the respondents initially 
offered no affidavits in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment. If the case were remanded in line with Byron's 
fuinking, however, I have li t tle doubt that respondents would be 
able to come up with some form of affidavit lending "more than 
mere colorable substance" to their claims. 
- 5 -
Indulging my inclination to beat a dead horse, I should 
note my fear that a heightened summary judgment standard 
may be even less of an answer to a case like Butz, where, if 
only a qualified immunity is extended, the judgment may well turn 
on the defendant's state of mind. I assume that even under your 
heightened summary judgment standard a plaintiff will not have to 
introduce counter-affidavits on the defendant's state of mind. 
As Professor Wright notes, usually it simply "is not feasible to 
resolve on motion for summary judgment cases involving state of 
rrind." Wright, Law of Federal Courts, 493 (1976). See Subin v. 
Goldsmith, 224 F. 2d 753 (CA 2 1955), relying on cases of this 
Court. Once it is held that only qualified immunity is to be 
accorded, public officials will be protected only from payment 
of damages at the end of the lawsuit, and then only if the jury 
chooses to believe their account of the facts. A heightened 
summary judgment standard, combined with an expedited time frame, 
will be of little, if any, help. 
Getting back to the case before us, I cannot dispel my 
whether 
doubtsL your proposal would aid in carrying out the goal 
of legislative immunity in protecting congressional officials 
from the time, worry and expense of combatting unmeritorious claims. 
- 6 -
But even if I could dispel those doubts, I would be hesitant to 
create an exception to the normal standard of Rule 56. I think 
a good case can be made that the entire evolution of the English 
common law -- from the original forms of action, to ·the 
intermediate stage where the forms of action were abolished but 
code pleading existed in some states and law and equity were 
separate in most, to the present stage where the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure or their state counterparts govern virtually 
all civil actions -- has been a monumental change for the better. 
It has taken hundreds of years to accomplish, and is based on 
the notion that whatever the substance of the lawsuit may be, 
procedurally the suit may be litigated by following uniform 
rules in the form of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If 
we try to modify those rules in one area of the law, we will 
mevitably invite modification, or at least claims for modification, 
in other areas of the law which will be difficult to distinguish 
from those which we will have already allowed~ The result, it 
seems to me, will be a setback for what is presently a relatively 
uniform system of procedure through which all of the myriad 
substantive grist of the legal mill is processed. 
- 7 -
Finally, I should note that I simply don't believe that there 
are the votes for your heightened standard for summary judgment. 
Byron, with whom Bill Brennan apparently agrees, would only 
accord petitioners "a careful application of Fed Rules of Civ. 
Proc. 56" which, of course, is exactly what every federal 
defendant is entitled to. And, as you might gather from the 
above, I also would find it very difficult to join an opinion drawn 
along the procedural line that you suggest, even though I agree 
completely with the end result which you seek. 
My own solution to the problem of protecting congressional 
~
officials from the intrusion of unmeritorious legal claims, and 
a solution that I believe is time honored, not surprisingly 
parallels my thinking in Butz v. Economou. While, as the above 
discussion might have already revealed, I have not given this 
particular case as much thought as either you or Byron, I will 
hazard my own effort to trace out the resolution of this dispute 
along those lines. I 
which must indicate that my thinking is not too far out of line 
with yours. 
- 8 -
I begin by agreeing with Byron that the Speech or Debate 
Clause protects even illegal activity within its coverage, see 
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 u.s. 491 (1975), 
but that it probably does not cover as far as field investigations. 
We have already given a relatively expansive reading to the 
activities covered by the Speech or Debate Clause; extending 
its protection to field investigations might be stretching its 
fabric a step too far. 
Because there is no doubt that Congress has the power to 
carry on field investigations, and because those investigations 
are in furtherance of Congress' functions, I would also agree with 
Byron that congressional officials should enjoy common law 
crficial immunity in such investigations even where Speech or Debate 
Clause protection ends. Support for this position can be found 
in Byron's opinion in Doe v. McMillan, 412 u.s. 306, 318-324 
(1972), as you note in fn. 19 of your present draft. Indeed, it 
would strike me as odd to, as I presume we would, extend official 
immunity to the investigative activities of cabinet officials, 




u.s. 367 (1951), but not to congressional officials. In short, 
I would limit Speech or Debate Clause protection to conduct which 
i an "integral part of the deliberative and communicative process," 
Gravel v. United States, 408 u.s. 606, 625 (1972), but, as with 
any other governmental official, extend official immunity when-
ever the defendant is acting within his official authority. (Should 
I assume from your new footnote 19 that, assuming it is ultimately ____________ 
determined that Brick violated respondents' Fourth Amendment 
rights, you would not accord Brick even qualified immunity? 
I assume that the gist of Byron's proposal is that Brick 
would at least be entitled to a good faith defense.) 
Under this framework, resolution of this case would turn 
on our ultimate disposition in Butz. Analogizing from my position 
Jerome S. Adlerman (the Subcommittee's General Counsel), and 
Donald F. O'Donnell (the Subcommittee's Chief Counsel), and 
L remand to the Court of Appeals with directions to dismiss the 
McSurelys ~' action as to them. I would accord only qua l ified 
immunity, however, to Brick and allow the action as to him to 
proceed on towards trial. As for the dissemination claim, I agree 
- 10 -
with you that it should be remanded for a determination of 
whether it is embraced in respondents• amended complaint. (If 
the Court were to conclude that the dissemination claim is 
embraced in the amended complaint, I would at a minimum direct 
the Court of Appeals to dismiss as to McClellan, Adlerman and 
O'Donnell, who as noted above should enjoy absolute official 
irnrnun i ty. ) 
In conclusion, I agree with Parts I, III and IV of your 
memorandum and the result reached in Part II. I cannot, however, 
join in your "procedural" answer to the problem of unmeritorious 
suits against congressional officials. As Learned Hand 
(Thurgood, I know you won't read past this point) recognized in 
his famous quotation from Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 
581 (1948), a balance of the evils involved in, on the one hand, 
unpunished truancy of public officials and, on the other, the 
subjection of honest officials to unmeritorious lawsuits, 
calls for absolute immunity: 
"It does indeed go without saying that 
an official, who is in fact guilty of using 
his powers to vent his spleen upon others, 
or for any other personal motive not connected 
with the public good, should not escape 
liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, 
- 11 -
if it were possible in practice to confine 
such complaints to the guilty, it would be 
monstrous to deny recovery. The justification 
for doing so is that it is impossible to know 
whether the claim is well founded until the 
case has been tried, and that to submit all 
officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, 
to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable 
danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor 
of all but the most resolute, or the most 
irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of 
their duties. Again and again the public 
interest calls for action which may turn out to 
be founded on a mistake, in the face of which 
an official may later find himself hard put to 
it to satisfy a jury of his good faith. There 
must indeed be means of punishing public officers 
who have been truant to their duties; but that is 
quite another matter from exposing such as have 
been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has 
suffered from their errors. As is so often the 
case, the answer must be found in a balance between 
the evils inevitable in either alternative. In 
this instance it has been thought in the end 
better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by 
dishonest officers than to subject those who try 
to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation." 
While it is tempting to embrace a heightened summary judgment 
standard as a theoretically more highly tuned solution to this 
tradeoff, I am convinced for the reasons outlined above that it 
will fail. Rather than culling the good from the bad, it will 
merely open up all public officials to unwarranted and burden-
- 12 ·-
some lawsuits at the benefit of compensating those few 
plaintiffs who are actually injured. 
Sincerely, 
~0-' 
Mr. Justice Powell 





MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
DATE: April 12, 1978 
Justice Rehnquist's Position in McSurely, No. 76-1621 
I do not think that Justice Rehnquist's approach 
to this case will hold water, even on his own terms. The 
initial problem is that he starts from his Butz position 
and assumes that all the federal officials must have 
absolute immunity for actions within official authority. 
WHR memo, p. 9. This creates some tension with your views 
in Butz, since it's not clear what would be the historical 
justification for cutting the immunity away from its 
historical mooring in the Speech or Debate Clause. 
Moreover, it is not clear why the field investigation, to 
which WHR would accord only qualified immunity, does not 
fall within this range. He says on p. 8 that field 
investigations are clearly within the ambit of 
congressional power. 
2. 
The more important problem with WHR's analysis is 
that it does not seem to avoid the very problem it sets 
~ 
out to avoid: an insistence ~ a relatively stringent 
~ 
summary judgment standard. There is an allegation that 
the three Washington defendants and Brick were engaged in 
a conspiracy. Thus, unless the Dombrowski "more than 
merely colorable" standard is applied to them, they 
probably cannot hide behind their individual absolute 
immunities: they are linked to Brick's activity by virtue 
of the pleadings. 
That is why we had to resort to the Dombrowski 
route in the first place, and WHR does not explain how he 
is avoiding it. If there is no requirement of a showing 
of more than merely colorable substance as to the 
participation of ~ defendant, then WHR's theory would 
seem incapable of getting the Washington defendants out of 
the case. He is merely changing the name of the immunity 




JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
;ittprtltt.t <!Jll'Urlltf tlrt 'Jbti:t~ ~httt.s' 
JlzurJringhm. ~. <!J. 2ll~'!!~ 
April 12, 1978 
Re: 76-1621 - McAdams v. McSurely 
Dear Lewis: 
Although I still have a good deal of uncertainty about 
this case, my present views are: 
1. That Bill Rehnquist is correct in his unwillingness to 
bend the summary judgment rule to dispose of this case: 
~ 2. That Bill and Byron are correct in their unwillingness 
to extend Speech and Debate immunity to include 
informal information gathering activity: 
v 3. That we should not create a new absolute immunity for 
legislators or their aides, beyond that authorized by 
the Speech and Debate Clause: 
4. That there is no need to venture into the factual 
thickets explored by Byron and Lewis because the 
questions presented by the certiorari petition do not 
embrace the sufficiency of the allegations of the 
complaint or the sufficiency of an affirmative defense 
of good faith: and 
5. That the dissemination of information by a legislative 
committee to the executive should be considered a 
legislative act entitled to immunity. 
In short, except for the dissemination claim, I 
substantially agree with Byron's views. I also do not think 
much of plaintiff's lawsuit but I am not sure that defendants' 
conduct was exemplary either. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
Dear 
• iiOO··!I: ~ ~~1i 'l: 
Thanks for your memorandum in this case. I am 
glad that we are relatively close on the result, and I can 
appreciate your concern over the summary judgment rules. I 
am not sure, however, that I understand why your reliance 
on absolute official immunity serves to avoid recourse to 
the heightened summary judgment procedure outlined in Part 
II-B of my memorandum to the Conference. 
Everyone who has spoken so far seems to agree that 
enough facts have been adduced as to Brick's possible 
wrongdoing to keep him in the case. The trouble starts 
with the three Washington defendants - McCleJlan, Adlerman, 
and O'Donnell. There is an allegation of conspiracy among 
Brick and those three to carry on various non-legislative 
activities in Kentucky and elsewhere. Thus, the Washington 
defendants are tied into whatever non-legislative actions 
Brick was performing out in the field, unless there is a 
requirement - as I believe there i.s under Dombrowski v. 
Eastland, 387 u.s. 82 (1967) - that the plaintiffs adduce 
f'acts--or affidavits tending to establish "more than merely 
colorable" substance to the charges of wrongdoing ~~ ~Q 
each defendant. ---- ---
It seems to me that you have not avoided this 
problem simply by changing the name of the immunity you are 
applying to the Washington defendants. ~h~Ra~e 
Clause immunity is also a bsolute immuni~y,~so- tnat-your 
approach an 1 e hould not d1 · er w1 r pect to the 
light they cast upon the pleadings. In other words, the 
problem is not the scope of the immunity, but the posture 
of the case on summary judgment. Shifting from Speech or 
Debate to official immunity does not alter this, as I view 
the case. 
.._.,;;. 





In addition, as you would expect, I have some 
difficulty applying your analysis in Butz to this case. 
But apart from this more general problem, I am unable to 
see how taking your approach obviates resort to the sort 
summary judgment procedure you wish to avoid. 
Nor do I agree, at least as to federal practice, 
that we cannot influence (if not require) district courts 
to hold plaintiffs who sue government officials to a 
stricter standard on summary judgment than in an FELA case ,· 
- whether the official claims qualified immunity or - '" 
absolute immunity. The policy considerations ldenti.fied on 
p. 17 of my memo, and recognized Jn our cases, justify this. '1····· . . ;~ ,. 








.... :··' I am beginning to feel, in view of the fusillades 
launched 'in my direction, that my foxhole is not deep '!'. 
enough, ; and that I had best keep qui~t _ . . ' 
' 
~ But ~ ~ill respond briefly' t~ your letter m~rely 
to say that as to two of your five points, we are not in 
disagreement. If it were necessary to decide that Speech 
or Debate immunity does not include informal information 
gathering, I would agree·. This question t<~as expressly left 
open in my memo. · 
., 
· :, .~ ~-~ Nor would I create any "new absolute immunity" or, 
indeed, any new immunity of any kind. My point was that an 
aide (e.g., Brick}, if not entitled to invoke Speech or 
Debate -Clauser-mmuni ty, could re1 at least on alified 
otfl~i~unity. As the case now stan s, however, this 
quest1on--i~ presented. See note _, :in my memorandum. 
l· . ~ 
. As to the fifth point in your letter 
(dissemination to the IRS), I would simply leave that issue 
open. On the record before us, . I am not at all s~re that 
it is ' i.n , the case. ~ .. -
' " -·,,, ,, " " .. •n 
:1.1'< 
1~ ~\8:.~<-
We are in disagreement as to the duty of a 
District Court, where Speech or Debate immunity is the 
issue. The policy considerations identified in Dombrowski 
and Servicemen's Fund then would require a DC, i'n-my view:-
to expect-a plaintiff to go beyond vague "information and 
belief" allegations. • 
'l. ~-; _,, . .,. •:\ 
't; J'';d( 
We disagree also as to the questions fairly raised 
by the petition and brief of the Solicitor General. I 
think a fair reading makes clear that he did raise the 
issue whether a viable Fourth Amendment claim was raised by 
McSurelys' pleadings and affidavits. 
-2-
~ ').'1 
You have mentioned, rightly, that we seem this • 
Term to be "burying" a number of the Court's prior 
decisions. In my view Dombrowski, a case similar in many 
respects to this one, can-be added to the list if the Court 
concludes that the McSurJeys hav~ shown "more than merely 
colorable substance" to their allegations. 
I do not wish bad luck on any of my Brothers, but 
I would not be "bitter" - to use the Chief's term if this 
cat were now put on "someone else's back". I aJready have 
spent as much time on this "loser" as Bill Brennan and I ~ 











April '14, 1978 :\' 
l~v 
·t Si~ce the~e were no "takers" of my generous offer 
thj s ,mornl.ng · to reU nquish my ., interest in ~E~.!:!!~Jr, I , wi lJ. 
continue the dialogue. · ~ 
~· -. -~-- ~., ~~>1\: I.~) ~-
: .. 1 t; ; • ~ f]'- f ~.t. j,". 
' ,, ,: 'f ··~ ,, Some of the circulated comments indi cat'e a 
perception tha~ Part II B of my initial. memo would ;~~~;~ 
undercut Ru e 56. This is neither its pur. pose nor its :( ''\, 
effect. Rather, I have attempted, .. · n , j ght of the ' ' 
teaching of Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 u.s. 82 (1967), to 
be fai thfu1. to-the purposes ofa-consti tutional provision 
-- the Speech or ,Debate Clause. 
. It is that Clause that provides fo! congressional 
defendants protection from the burdens ,of litigation. It 
is that constititutional immunity · that requires plaintiffs 
to come forward with "more than merely colorable substance 
to [their] assertions" before a lawsuit can be allowed to 
proceed against such defendants.. Id., at 84 . A Rule 56 
motion is merely the avenue for affording that procedural 
protecti6n, ~ which actually derives from the Constitution 
itself •• My view of this aspect of ~the case would be the 
same if there were 0no Rule 56 . ~ .. ~u'J.i.!" ·r,. / , 
' ~":'' 'I' X 
, ·•· I would be glad to amend my memorandum, or to add 
a footnote to this effect, if this is a stumbling block 
for other Members of . the Court . _ •• 
if,~ ;;,;;/' ~~: ;!;: .k J,• 
,. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u.prttttt <!fqmigf tlrt ~tb ~tzdtg 
jtuftitt:gton, ~. <!f. 2ll.;i'l-$ 
April 17, 1978 
Re: No. 76-1621 - McAdams v. McSurely 
Dear Lewis: 
I think that your willingness to "continue the dialogue" 
in this case is admirable, and that the case is one of those 
whe re additional dialogue might produce a consensus which is 
not apparent now. 
As to the summary judgment point involving Rule 56, I 
may have expressed myself too strongly, and if so would like to 
now set the matter straight in the interest of obtaining a 
consensus if one is possible. I think that the phraseology 
from Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 u.s. 82 (1 967), to the effect 
that the plaintiffs must come forward with "more than merely 
colorable substance to [their] assertions" before a lawsuit can 
be allowed to proceed against defendants protected by the Speech 
and Debate Clause is one of those phrases that sounds good until 
you try to apply it. Since you were not the author of the 
language in the case, I feel no reluctance in asking "What does 
it mean?" My impression of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
is that they were designed to require trial on the merits of all 
contested actionsL_~li~~e there was no "genuine issue of material 
fact", and to permit summary judgment with respect to the latter. 
I think the creation of a hybrid, which you are quite correct 
in citing Dombrowski v. Eastland as supporting, is inconsistent 
- 2 -
with these rules. If the immunity is absolute there should be 
no requirement of "more than merely colorable substance to 
[their] assertions", other than the assertion that the official 
was acting outside the scope of his official duties, in order 
to have their case dismissed. If, on the other . hand, there is 
merely a "qualified good faith-reasonable" privilege, then, as 
I suggested in my earlier memorandum, this is the sort of battle 
that a defendant asserting such a privilege should never be able 
to win on summary judgment. 
I agree absolutely with you as to the result~ everybody 
but Brick should succeed on the immunity defense. I am perfectly 
willing to call that defense an extension of the Speech or Debate 
Clause immunity, or another form of the doctrine of official 
immunity. But I think we ought frankly to recognize that if 
these defendants are to be released on immunity at the pre-trial 
stage, their immunity cannot defend on their own good faith 
or the reasonableness of their belief~ the only point in issue 
can be whether or not they were acting within the outer perimeters 
of their official duty, and this seems to me so patently clear 
that a motion for summary judgment would be warranted. 
Thus my disagreement with you, to the extent that it may 
have been expressed in my earlier memorandum, comes not from a 
disagreement as to result but from a preference for acknowledging 
that some aspects of the privilege which the defendants claiming 
in this case, whether it be denominated an extension of the 
Speech and Debate Clause or a form of official immunity, be 
recognized as a doctrine of substantive law, rather than just an 
increased procedural burden. I don't think the quoted language 
fran Dombrowski v. Eastland is susceptible to the principled 
application by this Court or by other courts. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
Dear Chief: 
One of your clerks called to inquire whether I had 
formally "relinquished" the assignment to me of this case. 
I suppose the answer i.s "no", i.f emphasis is 
placed on the word "formal". My records indicate you are 
the only Brother who joined me completely. Bi1J Rehnquist 
joined me in the result only. Byron has circulated views 
differ i.ng substant 'tally from mine, ano Bi.Jl Brennan has 
' joined Byron. John Stevens also has indicated substantial 
agreement with Byron. I do not have any record of having 
heard from Potter., Thurgood or Harry. :, 
I think I commented at a Conference someti.me ago 
that in view of this diversity of oplnion, I have no idea 
how to reconcile it. I cannot tell at this point whether 
there is a majority for any particular judgment. 
As to my own position, I remain firm in Parts I 
and II. I indic~ted in my letter of April 5 to Byron that 
I had had considerable djfficu1ty with Part III, and that 
his reading of Judge Leventhal's opinion was a plausible 
one. I could modi.fy Part III to accord with Byron's 
reading of the opinion, but my result still would differ 
from his because of our difference as to the constitutional 
burden plaintiffs bore in the summary judgment proceeding 
under Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 u.s. 82 (1967). 
In any event, in these bewildering circumstances, 
more than happy to relinquish any residual cJajm to 




ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.iltprtnt.t Qftturl ttf flrt ~nittb .§bdtg 
~asqittgLtn, ~. Qt. 2.0.?'1-~ 
June 6, 1978 
Re: 76-1621 - McAdams v. McSurely 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
In light of Lewis' memo of June 5, I propose 
we discuss this case "one last time" at Thursday's 
Conference. My records parallel Lewis' as to the 
respective stances of each of you who have responded. 
Depending upon Potter's, Thurgood's and Harry's 
views, a reassignment, or assignment, as the case 
may be, might be necessary. 
;0: .(r~ ;,: 
Morituri te salutamus! 
The important point to make at Conference is 
that you are not rewriting Rule 56, but carrying out 
the mandate of the Speech or Debate Clause as in-
terpreted in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967). 
If a Court does not form around your position, 
I would recommend strongly that you vote to DIG. The 
plethora of opinions and rationales that would 
follow our failure to get a Court could disastrously 
confuse this area of the law for years to -come. ~~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.:iuprttttt <qtnttt 4tf tlr~ ~nitta ~htttg 
._.Mftittgbm. ~. <q. 2ll.;i~$ / 
June 7, 1978 
Re: No. 76-1621 - McAdams v. McSurely 
Dear Lewis: 
If it gives you any comfort, prior to tomorrow's 
conference, this is to let you know that generally I lean 
toward your proposed disposition of the case. There are 
some bumps along the way for me, but you also encountered 
some. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.ilt}Jrmtt (!fltltrl o-f tlrt ~b .§bdtg 
JfaslrittgLtn. J. QJ. 2!T~'l-~ 
June 7, 1978 
Memorandum to the Conference 
Re: 76-1621, McAdams v. McSurely 
My views in this case parallel those expressed 
by Bill Rehnquist in his letter of April 11 to Lewis 
Powell. 
P. S. 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
June 7, 1978 
Memorandum to the Conference 
Re: 76-1621, McAdams v. McSurely 
My views in this case parallel those expressed 




~ltprtntt Qt11nrt ,,f tire ~tittlt ~tau.s-
1tlasltingtcn, gl. <q. 2.0.?'~;t 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June a, 1978 
Re: No. 76-1621 - McAdams v. McSurely 
Dear Byron; 




Mr. Justice White 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEs 
No. 76-1621 
Herbert H. McAdams, III, as Executor 
of the Estate of John L. McClellan, 
et al., Petitioners, 
v. 
Alan McSurely et ux. 
'[March -, 1978] 
On Writ of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit. 
MR. JusTICE PowELL announced the judgment of the Court 
and delivered the following opinion.* 
This case presents important issues concerning the scope 
of legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause.1 
Specifically, the original petitioners-a Vnited States Senator 
and three members of a committee staff-co11tend that the 
Clause protects them from suits based on the alledegd use of 
illegal means in the course of field investigations related to 
congressional inquiries. They also argue that, on this record, 
respondents have not adduced sufficient evideuce connecting 
them to the alleged illegal actions to lift the cloak of legisla-
tive immunity. For the reasons that follow, we reject the 
first contention, but agree with the second argument as to 
three of the four petitioners. 
I 
In 1967, Alan and Margaret McSurely were field organizers 
for the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., in Pike 
County, Ky. Alan McSurely also had served as a field orga-
*Part II of thi~ opiniou i~ joined only by THE CHmF JusTICE and Mn. l 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN. 
1 Article I , § 6, cl. 1, provides that ' 'for Sprech or Drbate in either House, 
[Senato!1l and Represrntative;; I Hhall not be q11estioncd in any other Place." 
I ' 
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nizer for the National Conference of New Politics and 
distributed literature for Vietnam Summer. On the night of 
August 11, 1967, under authority of a warrant charging sedi-
tious a.ctivities against the Commonwealth of Kentucky and 
the United States in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. ~ 432.040, 
Pike County officials arrested the McSurelys and seized a 
quantity of books, pamphlets, and letters found in their 
home. Shortly after the raid, Thomas Ratliff, Common-
wealth Attorney for Pike County, announced publicly that the 
seized material would be made available to any Congressional 
Committees interested in the McSurelys. 
On September 14, 1967, a three-judge District Court for the 
Eastern District of Kentucky, one judge dissenting, declared 
the Kentucky sedition statute unconstitutional on its face and 
enjoined state prosecution of the McSurelys. M cSurely v. 
Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (ED Ky. 1967). The court ordered 
that all the seized material "be held by rRatliff] in safekeeping 
until final disposition of this case by appeal or otherwise." 
App. 78. 
Soon after issuance of the District Court's order, Ratliff 
received a telephone call from Lavern Duffy, Assistant Counsel 
to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
Senate Committee on Government Operations. The Subcom-
mittee, which was headed by Senator McClellan, was investi-
gating the causes of various riot.c;; across the Nation, including· 
one that had occurred in Nashville, Tennessee, in April 1967. 
Some of the Subcommittee's information showed that the 
organizations with which thf' McSurelys were a.ffiliated might. 
have been involved in the Nashville riot. Hence, Duffy 
asked Ratliff whether the materials seized from the McSurelys 
were in his custody. Ratliff replied that they were, and on 
October 8, 1967, a Subcommittee investigator, John Brick, 
arrived in Pikeville, the county seat. 
That same evening Thadeus Scott, a Commonwealth detec-
tive~ visited l3tkk'a motel room. and gave Brick photocopies 
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pf 234 of the seized documents. The next morning, Brick 
_,pent an hour examining the originals in a locked room at the 
Pike County courthouse. Apparently, Ratliff tried to reach 
the members of the three-judge court before, permitting Brick 
to enter the locked room. He succeeded in reaching the dis-
senting member of the court, but what transpired is not clear.2 
Brick also visited the Clerk of the District Coutt, who 
allowed him to inspect the case file of the McSurelys' three-
judge court action. Brick arranged to have the Clerk send 
him a copy of the court's safekeeping order and the inventory 
of seized items. On October 12, 1967, Brick again entered the 
locked room at the county courthouse and spent four hours 
taking notes on the materials. He then returned to W a.shing-
ton, taking with him the 234 copies that Scott had given him. 
This material included one personal letter addressed to Mrs. 
McSurely, which concededly had no relevance to Brick's inves-
tigation. At Senator McClellan's direction, Brick prepared 
subpoenas duces tecum for some of the material in Ratliff's 
possession that Senator McClellan concluded would be rele-
vant to the investigation of the Nashville riot. 
The McSurelys moved before the three-judge court to 
prevent Ratliff from releasing the subpoenaed materials.a On 
October 30, 1967, the court denied the motion and directed the 
2 At the McSurely';; sub::;rqnent trial for contempt of Congrr~~, ser n. 5, 
infra, Ratliff testified that "I had my permission" before he a11owed Brick 
access to the stored materials. Defendants' Appendix 407, United States 
v. McSurely, Nos. 24,812, 24,813 (DC 1971). The implica.tion of this 
sta.tement was that the dissenting judge gave "permission," but that is not 
clear. Moreover, the scope of any permission remains unexplained. Ra.tliff 
conceded that he had not communicated with the cocustodian of the 
materials, United States Marshal Archie Kraft, before permitting Brick to 
inspect the materials. /d., at 407-408. 
:• The MrSurely::; did not prrmi~e thrir oppo::;i1 ion to 1 he ::;ubpo<'llllH upon 
any allegedly unla.wful activity on Brick's part in impecting and transport-
ing the documents. Indeed, they testified that they did not even become 
aware of Brick's actual role until December 5, 1967. Id., at 655-65fJ, 
681-682, 704-705, 707-709. 
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parties to cooperate with the Subcommittee.' Further litiga· 
tion rnsucd." culminating in an oruer of the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit in July 1968, holding that since the time 
for appeal from the judgment of the District Court striking 
down the sedition statute had expired, there was no basis for 
continued court custody. The court ordered the seized mate. 
rials returned to the McSurelys, M cSurely v. Ratliff, 398 F. 2d 
817 (CA6 1968), and noted that questions as to the validity of 
the subpoenas still were open. According to Brick, the Sub· 
committee's photocopies were returned to Detective Scott on 
August 14, 1968. The originals and copies were returned to 
the McSurelys on November 8, 1968. Upon receipt of these 
materials, the McSurelys were served with new subpoenas. 
On March 4, 1969, McSurelys appeared before the Sub-
committee and refused to comply with the subpoenas. Their 
refusal rPsultcd in a conviction for contempt of Congress,6 but 
in December 1972, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the subpoenas were 
the fruit of two Fourth Amendment violations: (i) the original 
seizure by Kentucky officials, and (ii) Brick's "unauthorized 
search and inspection of the documents" in violation of the 
~ The court's ordPr rrad in part as follows: 
"The parties to this action and the officers of this Court are directed to 
·cooperate with the Senate Committee in making available such of the 
materials, or copies thereof, as the Committee considers pertinent to its 
inquiry; but until time for appeal is expired, this will be done in such 
ma.nnPr as to keep intact those materials that may be pertinent to the 
appeal of this case." 
It. cannot b<> detPrmined whether thi~ may be read as a retroactive 
ratification of Brick'~; in~prctiou and transportation activties. There is 
notlung in thP rpcord bPforr u~ to indicate that. the three-judge court was 
appri~Nl of thoRP activitir~ . SPr lRO U. S App. D. C., at. 117 n . 59, 553 
.F. 2.d, at 1293 11. 59. 
" For a synopsis of that litigation's course, see the opinion below of 
Judge Wilkey, id., at 132-133, 553 F. 2d, at 1308-1309. 
n Thr variom; te:stimony refprred to in thi~ memorandum was given at the 
\'OC\lltempt trial. See, e. g., n. 1, S'Uprq. 
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three-judge court's safekeeping order. United States v. 
McSurely, 154 U. S. App. D. C. 141, 154-155, 473 F. 2d 1178, 
1191-1192 (1972). 
On the same day that they appeared before the Subcom-
mittee, the McSurelys filed this action/ alleging that Se11ator 
McClellan, Brick, Jerome S. Adlerman (the Subcommittee's 
General Counsel), Donald F. O'Donnell (the Subcommittee's 
Chief Counsel), and individual Members of the Subcommittee 
had conspired to violate the McSurelys' constitutional rights. 
They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and $50,000 
damages from each defendant. The action was stayed to per-
mit the contempt trial to proceed. McSurely v. McClellan, 
138 U. S. App. D. C. 187, 426 F. 2d 664 ( 1970). In Septem-
ber 1971, while the appeal of their contempt conviction wa.s 
pending, the McSurelys filed an amended complaint, naming 
Ratliff, McClellan, Brick, Adlerman, and O'Donnell as defend-
ants. The amended complaint alleged in essence that the 
federal defendants had conspired with Ratliff to carry out an 
illegal raid in 1967, and to inspect, tran,sport, and use the seized 
materials in violation of the McSurelys' constitutional and 
other rights. On October 26, 1971, petitioners moved to 
dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment on the 
basis of legislative immunity, failure to state a claim, and 
collateral estoppel by virtue of the contempt convictiou.A The 
motion was denied and petitioners appealed.11 
7 Li~h:d with the MrSurely~ as plaintiffs in thiH initial complaint were 
three associations with which they were connected: the Southern Conference 
Educational Fund, the Southern Student Organizing Committee, and the 
Students for a Democratic Society. 
~ Ratliff did not joill thi~ motion. 
1' Normally the denial of a motion for ~ummar~· judgment i;; uot appeal-
able because it is not a final decision for purposes of § 28 U. S. C. § 1291. 
See generally 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice ~ 56.21 [2], at. 56-1275 to 
56--1286 (2d ed. 1976). The Court of Appeals. however, adopted the 
reasoning of the panel opinion, which hE>Id that this particular denial had 
"sufficient in,dicia of finality," 172 U. S. App. D . C. 364, 371, 521 F . 2d 
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In 1974, while petitioners' appeal was pending in the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, respondents obtained 
documents thought by them to indicate that the Subcommittee 
had established an information-sharing relationship with the 
Internal Revenue Service. These documents were lodged with 
the Court of Appeals, together with affidavits suggesting that 
petitioners might ha.ve exhibited the allegedly wrongfully 
seized materials to agents of the Internal Revenue Service. 
In 1976, the Court of Appeals, en bane, affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, and remallded.1 " Judge Leventhal wrote for 
himself and four others, as did Judge Wilkey. Senior Jqdge 
Danaher, who had sat on the panel, joined Judge Wilkey's 
1024, 1031, quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United Sta.tes, 370 U. S. 294, 308 
(1962), to qualify as a.pJ)('alable, even t.hough it was not a. deci.~ion that 
ended t.he action. The panel observed that the Speech or Debate Clause, 
upon which the summary judgment motion was focused, protects Members 
of Congress and their aides from the burdens of defending themselves as 
well as from the consectuences of the litigation. 172 U.S. App. D. C., at 372, 
521 F. 2d, at 1032, citing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82,85 (1967). 
Reasoning that the asserted right to be free of the burdens of a. la.wsuit, 
would be irretrievably lo~t if the case procof'dcd to trial, the panel con-
cluded that an appeal from the final judgment would come too late to pro-
vita meaningful review of that ela.im. Hence, a.s to the assertion of immu-
nity from inquiry, the denial of summary judgment. was held a. "final 
decision" for purpol:les of § 1291. 172 U. S. App. D. C., at 372, 521 F. 
2d, at 10:32. Neithcr :>idE' chall<-nge:-; that. analyl:li~ hrrl'. Sec all:lo Cohen v. 
Beneficial Loan Corp., :~a7 U.S. 541 (1949) . 
w While thc ca~c was in 1ht> Court of Appeals, Brick and Adlcrman died. 
180 U. S. App. D. C., at 104 n. 1, 55:{ F. 2d, a,t 1280 n. 1. The Court of 
Appenls did not decide whether the actions against. them survived, lea.ving 
that issue for the District Court 01\ remand. In August 1977, respondent 
moved in the District Court to ~ubstitute t.he survivors or estates for Brick 
and Adlerrnan. Petitioners oppose that. motion, arguing tha.t respondents' 
delay caused t.he a.ction to abate. They nevertheless named Brick and 
Adlerman as petitioners in case this opposition should fa.il. See Fed. Rule 
App. Proe. 43 (a). We need not pass on the questions either of surviva.l or 
· aba.tement of the actions. 
Senator McClellan died while the case was pending before this Court. 
His executor was substituted under Rule 48 (1) of this Courj,, 
i" 
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opmiOn, but wrote a separate opinion as well. The court 
unanimously reversed the refusal to dismiss that part of the 
complaint relating to the original seizure of the McSurelys' 
materials by Kentucky authorities. The court also agreed 
unanimously that summary judgment should have been 
granted as to the portion of the complaint charging unlawful 
use of the material within Congress itself. 180 U. S. App. 
D. C. 101, 104, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1280 (1976). Respondents do 
not dispute those actions here. 
The Court of Appeals, again unanimously, affirmed what it 
designated as the denial of summary judgment as to those 
portions of the complaint alleging dissemination of the mate-
rial outside of Congress. Ibid. 11 By an evenly divided vote, 
it affirmed the denial of summru•y judgment on the allegations 
that Brick had violated the McSurelys' rights by inspecting 
the documents subject to the safekeeping order and transport-
ing copies back to Washington.12 Judge Leventhal, writing 
11 .TudgP LPventhal'H opinion and the i>hort. per curiam opinion stating 
the judgment both indicated that the dissemination claim was to proceed 
upon remand. .Judge Wilkey's opinion agreed with that disposition. 
Although Judge Danaher joined .Judge Wilkey's opinion, his separate opin-
ion seems to call for a different resolution of the dissemination claim, sin.ce 
he would have directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint entirely, 
on the basis of official immunity. 
12 All 10 juclgcH below appear to have agrPed f.ha.t the McSurely;; alleged 
seven categories of wrongdoing: 
" ( 1) The unlawful search and seizure of the McSu relys' books and 
papers by Kentucky authorities; 
"(2) the inspection by Brick of those unlawfully seized materials; 
" (3) the transport by Brick of copies of 234 documents to Washington; 
" ( 4) the inspection of some or all of tlwse 234 copies by the staff of the 
Subcommittee; 
" (5) the use of the copies, as the basis for issuance of subpoenas for some 
of the documents; 
" (6) the procurement of Contempt of Congress citations against the 
plaintiffs by consciously withholding from the Senate the facts relating to 
tn.e challenged subpoenas; 
" (7) the disseminatiGiil of some or all of the 234 copies obtained lhy .Brick. 
'\ .. f,:. 
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for himself and four others, concluded that the allegations 
and facts of record stated Fourth Amendment and invasion 
of privacy claims. Judge Wilkey, writing for the other five 
members of the court, disagreed and would have reversed and 
remanded only in the allegation of dissemination outside of 
Congress. Judge Danaher would have ordered the case di~ 
missed on the basis of official immunity. We granted cer-
tiorari. - U. S.- (1977). 
II 
'A 
In this Court, petitioners have chosen to rely principally 
upon an argument that was rejected by a.U 10 judges of the 
Court of Appeals. They contend that the protection of the 
Speeeh or Debate Clause extends "to [the use of] unlawful 
means to achieve legitimate objectives." "1 In their view, 
unla.wful activities carried out in the course of an otherwise 
legitimate investigation should be completely cloaked by a 
legislative immunity that "precludes judicial inquiry even into 
conduct that would be illegal or unconstitutiona.l if performed 
by private persons." 1 '1 Indeed, for purposes of this argument, 
petitioners concede that Brick's conduct was "a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment." 1" They insist, however, that legis-
to persons or agencies outside of the Subcommittee-particularly the 
Internal Revenue Service." 180 U. S. App. D. C., a.t 108, 553 .F. 2d, at 
1285 (footnote omited). 
At issue here are allegations (2), (3), and (7). 
·1u Brief for Pct.Jtioncrs 15. 
u !d., at 14. 
1 " At oral nrgumcnt, petitioners made their concession on this issue quite 
explicit: 
"QUESTION : A11en't you conceding for the purpose of argument that 
there was wrongdoing? 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: We are conceding for the purposes of thiS; 
srgument that [Brick's activity] was actionable in some way. 
1'QUEST~ON : 1:hat.'s what l thought., 
76-1621- 0PINION 
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lative immunity from suit is meaningful only when a Member 
or a legislative aid is alleged to have engaged in conduct that 
would be actionable if engaged in by a private citizen, since 
an "immunity that would protect on,ly when no wrong was 
alleged to have been committed would be no immunity at 
all." 10 
While this extreme position may have some superficial plau-
sibility, its logic would lead to acceptance of untrammeled 
l('gislative power.17 Moreover, it has been rejected by prior 
decisions of this Court. In Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 
U. S. 82 (1967), this Court squarely held that legislative 
immunity did not shield a congressional aide charged with 
"QUESTION: And also a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Yes, we are conceding for purposes of this 
a.rgument." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. See also id., at 29. 
1 ° Brif'f for PPtitioncr 15. 
1 7 In petitioners' vifw, Je~islative immunity "probably" cxtendR even to 
deliberate theft and murder, so long as they occur in the course of a 
congressional investiga.tion. This was made clear a.t oral argument: 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: . ... 
"But essentially our approach rests on the contention that the immunity 
is triggered by the purposes of the activity in which the Senator or the 
Senate aide was engaged. We believe that this approach was consistent 
with and indeed required by the considerations that led to the establishment 
of the constitutional privilege. 
"QUESTION: How far does that reasoning take you? Let's say its 
purposes were very clearly to aid the legislative process by aiding the 
congressional committees, and in pursuance of that. pristinely protected 
purpose he simply burglarized a house and stole things out of a locked 
drawer or safe. Is he protected under the Speech or Debate Clause for 
that ? I am talking now, by "he" I mean an aide to the committee. 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Mr. Justice Stewart, that question raises a 
number of complexities. My answer to it ultimately is, yes, probably he 
is protected. 
"QUESTION: Including murder, I suppose. Well, maybe not there. 
"MR. EASTERBROOK : That, too falls within my yes, probably 
answer, but I would like, if I can-this one, the answer is not. intuitively 
appcalin.g, I must concede." Tr. of Oral Ar_g. 14-15. See also id., at 16-1.7. 
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violating the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights in the 
course of an otherwise legitimate investigation.'~ Similarly, 
our decision in Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 628-
629 ( 1972), held that the Speech or Debate Clause did not 
immunize an aide from grand jury questioning concerning pos-
·sible criminal conduct in the course 'of Senate information-
gathering activity. As we declared in Gravel, "no prior case 
[has] held that Members of Congress would be immune if 
they executed an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out 
an illegaJ arrest, or if, in order to secure information for a 
hearing, themselves seized the property or invaded the privacy 
of a citizen. Such acts are no more essential to legislating 
18 Pt>titionrns attrmpt to di~:>tinguish Dombrowski on tlw ground that 
the congressional aide involved in that case was not engaged in investiga-
tive activity on behalf of Congrrss. They argue that he merely "con-
spired with state officials to plan and carry out a. raid to gnin evidence 
for use in a state prosecution." Brief for T~etitioners, at 2!}. In their 
view, summa.ry judgment in his favor was rrversed simply because the 
Speech or Deba.te Clause furnishes no protection to r~etivities not carried 
·out in the course of a. congressional invPstigaA.ion. Petitioners' characteri-
zation of the fad ::; in that. case is erroneous. As we observed in Gravel v. 
United States, 408 U. S. 606, 620 (1972), t.hc aide in Dombrowski "was 
gathering information for a, hearing." Moreover, the record in, Dom-
bmwski mrikes clf'a.r that the aide tr::weled to Louisiana. at the behest of 
Senator Eastland and in pursuance of the investigative functions of a 
Senate Subcommittee. Record in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 0. T. 1966, 
No. 118, pp. 35, 40-41 , 87, 91-94. 
Dom.b1·owslci can be read as suggesting t.hat the scope of legisla.tive 
immunity for niclcs is narrower than that for the Member. 387 U.S., a.t 85. 
' 'This suggestion , however, wns laid to rest in Gravel v. United States, 408 
U. S. 606 (1972), which lwld "that the Sprech or Debate Clause applies 
not only to a Mrmber but abo to hi~ aides insofnr as the conduct of the 
latter would be a protected legislat ive act if pNformed by the Member 
l1imself." !d., nt, 618. Our decision in Eastland v. United States Service-
men's Fund, 421 U. S. 491, 502 (1975), viewed the distinction in 
Dombrowski between Member and aide not as one deriving from a 
· difference in the srope of their legislntive immunities, but as one rela.ting 
to the activities in which !,hey were alleged to have 'engaged ,by the: 
· <~Complaint. 
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than the [conspiracy] held unprotected in United States v. 
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966)." Gravel, supra, at 621 (foot-
note omitted). Conduct in the course of informal investiga-
tive activity simply does not fall within the Speech or Debate 
Clause if it clearly exceeds the lawful powers of Congress. 
Our decision in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's 
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), is not to the contrary. There the 
Court addressed the "power to investigate and to do so through 
compulsory process." ld., at 504 (emphasis added). We 
refused to recognize an action to enjoin implementation of a 
facially proper subpoena, holding the subpoena "an indispen-
sable ingredient of lawmaking," 19 id., at 505. We had no 
occasion, however, to consider the effect of lawless activity in 
the course of informal investigative conduct. Such activity 
simply is not a part of "th~ due functioning of the [legislative] 
process." Um:ted States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501, 516 
(1972) (emphasis in original). 
In arguing that an immunity which evaporates with the 
allegation of actionable conduct is no immunity at all, peti-
19 In this case the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of Bummary 
judgment as to the claims relating to the issuance of subpoenas: 
"The Subcommittee here employed proper process for information 'on 
which "legiruation could be had."' We note that the subpoenas called for 
materials that were at least arguably relevant to its investigation, but did 
not call for the production of Mrs. McSurely's letter or any other 
demonstrably irrelevant private correspondence. Under these circum-
stances Se1·vicemen's Fund prevents further inquiry into plaintiff's charge 
that the Subcommittee's purpose was to harass and intimidate them in the 
exercise of their First Amendment rights. The Subcommittee's issuance of 
subpoenas is privileged activity, notwithstanding plaintiff's bare allegation 
tha.t the real purpose behind the subpoenas was to 'cover-up' the earlier 
improper conduct by Brick, and the further assertion that had there been 
full disclosure the Subcommittee would not have issued the subpoenas, and 
the Senate would not have approved the contempt cita.tion." 180 U. S. 
App. D. C., at 122, 553 F. 2d, at 1298 (footnotes omitted) . 
No f]uestion is raised here concerning the correctness of the Court d 
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tioners misapprehend the sweep of our prior decisions dealing 
with investigative activity. When Congress employs facially 
proper means of information-gathering-such as the subpoena 
in Servicemen's Fund-the Speech or Debate Clause precludes 
both inquiry into legislative motive and lawsuits for damages 
resulting from the investigation. But when Members of 
Congress or their aides resort instead to criminal or otherwise 
unlawful methods of obtaining informa,tion, they exceed the 
power duly vested in Congress and can expect no condonation 
by virtue on the Speech or Debate Clause. This "focus on 
means permits the court to afford relief 'without proof of a 
legislative act.' " 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 112, 553 F. 2d, at 
1288 (opinion of Leventhal, J.), quoting Gravel, 408 U.S., at 
621. Legislat.ive immunity does not shield a Member or his 
aide from being called to account for Fourth Amendment or 
other violations committed in the course of their investigative 
work in the field. Dombrowski, supra; cf. Gravel, supra.2 0 
B 
Petitioners further contend that on the record in this case, 
respondents' complaint should be dismissed because they have 
not made the requisite showing of liability. It is clear that 
when a defendant entitled to invoke Speech or Debate immu-
nity moves for summary judgment on that basis, the Constitu-
tion requires the plaintiff to adduce evidence affording "more 
than merely colorable substance" to allega.tions of actionable 
conduct. Dombrowski, 387 U. S., at 84. Otherwise, the 
cloak of immunity is 11ot.. lifted. and the Speech or Debate 
Clause forecloses further litigation. This follows from the 
established doctrine that Speech or Debate immunity protects 
Members of Congress and their aides "not only from the con-
sequences of litigation's results bnt also from the burden of 
""In light of thi::: conclusion, we n('Cd not dC'termint> whether even prop-
erly conducted fi<>ld invrRtigation would fnll outside the protection of the 
S!(lPCch Ol' DebatQ Cla.li,'<e. 
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defending themselves." I d., at 85. Since petitioners moved 
for summary judgment on the basis of the Speech or Debate 
C'lause. the courts below were required to determine whether 
the Do·rnbrowski threshold-evidence affording "more than 
merely colorable substance" to the allegations of unimmunizecl 
conduct--had been passed with respect to each defeuda11t."1 
2 .1 Rrspondrnt8 wrrr put. on noticE' quite t'xplicitly that . b~· makiug the 
summary judgment motion petitioners were calling upon them to adduce 
some evidence tending to connect each defendant to the alleged wrong-
doing. The petitioners made that point repeatedly at the hearing on the 
summary judgment motion. For example, counsel for petitioners declared 
at one point as follows: 
" ... [P]art and partial [sic] of tl1e defense of legislative immunity, is the 
immunity of having to suffer the burdens of extensive litigation. 
"This is what the Supreme Court held in Dombrowski against East-
Jnnd . . . . And the on]~· refl><on that Dombrowski against Eastland was 
permitted to go into some discovery-and I understand that case has been 
dismissed for want of prosecution-the only reason was, there was on the 
record a discrepancy of factual evidence. The documents seemed to show 
some discrepancy about a date on some subpoena which lent some support 
in rtrgumcnt, and the Supreme Court said, in view of this factual dispute, 
we need to resolve it a little further before we can consider whether or not 
legislative immunity is sufficient to protect [the Member's aide]." Tr. of 
Hearing Oct. 28, 1971, at 15-16. 
More succinct.ly, counsel for petitioners stated: 
" ... I think t,he burden should be placed on the plaintiffs to come forward 
with any evidence they may have to suggest and demonstrate that these 
defendants were not acting within the scope of their legislative duties. 
That would present rtn issue in which we were forewarned. That is the 
function of the motion for summary judgment." /d., at 18. 
Respondents made a simila.r argument. in a. mf'monwdum supporting lhPir 
motion: 
"Tiw affidn.vit of Senator McClellan filed in support of t lw pending 
motion;; fully Pl:ltahli~lw~ t hr c·irrum~1.mJce,- b~· whi<'h the Sen at c' C'onunit tt>P 
conduct!'d it>-~ inve~tigation and ;;erved the Rubpoena,; out of whirh thi,; 
litigation ari~es. Aga.in, nothin(! i.n the McSnre/y~s' affidrwd fnmishcs any 
facts to demonstrate that Brick, Ad/erma.11. or O'Dollnl'll 11'1'1'1' adi11g 
outside the JJerimeter of their ii'(JiBlatioe functiollis." Rupplenwntal ::\femo-
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Respondents have satisfied the constitutional standard as to 
allegations of Brick's misconduct. It is stipulated that Brick 
inspected the documents subject to the safekeeping order in a 
locked vault in Pikeville and that he transported copies of 
selected ones to Washington. The court below divided evenly 
as to whether, in light of the three-judge court's safekeeping 
order, the stipulated facts state a claim under the Fourth 
Amendment. On the 'present state of the record, however, 
there is no basis for concluding that respondents failed to 
state a claim, if only for invasion of privacy.22 Some of the 
facts at issue in ~he dispute as to the validity of the Fourth 
Di::;mis:; or in the Altemative for Summary Judgment, Nov. 23, 1971, at 5 
(emphasis added). 
See also Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' 
Motion t.o Dismiss or in the Altemativc for Summa.ry Judgment, Oct. 26, 
1971, a.t 3-4; Reply of Defendants McClf'll::m, Adlerman, O'Donnell, and 
Brick to Plaintiff's Letter to the Court Da.ted Sept. 12, 1972, Oct. 13, 1972, 
at 10. 
Counsel for respondents indicated that he understood the burden peti-
tioners sought to cast upon him, although he disputed their right to do so : 
"Now comes Mr. Goldbloom [coW1sel for petitioners] and says, prove to 
me by f1~cts disputing Senator McClelland's [sic] affidavit that it is not 
true, before you can take depositions. How can I do that.? And this is 
what the trouble is with this whole posture. I am going to file an affidavit 
which says he is wrong. I have to say it on information and belief. And 
then he is going to come into court and say, it is just on infom1ation and 
belief." Id., at 43-44. 
Thus, tJ1ere can be no queRiion that rrspondents were on not.ice as to the 
importance of adducing such evidence as they had with respect to each 
defendant. 
2 2 At oral argum<'nt , counsel for petitioners ::Lcknowledged tlJP possibility 
that the complaint ma.y state a cause of action under state tort law: 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: . . . There is the possibility that under Dis-
trict of Columbia or Kentucky law there is a common-law tort lurking in 
the background of this ca.se. Tha.t's the reason why we elected not to 
·make strongly here any arguments about. the me.'tning of the Fourth 
Amendment, precisely because there may be aJlegations of other bases of 
.. liability ba,sed on common law." Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. 
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Amendment claim were obtained only after oral argument en 
bane. 180 U. S. App. D. C .. , at 126 n. 84, 553 F. 2d, at 1302 
n. 84. There has been no opportunity to weigh the various 
characteriza.tions of Brick's activity or the meaning of the 
three-judge court's safekeeping order. Moreover, the record 
also contains testimony by Brick that he carried to Washing-
ton a copy of at least one document that he believed to be 
of no relevance to the Subcommittee's investigation of the 
riots. 23 Congress possesses no general power to investigate 
23 Brick te~tified a!' follows: 
"Q. Did you tell Mr. Dotson or any of the folk with whom you met 
there that there was some of that stuff that you didn't think that you 
needed? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Did you give it back to them? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Did you need that letter signed Dearest Cucumber or address 
De.o'trest Cucumber? 
"MR. BRESS: Objection. Irrelevant. 
"THE COURT: He may answer the question. 
"THE WITNESS: No. Didn't you say signed Dearest Cucumber and 
when in fact it says addressed to Dearest Cucumber. 
"MR. STAVIS: No, I didri't . 
"THE WITNESS: Was the question, did I need that letter? 
""BY MR. STAVIS: 
"Q. Yes. For the performance of your duties. 
·"A. No sir. 
"Q. As a matter of fact, in respect. to the performance of your duties, 
you didn't need most of the items in that list, did you? 
"A. Some of them. There were many others in the locked vault in 
the Court House that I would have obtained under the subpoena. 
"Q. That what? 
" A. That I would have obtained under the subpoena ha.d not the Sub-
committee stopped all a.ction when the defendants went. into Court. 
"Q. Did you-when I was asking my questions about this list of 234 
items, there were lots of these items that you didn'1, need a.t all, correct'? 
"MR. BRESS: Objection. Irrelevant. 
"THE COURT: I believe he has already answered the question. 
"BY MR. BRESS: 
··~ 
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private affairs, even by subpoena; the subject of the inquiry 
must always be one on which legislation could be had. Serv-
icemen's Fund, 421 U. S., at 504 n . . 15. Therefore, Brick's 
copying and transportation of concededly irrelevant material 
is sufficient to lift legislative immunity for purposes of a sum-
mary judgment motion. Brick's testimony on that subject 
ultimately may be explained aw,ay, or the inclusion of a single 
irrelevant letter may be deemed de minimis. But his tes-
timony, together with the other factors mentioned above, 
is sufficient to carry respondents across the Dombrowski 
threshold. 
The posture of the .ot.her three federal defendants, however, 
is decidedly different. The opinion of Judge Leventhal noted 
that although "plaintiffs have alleged Brick's involvement in 
possible actionable conduct with sufficient factual particularity 
to permit trial to proceed as to him, the record is silent on 
the involvement of defendants McClellan, Adlerman and 
O'Donnell 'in any activity that could result in liability.'" 
180 U. S. App. D. C., at 123, 553 F. 2d, at 1299, quoting Dom-
browski, supra, a.t 84. lu response to defendants' summary 
judgment motion and Seuator McClellan's affidavit denying 
any conspiracy or activities outside the scope of legislative 
activity, respondents could a.ver only on information and 
belief that the defendants joined in the conspiracy to drive 
respondents out of Pikeville ru'ld exceeded the bounds of legis~ 
"Q. Wha.t was your answer? 
"A. Some, yes. 
"Q. Some that you did? 
"A. It was-
"Q. Lots? 
"A. I object to the use of the word lots. 
"Q. A great many, a great many? 
"A. Oh, I will say many. Le~ me explain. I didn't select any of these 
a,s I told you." App. 101-102. 
•. 
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lative activity.21 Dombrowski teaches that mere allegations 
are not enough. 25 There must be facts of record tending to 
connect the defendant to the alleged misconduct. Having 
2• Senator McClellan's affidavit deniPd "any conspiracy, collaboration or 
any other participation of any sort in the allegedly illegal police raid 
allegedJy planned and conducted by defendant Ratliff." App. 49. He also 
denied that he or his aides had exceeded the legislative authority of the 
Subcommittee. !d., at 50. While his affidavit contains no specific denial 
of a Fourth Amendment violation by Brick with respect to the inspection 
of documents in Pikeville, the general denial of exceeding legislative a.uthor-
it.y must be read as embracing one. It is only fair to read the affidavit 
that way, since the specific theory of a separate Fourt.h Amendment viola-
tion by Brick-though supportable on the allegations of the amended 
complaintr-apparently did not emerge clearly until the case reached the 
Court of Appeals. 
Examination of the District Court record discloses no suggestion by 
appellants that Brick's activity in and of itself 'amounted to a S<'para.te 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, plaintiffs' theory of t.ht> ca;;e 
was that since the Kentucky S(>arch aJJd t:lC'izure had been ntkd unconstitu-
tional at the time of the Subcommitt('(' takeover of the documents, tho 
subpoenas were the fntit of thP original Kentucky seizure. This is the only 
Fourth Amendment theory set forth in thC' amended complaint. App. 
32-33. Thus, in the District Court the tlwory was not. that Brick's 
inspection of the documents in Pikrsville was a second violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, the issue dividing Judge Wilkey and Judge Leventhal; 
rather, the thC'ory then was that. Brick's inspPction, takeovPr, and tlw 
subsequent subpoenas were the fruits of the original illegal search and 
seizure. 
In these circumstances, it hardly could be expected that Senator 
McClC'!lan's affidavit would dPclare specifically that there had been no 
Fourth Amendment violation by Brick. Respondents had not been 
presented with that. theory of the case. Since the amended complaint ha.<: 
been viewed expansively, the Senator's affidavit correspondingly must b(' 
tak,en a.s putting in issue all the allegations subsequently read into the 
amended complaint. It denies, on bC'half of all the respondents, any 
activity outside the scope of legislative authority. 
To this denial, respondents could reply only "on information and belief 
[that] the defendant McClellan, together with defendants Adlerman, 
O'Donnell, and Brick, joined in the conspiracy of the defendant Ratlll' 
.[Footnote 25 is on p . 18] 
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found, properly, that the record was silent as to the involve-
ment of McClellau, Adlem1an, and O'Donnell in any activity 
that could result in liability. it was the duty of the court 
below to reverse the denial of their motion for summary 
judgment. 
Although this standard imposes a not insubstantial burden 
upon plaintiffs who srek to lift the veil of legislative immu-
nity, it is .i ustifi0d by thr purposes scrvPd by the Speech or 
Debate Clause. As noted above, it is intended to protect 
Mrml)('rs of Conp;res8 all(] their aides from "the burden 
of dcf0nding thrmsel Vf'R against unsubstantiated claims." 
Dombrowski, supra, at 85. Even wh0rc an injuuction is not 
sought. Mcmbrrs are forced "to divert their time, energy, and 
attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation." 
Id., at 503. Thus. the Constitution requires that motions 
foundrd on legislative immunity "be given the most expedi-
tious treatment by district courts because one branch of Gov-
ernment is bring asked to halt the functions of a coordinate 
branch." Servicemen's Fund, supra, at 511 n. 17. 
III 
The Speech or Debate Claus(' docs not immunize the dis-
semination of allPgedly actionable material "beyond the rea-
sonable bounds of the legislative task.'' Doe v. McMillan, 
412 P. S. 306. :us (1973). Again, however, a motion for 
summary judgment grounded on Speech or Debate immunity 
to force us out of Pikeville . .. . " App. 55-56. See also n. 19, supra. 
They nlso contested McClellan's general denial of exceeding legislative 
authority, App. 56, but agn.in no fads were adduced. 
2 '; ~or may thr involvrment of the l\Temb<·r or ,.:ome of hi~ aid~ br 
inferred solely from the involvement of other aides. In Dombrowski, sum-
mary judgment for Senator Eastland was upheld despite an allegation of 
conspiracy and the existence of facts linking his Subcommittee's chief 
counsel to possible Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, the mere fact 
that Brick may have engaged in conduct outside the scope of legislativ~ 
immun.it¥ clQes not suffice to li11k tne. Qth.e.r. d~e,udants to tha.t conduct. 
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requires a plaintiff to adduce evidence lending "more than 
merely colorable substance" to an assertion of uulawful dis· 
semination. Dombrowski, supra, at 84 .. 
Respondents argue that they have carried this burden with 
respect to their claim that petitioners exhibited to the IRS 
the documents Brick obtained in Pikeville. In 1974, they 
lodged with the Court of Appeals recently obtained material 
indicating that the Subcommittee had permitted agents of 
the IRS to inspect portions of the Subcommittee files. Spe-
cifically, respondents pointed to a letter of March 5, 1969/1; 
in which Senator McClellan informed the Secretary of the 
Treasury that the Subcommittee had taken certain steps in 
September 1968, toward arranging meetings with Internal 
Revenue agents for the purpose of exchanging information 
about organizations under investigation. Respondents also 
2o Thi:s letter read as follows : 
"UNITED STATES SENATE 
Committee on 
Government Operations 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investiga.tions 
Washington, D. C. 20510 
March 5, 1969 
'"Dear Mr. Secretary: 
"In accordance with Executive Order 11337, da.ted March 27, 1967, a 
resolution was duly adopted by the Committee on Government Opera-
Lions on September 18, 1968, with regard to the organizations listed on the 
attached pages. It should be noted that this request was made on Decem-
ber 16, 1968, prior to the expiration of Executive Order 11337. This is 
to reaffirm the same request pursuant to Executive Order 11454 dated 
February 7, 1969, and Treasury Decision 6133. 
"Pursuant to this resolution, I hereby designate the following individ-
uals, members of the Subcommittee staff, to make such examinations: Mr. 
Philip R. Manuel, Mr. John E. Drass, Mr. Fred P. Miller, Mr. Perman 
H. Clay, Mr. James H. Dillon, and Mr. Walter S. Fia.Jkewicz. In, this 
connection, it will he appreciated if the files could be assemblro in the 
district office of jurisdiction. In order to facilitate the work of the staff,. 
ilt ..-otrld be fu:rt.her a:ppreciated ilf the staff designees be permi.tted to con,.. 
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emphasized an IRS memorandum 27 showing August 28. 1968, 
as the date on which the possibility of a cooperative relation-
ship between Subcommittee and Service was first explored. 
Respondents argue that these materials tend to establish that 
the defendants exhibited to the Internal Revenue agents the 
Pikeville documents, which were not returned to respondents 
until November 8, 1968.28 
suit with Internal Revenue Agents and Auditors familiar with the content 
of the respective files. 
"Your cooperation in this matter will be greatly appreciated. 
"Honorable David M. Kennedy 
Secretary of the Treasury 
Washington, D. C." 
App., at 70. 
"Sincerely yours, 
John J. McClellan 
Chairman 
27 The memorandum reads in pertinent part as follows : 
"FAC1' SHEET 
EsTABLISHMEN1' oF SPECIAL SEnvrcE STAFF 
"Allegations have been made that the Internal Revenue Service estab-
lished the Special Service Staff from instructions received from White 
House officials. This simply is not true. The facts are these: 
"August 28, 1968. Mr. Philip Manuel, an investigator with the Perma-
nent Committee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Government 
Operations, contacted the Service to say that he had a group of seven 
investigators working for him on matters pertaining to certain organiza-
tions and other groups; that he had prepared a letter for the Chairman 
of the Committee, Honorable John J. McClellan; and that he expected 
the request to be signed sh01tly. His call was to alert us to the fa.ct that 
he wanted the Committee investigators to be permitted to discuss these 
matters with our District officials rather than to conduct inspection of 
returns in the National Office." App., at 73. 
2 " Although thE' documE'nts were' not returnE'd to thE' McSurPlyH until 
November, Brick testified that he returned the Subcommittee copies to 
Kentucky authorities on August 14, 1968-two weeks before ~he initial 
exploration of possible cooperation between the Subcommit.tee and the· 
Service. He also declared that the Subcommittee had made no additional: 
eopie:~: 
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The Court of Appeals, however, apparently did not view 
respondents' amended complaint as presenting this belated 
claim of dissemination outside the Subconunittee: 
"The claim of dissemination of some or all of the 234 
documents to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was 
not made in the amended complaint. This claim arose 
because of the disclosure of certain IRS documents, 
obtained as a result of a Freedom of Information Act suit, 
"Q. And did they-did there come a time when you returned those 
documE'Jlts? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. During the time that you had possession of the documents, were 
they publicly-publicized, distributed or seen by anybody outside of the 
Committee? 
"A. No, sir, and not by anybody inside of the Committee, either. 
"Q. Where were the documents maintained? 
"A. In my personal file under lock a.nd key and the key was always 
in my pocket and that was by order of Senator McClellan,. 
"Q. Did Sena.tor McClellan look at those records? 
"A. No, sir. He looked at one. 
"Q. Did there come a time when you-after the expiration of certain 
litigation between the McSurelys and the officials in Kentucky, did you 
then return that batch of documents to the authorities in Kentucky? 
"A. I did. I returned thE>m to Thadcus Scott on August 14, 1978. 
"Q. And is the receipt that has been marked listing the 230-some docu· 
mcnts, is that the receipt that you got when you returned them? 
"A. That is the receipt I prepared and he signed, yes. 
"Q. Did you retain any of the documents thereafter or did yon make 
any copy of any documents and retain them in your file? 
"A. I never made a single copy of those documents. I retained none. 
I have not now and the Subcommittee has none. All the documents were 
returned to Mr. Tha.deus Scott. I have never u~ed a, Xerox machiuc on 
those documents, although it has been said here a number of timE's that 
I did. I did not." App. 97-98. 
This te::;limony was incorporated in Senator McClellan's affidavit accom-
panying the swnmary judgment motion. ld., at 50. Respondent,<; diF:-
pute it, although they have adduced no facts tending to disprove it. Sco 
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which indicated contacts, beginning on August 28, 1968, 
between members of the Subcommittee staff and the IRS 
concerning formal access to each other's files." 180 U. S. 
App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d, at 1285 n. 25 (em~ 
phasis added). 
The court noted further, ibid., that the complaint "also" made 
two other allegations that could have been related to the 
dissemination claim. First, there was a charge that Brick had 
exhibited the McSurely documents "to persons whose names 
are unknown to plaintiffs." App. 31-32. Second, the com-
plaint alleged that McClellan has "used the instrumentality 
of the [Subcommittee] investigation to carry out a personal 
vendetta between himself and a certai11 personage of promi-
nence named in some of the private correspondence of the 
plaintiff Margaret McSurely." App. 35. The court pointed 
out, however, that there was "no specific allegation that Brick 
embarrassed plaintiffs or that McClellan pursued his purported 
'vendetta' by dissemination outside the Subcommittee itself. 
The claim of dissemination outside the Halls of Congress 
apparently rests on access by the IRS officials." 180 U. S. 
App. D. C., at 109 n. 23, 553 F. 2d, at 1285 n. 25.:!n In sum, 
:!" Thr Court of Apprab' diHCllH~ion of tbr pari ic.,;' disputr and 1 he two 
allegations in the amended complai11t is as followH: 
"On November 25, 1974, plaintiffs filed a supplemental affidavit lodging 
thesr rerrntly disclosed materials with the court. The federal defendants 
countered on January 24, 1975, arguing that even if the IRS had ga.ined 
.nccess to the Subcommittee files at some point after August 28, 1968, the 
McSurelys could not, have been harmed thereby because the 234 copies 
were returned to Commonwealth Detective Scott on August 14, 1968 (and 
received by the McSurelys on November 8, 1968), and Brirk had testified 
nt the McSurelys' contempt trial that he made no copies and that neither 
·he nor the Subcommittee retained :my of the documents, D. A., II, 730. 
Phtintiffs, in their reply to defendants' response, filed January 31, 1975, dis-
pute both that the documents were turned over to Scott on August 14, 
1968, anct that no copies were mude. Since we affirm the Distrirt Court'$ 
76-1621-0PINION 
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the court's conclusion that the dissemination claim 11was not 
made in the amended complajnt," its distinction between that 
claim and the other two claims actually made in the com-
plaint, and its ultimate conclusion that the claim of dissemina-
tion rested solely on the newly developed theory indicate that 
the Court of Appeals did not believe that the amended com-
plaint encompassed this claim.30 
In light of this appa.rent conclusion, it is difficult to under-
stand the court's declaration in the same footnote that it was 
affirming "the District Court's denial of summary judgment 
on this claim," as well as the statement to that effect in the 
per curiam opinion announcing the judgment. If the com-
plaint did not encompass the new dissemination claim, there 
had been no occasion for the District Court to pass on its 
sufficiency, nor for the Court of Appeals to affirm any judg-
ment thereon. Respondents' belated injection, of the dissemi-
nation theory into the case, standing alone, would not amount 
to an amendment of the complaint, and no motion to amend 
was made. Because there had been no trial, there had been 
no admission of evidence to which the pleadings could be held 
to conform under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15 (b). Thus, it is 
denial of summary judgment on this claim, we leave the resolution of this 
que.stion to the District Court on remand. 
"Plaintiffs' amended complaint also alleges that Brick exhibited copies 
of the 284 item,; to unknown persons causing plaintiffs damagf' and embar-
ra.ssmcnt, and that McClellan 'used the instrumentalit.y of the [Subcom-
mittee J investigation to carry out a personal vendetta between himself and 
a certain perl>Onage of prominence named in some of the private corre-
spondence of the plaintiff Margaret McSurely.' Amended and SuppL 
Com pl. 1T1T 19, 28 (b) (ii), App. 45, 50. However, there is no specific alle-
gation that Brick embarrassed plaintiffs or that McClellan pursued his pur-
·ported 'vendetta.' by dissemination outside of the Subcommittee itself. The 
claim of dissemination outside of the Halls of Congrer apparently re1;!R on 
'access by IRS officials ." 180 U. S. App. D . C., Itt 109 n. 25, 553 F . 2rl, 
at. 1285 n. 25. 
"0 Tht> panel opiuion wns uo cbtl • t' on t.hi~ tii~liP. S<' P li:? 11 . R. App. 
D . C., at 373-874, and Il. 29, 521 F. 2d, at 1033- 1034, and n . 29. 
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unclear whether any issue regarding dissemination, of the 
McSurely materials outside Congress was properly before the 
Court of Appeals. 
For this reason, we must vacate the judgment of affirmance 
as to that claim. ·we Pxpress no opinion as to the merits 
of the dissemination theory.30 On remand, the Court of 
Appeals may determine whether the dissemination claim is 
embraced by respondents' amended complaint, or it may take 
such other steps with respect to this claim as it deems proper. 
IV 
The juclgnwnt of the Court of Appeals is affirmed insofar 
as it reversed the refusal of the District Court to dismiss the 
portions of the complaint relating to the original seizure of the 
McSurelys' materials. 1t is also affirmed insofar as it directs 
the entry of summary .iudgment. for petitioners as to claims 
concerning use of the materials within Congress. With 
respect to the claim concerniug Brick's inspection of the docu-
ments and transportation of copies. the judgment is affirmed 
as to Brick. but reversed as to McClellan. Adlerman, and 
O'Donnell. and remanded with directions to enter summary 
judgment for them on that claim. Finally, the judgment is 
vacated insofar as it purports to affirm the denial of sum-
mary judgment on the dissemination issue and remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion , 
:MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: Bob DATE: June 14, 1978 
RE: Our Draft in McSurely, footnote 20 
Our present footnote 20 is the vestige of a great 
long footnote we added in reply to the memo of Justice 
White. Most of it now has been omitted. It may be 
that this vestige should be omitted, too. 
The footnote reserves the question whether properly 
conducted field investigation is within the immunity 
provided by the Speech or Debate Clause. But a question 
from the Rehnquist Chambers prompts the conclusion 
that our opinion does not in fact leave that question ----open. Respondents are saying the following: "The 
Speech or Debate Clause does not extend to field investi-
gations. Hence, fall under the Dombrowski 
standard and need not make this 'more than merely colorable 
showing', as the opinion suggests." Because our opinion 
requires such a showing, we have at least implicitly 
held that the Speech or Debate Clause, with the Dombrowski 
gloss, applies to field investigations. Thus, we probably 
should omit this footnote. 
On a broader plane, you are forced to confront the 
question whether field investigation is a legislative act. 
In light of Gravel and United Servicemen's Fund, I think 
the answer probably is that it is. Those cases would 
2. 
~ 
haveAfar easier to decide if the Court could simply have 
said that activity in the field, unrelated to a subpoena, 
is not legislative. And it does seem to be part of the 
due functioning of the legislative process, as Judge 
Leventhal noted. Hence, if you must decide the issue 
in this case -- and it looks as though you must 
sticking with the Leventhal approach is probably more -in line with the past decisions of the Court, decisions 
that BRW and his crew are prepared now to recast. 
\ 
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MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring.~ 
I join Parts I, III and IV of Mr. Justice Powell's 
opinion. While I also agree that the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals must be affirmed with respect to the claim concerning 
Brick's inspection of the documents and transportation of 
copies, but reversed as to McClellan, Adlerrnan, and O'Donnell, 
I reach this result by rationale different from that employed 
by Mr. Justice Powell in Part II of his opinion. Immunity, -
whether of a constitutional or common-law origin, is a 
substantive rather than a procedural doctrine. According 
by my Brother Powell, congressmen are liable in civil damages 




of their legislative activities; the Speech or Debate Clause 
merely guarantees that congressmen can avoid the burdens of 
a full trial if the plaintiff is unable to "adduce evidence 
affording 'more than merely colorable substance' to allegations 
of actionable conduct." Ante, at 12, quoting from Dombrowski 
v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 84 (1967). 
Our past cases, however, provide no support for such 
a heightened summary judgment standard. Once it is established 
that the defendant was engaged in protected activity, the only -
question is whether the defendant is absolutely immune 
in which case the action must be dismissed -- or only enjoys 
qualified ~unity -- in which case the defendant must prove 
. - -
that he acted in good faith. Immunity, in other words, is a 
-
doctrine of substantive law which determines whether a public 
c:: --- ..._..... 
official may have a defense for tortious actions which would 
otherwise subject him to liability; it is not a doctrine of 
• 
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procedural law which modifies the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. I would accord Senator McClellan, Adlerrnan, 
and O'Donnell ab~olute immunity and therefore reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals as to them. I would, how-
ever, accord only qualified immunity to Brick. 
I 
The purpose behind constitutional and common-law 
immunity was perhaps best summarized in a now-famous opinion 
by Judge Learned Hand. 
•!t does ·indeed go without saying 
that an official, who is in fact guilty 
of using his powers to vent his spleen 
upon others, or for any other personal 
motive, not connected with the public good, 
should not escape liability for the 
injuries he may so cause; and, if it were 
possible in practice to confine ~uch com-
plaints to the guilty, it would be 
monstrous to deny recovery. The justi-
fication for doing so is that it is 
impossible to know whether the claim is 
well founded until the case has been 
tried, and that to submit all officials, 
the innocent as well as the guilty, to 
the burden of a trial and to the inevitable 
danger of outcome, would dampen the ardor 
of all but the most resolute, or the most 
irresponsible, in the unflinching dis-
charge of their duties. Again and again, 
the public interest calls for action which 









may turn out to be founded on a mistake, 
on the face of which an official may 
1ater find himself hard put to satisfy 
a jury of his good faith. There must 
indeed be means of punishing public of-
ficers who have been truant to their 
I 
duties; but that i~ quite another matter 
from exposing such as have been honestly 
mistaken to suit by anyone who has 
suffered by their errors. As is so often 
the case, the answer must be found in a 
balance between the evils inevitable in 
either alternative. In this instance it 
has been thought in the end better to 
1eave unredressed the wrongs done by 
dishonest officers than to subject those 
who try to do their duty to the constant 
dread of retaliation." Gre;roire y. 
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (CA 2 1948). 
A heightened standard of summary judgment would do little, if 
anything, to protect public officials from unrneritous lawsuits, 
while it would have the concomitant disadvantage of impairing 
the important goal of uniform procedural standards in civil 
cases. As Learned Hand ultimately concluded in Gregoire, honest 
p~lic officials can only be protected from unmeritorious 
lawsuits by substantive immunity. 
- 5 -
Under my Brother Powell's theory, a plaintiff, to 
survive summary judgment, must adduce evidence affording 
"more than merely colorable substance" to allegations of action-
able conduct. This requirement would be unlikely to decrease 
significantly the number of unmeritorious lawsuits. The 
standard is obviously open to different interpretatio~s and 
undoUbtedly would be stretched and pulled according to the 
proclivities of the particular district court judge before 
whom the claims are brought, with little opportunity for 
y 
principled and meaningful appellate review. Even assuming, 
moreover, that judges were able to agree on the proper inter-
pretatian· and application of the standard, I doubt that many 
litigants would find themselves unable to meet it in practice. 
No more than a few experiences in the courtroom would teach 
even legal neophytes exactly what sorts of affidavits would 
- 6 -
lend "more than mere colorable substance" to their claims. 
\ 
And I have little doubt thereafter that they would have 
virtually no difficulty in securing such affidavits. 
But even if I were more sure that a heightened standard 
of summary judgment would aid in carrying out the goal of 
immunity in protecting governmental officials from the time, 
worry and expense of combatting unmeritorious claims and 
thus unduly inhibiting them in the exercise of their official 
functions, I cannot join· in the creation of a novel exception 
to the normal standard of Rule 56. The evoiution of the 
----------~--~------------------
procedural aspects of the common law from the original 
forms of action, to the intermediate stage where the forms 
of action were abolished but code pleading existed in some 




stage where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their 
state counterparts govern virtually all civil actions --
has been a monumental change for the better in my opinion. 
It has taken hundreds of years to accomplish and is based 
on the notion that whatever the substance of the lawsuit, 
procedurally it may be litigated by following uniform rules 
in the form of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or 
cognate state provisions. Any attempt to modify those rules 
in one area of the law will inevitably invite modification, 
or at least claims for modification, in other areas of the 
law which will be difficult to distinguish on any principled 
basis from those which will have been created. Such a result 
w6uld be a serious setabck for what is presently a relatively 




I substantive grist of the legal mill is processed. 
----- ---·~- ---
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In summary, substantive immunity is the result of a 
balance_. (in the case of Speech or Debate Clause nnmunity, 
on the part of the framers; in the case of common-law immunity, 
by the courts) of the evils involved in, on the one hand, 
unpunished truancy of public officials and, on the other, 
the subjection of honest officials to unmeritorious lawsuits. 
While it is tempting to embrace a heightened summary judgment 
standard as a theoretically morefinely tuned solution to 
this trade-off, I am convinced for the reasons outlined above 
that it will fail. Rather than culling the good from the bad, 
it will merely open up all public officials to unwarranted 
and burdensome lawsuits at the benefit of compensating those 





R~spondents allege that petitioners violated their 
constitutional rights in the course of an informal field 
investigation. If such field investigations fell under the 
protection of the Speech or Debate Clause, petitioners would 
be absolutely immune from suit and respondents' action 
would have to be dismissed. Speech or Debate Clause immunity 
does not vanish when otherwise covered legislative activities 
are unlawful or unconstitutional. See Eastland v. United 
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509-510 (1975). 
Immunity which is lost once grounds for suit are made out 
• is no immunity at all. 
.,,_, ____ _ 
I 
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Informal field investigations, however, are not comprehended 
within the Speech or Debate Clause. The Court, of course, -
has wisely refrained from a "cramped construction" of the Speech 
or Debate Clause. Gravel v. United States, 408 u.s. 606, 618 
(1972). 
•[T]he Court's consistent approach has been 
that to confine the p~otection of the Speech 
or Debate Clause to words spoken in debate 
would be an unacceptably narrow view. 
Committee reports, resolutions, and the act 
of voting are equally covered7 • [i]n short, 
• • • things generally done in a session of 
the House by one of its members in relation 
to the business before it.' Kilbourn v. 
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881) •••• 
Rather than giving the Clause a cramped con-
struction, the court has sought to implement 
its fundamental purpose of freeing the 
·legislator from executive and judicial over-
sight that realistically threatens to control 
his conduct as a legislator." Id., at 617-
618. 
There are limits, however, to the legislat-ive acts that are 
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. "In no case has this 
Court ever treated the Clause as protecting all conduct 




408 U.s. 501, 515 (1972) (emphasis added). Immunity is 
extended under the Clause only for conduct which is an 
•integral part of the deliberative and 
communicative processes.by whi~h Members 
participate in committee and House pro-
ceedings with respect to the consideration 
and passage or rejection of proposed legis-
lation or with respect to other matters 
which the Constitution places within the 
jurisdiction of either House." Gravel, 408 
U.S., at 625: Eastland, 421 U.S., at 504. 
, in my opinion, 
Field investigation~do not fall within this broad core 
of legislative activities, "integral" to the "deliberative and -----
communicative processes," that is protected by the Speech or 
Debate Clause. Cf. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967). 
. As the court noted in Gravel, "no prior case has held that 
Members of congress would be immune [under the Speech or 
Debate Clause) • • • if, in order to secure information for 
a hearing, [they) themselves seized the property or invaded 
- 12 -
the privacy of a citizen." 408 U.s., at 621. Relief could 
be afforded in such a case "without proof of a legislative 
act or the motives or purposes underlying such an act." Ibid. 
lt. ,, 
Even though not constitutionally protected by the Speech 
or Debate Clause, Congressmen and their aides who are acting 
I 
within the outer perimeter of their legislative authority 
may still be entitled to claim official ~unity. The court 
has previously concluded that important public officials 
. 
who are engaged in activities within their governmental 
authority-enjoy a common-law immunity from civil damages · suits. 
A1though . such immunity is not constitutionally required, it 
•has been thought important that officials 
of government should be free to ·exercise their 
duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage 
suits in respect of acts done in the course 
of those duties -- suits \l ~>. ic~ would consume 
time and energies which would otherwise be 
devoted to governmental service and the threat 
- 13 -
of which might appreciably inhibit the 
fearless, vigorous, and effective ad-
ministration of policies of government." 
Barr v. Matteo, 360 u.s. 564, 571 (1959}. 
Xn determining whether a particular governmental official 
is entitled to claim. common-law immunity, "the Court has not 
fashioned a fixed, invariable rule of immunity but has ad-
vised a discerning inquiry into whether the contributions 
of ~unity to effective government in particular contexts 
outweighs the perhaps recurring harm to individual citizens." 
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.s. 306, .320 (1973). Although the -
Court has never expressly held that Congressmen are entitled 
to official immunity, it has extended such immunity to of-- -
ficials of both the executive and judicial branches of the 
2/ 
federal gover~ent. See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 
(cabinet officials}: Barr v. Matteo, suora (lower federal 
officials): Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872) (judges): 
Embler v. Pachtman, 341 U.S. 367 (1976) (prosecutors}. The 
- 14 -
court has also extended common law ~unity to state legis-
lators alleged to have deprived a plaintiff of constitutional 
rights in the course of a legislative investigation. See 
~enney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). 
There is no reason not to accord Congressmen and their 
aids the same official immunity that is enjoyed both by 
--------------~---·---------------
comparable members of the executive and judicial branches 
and by state legislators. Field investigations are today 
an ~portant Congressional tool. Failure to extend immunity 
from civil damages suits to Congressmen and aid.es engaged 
in such investigations could "seriously cripple the proper 
and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted 
to the [legislative] branch of the government... Vilas, 
161 u.s., at 570. The fact that the framers in 1787 chose 
··---..-- ~ 
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to constitutionalize absolute immunity for legislative acts 
that are integral to speech or debate does not mean that 
they intended Congressmen to enjoy less immunity under the 
common law than other governmental officials. The impli-
cation. ,indeed, is just the reverse. 
III 
Official immunity is a purely substantive doctrine and -
does not provide for a heightened standard of summary judg-
------------------~----------
ment. Thus, in Butz v. Economou, slip op., at 28, the Court -
emphasiz~s that motions for summary judgment based on official 
immunity should be decided only by a 11 firm application of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure... Whether respondents • 
action should proceed on towards trial depends instead on 
the answer to two questions. F_irst, were petitioners acting 
• 
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within the outer limits of their authority? Second, assuming 
they were, are they entitled to absolute or only qualified 
immunity for those actions? 
The answer to the first question is clear. Congress 
certainly had the power to investigate the causes of riots 
across the nation, including the one that occurred in Nashville 
in 1967. There is likewise no doubt that Congress had the 
power to carry on field investigations and that the actions 
taken by these federal officials, a Senator and three employees 
of Congress, were in furtherance of Congress• investigative 
functions. 
The answer to the second question is slightly more 
complex. Because the court has not previously addressed the 
application of official immunity to Congressmen and their em~ 
• 
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ployees, we must work largely by analogy to the immunity 
granted to similar officials of other branches or governments 
and the reasons behind common-law tmrnunity. As a general 
rule, the higher the official the 
broader the immunity to which he is probably entitled. 
•[T]hat is because the higher the post, the 
broader the range of responsibilities and 
duties, and the wider the scope of discretion 
it entails. It is not the title of his office 
but the duties with which the particular of-
ficer sought to be made to respond in damages 
is entrusted -- the relation of the act 
complained of to 'matters committed by law 
to his control or supervision,' Spaldinq v. 
Vilas, supra, at 498 -- which must provide 
the guide in delineating the scope of the rule 
which clothes the official acts of the [govern-
ment] officer with ~unity from civil 
defamation suits." Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.s., 
at 573-574. 
Working from these principles, it is clear that Senator 
McClellan was entitled to absolute immunity in his legislative 
actions. Pull immunity has previously been granted to state 
- 18 -
legislators, see Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, and to the 
heads of executive departments, see Spalding v. Vilas, 
supra. The wide range of responsibi~ities and duties by 
which a member of either House of Congress is burdened, combined 
with the broad discretion which he must exercise in order to 
execute these responsibilities and duties, calls for as full 
a grant of immunity as possible. A Congressman, like a cabinet 
official, should not be forced to operate 
•under an apprehension that the motives 
that control his official conduct may, at 
any time, become the subject of inquiry in 
a civil suit for damages. It would seriously 
cripple the proper and effective administration 
of public affairs as entrusted to the [legis-
lative] branch of the government, if he were 
subjected to any such restraint." Spaldin·g "v. 
Vilas, 161 u.s., at 498-499. 
The degree of immunity to be accorded to officials employed 
by Congress is a considerably more difficult question. In ex-
,I 
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tending immunity to state legislabors in Tenney, the Court 
cautioned that "this is a case in which the defendants are 
members of a legislature. Legislative privilege in such a 
case deserves greater respect than where an official acting 
on behalf of the legislature is sued." 341 u.s., at 378. 
Cf. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 u.s. 168 {188~. The Court, 
however, has not ltmited absolute immunity merely to the heads 
of the various branches of government, and our past precedents 
support the granting of absolute immunity also to Jerone 
Adlerrnan, the Subcommittee's General counsel, and Donald 
.v 
O'Donnell, the Subcommittee's Chief Counsel. Such officials 
are delegated many of the responsibilities of Congressmen 
• 
themselves and operate with much the same degree of discretion. 
As Justice Harlan explained for a plurality of the Court in 
---
- 20 -
Barr v. Matteo, which extended official ~unity beyond 
cabinet officials to lower executive officials, 
.,The privilege is not a badge or emolument 
of exalted office, but an expression of a 
policy designed to aid in the ·effective 
functioning of government. The complexities 
and magnitude of governmental activity have 
become so great that there must of necessity 
be a delegation and redelegation of· authority 
as to many functions, and we cannot say that 
these functions become less important simply 
because they are exercised by officers of lower 
rank in the executive hierarchy." 360 U ~ S., 
at 572-573. 
gator for the Subcommittee, however, is a good deal different. 
He held a position not merely substantially lower in the 
legislative hierarchy than the other petitioners, but one 
which contemplated far more routine duties. There is little to 
indicate that he was vested with sufficient discretion that 
the threat of litigation would, to paraphrase the now familiar 
words in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d., at 581, 
dampen his ardor in the unflinching discharge of his duties. 
{ 
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Indeed, his investigative functions bear close resemblence 
to those of police officers, who have never been granted an 
absolute and unqualified immunity under the common law. See 
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). See also Kilbourn 
v. Thompson, 102 U.S. 168 (1881). Accordingly, I would rant 
~nly a qualified, good-faith immunity. 
FOOTNOTES FOR McADAMS v. McSURELY 
!/ A heightened summary judgment standard may well be 
no answer at all for public officials who are only accorded 
· qualified immunity and thus must prove that they acted in 
good faith. A plaintiff certainly could not be expected 
or required to introduce counter-affidavits on the defendant's 
state of mind. Indeed, it simply 11 is not feasible to resolve 
on motion for summary judgment cases involving state of 
mind. 11 Wright, Law of Federal Courts 493 (1976). See also 




~ Although the Court has never expressly held that 
Congressmen and their aides are entitled to official immunity, 
the Court has implicitly acknowledged that legislative immunity 
is not limited solely to the bounds of the Speech or Debate 
Clause. Thus, in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967), 
where the defendants argued that they were immune under both 
the Speech or Debate Clause and common-law official immunity, 
the Court spoke broadly of "the doctrine of legislative 
~unity, having its roots as it does in the Speech or Debate 
Clause of the Constitution," id. at 85 (emphasis added), and 
relied on common-law immunity cases such as Tenney v. Brandhove, 
341 U.S. 367 (1951). See also Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 
318-324 (1972); Dombrowski v. Burbank, 358 F.2d 821 (CA D.C. 





Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 u.s. 82 (1967), does not 
conflict with the proposition that the chief counsel of 
a Congressional committee is entitled to an absolute common-
law immunity when acti~g within his authority. The court 
apparently approved of the holding of the Court of Appeals' 
panel, composed of Judge McGowan and now Chief Justice Burger, 
that both Senator Eastland and Chief Counsel Sourwine were 
immune from those claims "which related to the take-over of 
the records by respondents after the raids." Id. at 83-84 
(emphasis in original). But the Court of Appeals had failed 
to specifically address "petitioners• contention that the 
record shows a material dispute of fact as to their claim 
that respondent Sourwine actively collaborated with counsel 
to the Louisiana committee in making the plans for the 
V (Continued) : 
allegedly illegal 'raids.'" Id. at 84. Because there was 
evidence in the record showing that the investigation into 
petitioners' records had not been authorized by any member 
of the Senate Committee until after the raids, it was possible 
for the Court to conclude that Sourwine had acted outside the 
outer perimeters of his authority and thus was not entitled 
to any immunity. 
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Herbert H. McAdams, III, as Executor 
of the Estate of John L. McClellan, 
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v, 
Alan McSurely et ux. 
'[March -, 1978] 
On Writ of Certiorari 
to the United States 
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the District of Co~ 
lumbia Circuit. 
MR. JusTICE PowELL announced the judgment of the Court 
and delivered the following opinion.* 
This case presents important issues concerning the scope 
of legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause.1 
Specifically, the original petitioners-a United States Senator 
and three members of a committee staff-contend that the 
Clause protects them from suits based on the alleged use of 
illegal means in the course of field investigations related to 
congressional inquiries. They also argue that, on this record, 
respondents have not adduced sufficient evidence connecting 
them to the alleged illegal actions to lift the cloak of legisla-
tive immunity. For the reasons that follow, we reject the 
first contention, but agree with the second argument as to· 
three of the four pet.itioners. 
I 
In 1967, Alan and Ma.rgaret McSurely were field organizers 
for the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., in Pike 
County, Ky. Alan McSurely also had served as a field orga-
*Part II of this opinion is joined only by THE CHIEF Jus'l'ICE and Mn . 
.JusTICE BLACKMUN. 
1 Article I, § 6, cl. 1, provides that "for Speech or Debate in either House, 
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nizer for the National Conference of New Politics and 
distributed literature for Vietnam Summer. On the night of 
August 11, J967, under authority of a warrant charging sedi-
tious activities against the Commonwealth of Kentucky and 
the United States in yiolat.ion of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 432;040, 
Pike County officials arrested the McSurelys and seized a 
quantity of books, pamphlet&1• and letters found in their 
home. Shortly , after the raid, Thomas Ratliff, Common-
wealth Attorney for Pike ·County, announced publicly that the 
seized material ~buld be made available to any Congressional 
Committees interested in the M~Surelys. 
On September 14, 196{, a three-judge District Court for the 
Eastern District of Kentucky, one }udge dissenting~ declared 
the Kentucky sedition statute unconstitutional on its face and 
enjoined state prose(mtion of the McSurelys. M cSurely v. 
Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (ED Ky. 1967). The court ordered 
that all the seized material "be held by [Ratliff] in safekeeping 
until final disposition of this case · by appeal or otherwise/' 
App. 78. 
Soon after issuance of the · District Court's order, ··Ratliff 
received a telephone call froni'Lavern Duffy, Assistant Counsel 
to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
Senate Committee on Government Operations. ··· The Subcom-
mittee, which was headed by Senator McClellan, was investi-
gating the causes 'of va.rious riots across the, Nation; including 
one that hRd occurred in Nashville; Tennessee, in April 1961. 
Some of the' Subcommittee's information showed that the 
organizations with which the McSurelys were -affiliated might 
have been involved in' the' Nashville riot. Hence, Duffy 
asked Ratliff whether the materials seized from the McSurelys 
were in his · custOdy. Ratliff replied that they were, and on 
October 8, 1967, a Subcommittee investigator, John· Brick, 
arrived in Pikeville, the county seat. 
· That same evening Thadeus Scott, a Commonwealth dete.c-
t "tive, visited Brick's motel room and gave ~Brick ,_photocopies 
.•. 
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of 234 of the seized documents. The next morning, Brick 
spent an hour examining the originals in a locked room at the 
Pike County courthouse. Ratliff testified that he had tried 
to reach the members of the three-judge court before permit-
ting Brick to enter the locked room. He succeeded in reach-
ing the dissenting member of the court, but what transpired 
is not clear.2 
Brick also visited the Clerk of the District Court, who 
allowed him to inspect the case file of the McSurelys' three-
judge court action. Brick arranged to have the Clerk send 
him a copy of the court's safekeeping order and the inventory 
of seized items. On October 12, 1967, Brick again entered the 
locked room at the county courthouse and spent four hours 
taking notes on the materials. He then returned to Washing-
ton, taking with him the 234 copies that Scott had given him. 
This material included at least one personal letter addressed 
to Mrs. McSurely, which concededly had no relevance to 
Brick's investigation. At Senator McClellan's direction, Brick 
prepared subpoenas duces tecum for some of the material in 
Ratliff's possession. 
The McSurelys moved before the three-judge court to 
prevent Ratliff from releasing the subpoenaed materials.8 On 
October 30, 1967, the court denied the motion and directed the 
2 At the McSurcly's subsequent trial for contempt of Congress, see n. 5, 
infra, Ratliff testified that "I had my permission" before he allowed Brick 
access to the stored materials. Defendants' Appendix 407, United States 
v. M cSurely, Nos. 24,812, 24,813 (DC 1971). The implication of this 
statement was that the dissenting judge gave "permission," but that is not 
clear. Moreover, the scope of any permission remains unexplained. Ratliff 
conceded that he had not communicated with the cocustodian of the 
materials, United States Marshal Archie Kraft, before permitting Brick to 
inspect the materials. I d., at 407-408. 
8 The McSurelys did not premise their opposition to the subpoenas upon 
any allegedly unlawful activity on Brick's part in inspecting and transport-
ing the documents, Indeed, they later testified that they did not even 
become aware of Brick'~> actual role until December 5, 1967. !d., at 655~ 
~56,681-682, 704-705,707-709. 
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parties to cooperate with the Subcommittee.4 Further Iitiga. 
tion ensued,r. culminating in an order of the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit in July 1968, holding that since the time 
for appeal from the judgment of the District Court striking 
down the sedition sta.tute had expired, there was no basis for 
continued court custody. The court ordered the seized mate-
rials returned to the McSurelys, McSurely v. Ratliff, 398 F. 2d 
817 (CA6 1968), and noted that questions as to the validity of 
the subpoenas still were open. According to· Brick, the Sub· 
committee's photocopies were returned to Detective Scott on 
August 14, 1968. The originals and copies were returned to 
the McSurelys on November 8, 1968. Upon receipt of these 
materials, the McSurelys were served with new subpoenas. 
On March 4, 1969, McSurelys appeared before the Sub. 
committee and refused to comply with the subpoenas. Their 
refusal resulted in a conviction for contempt of Congress/ but 
in December 1972, the Court of Appeals for the District -of 
Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the subpoenas were 
the fruit of two Fourth Amendment violations: (i) the original 
seizure by Kentucky officials, and (ii) Brick's "unauthorized 
search and inspection of the documents" in violation of the 
4 The court's order rrad in part as follows: 
"The parties to this action and the officers of this Court are directed to 
cooperate with the Senate Committee in making available such of- the 
materials, or copies thereof, as the Committee considers pertinent to its 
inquiry; but until time for appeal is expired, this will be done in such 
manner as to keep intact those materials that may be pertinent to the 
appeal of this case." 
It ca,nnot be determined whether this may be read as a retroactive 
ratification of Brick's in~pection and trant>portation activties. There is 
nothing in thr rrcord brforr us to indicate that thr three-judge court wal:! 
apprit>rd of tho~e activities. See 180 U. S. App. D . C., at 117 n. 59, 5M 
F. 2d, at 1293 n. 59. 
5 For a synopsis of that litigation's course, see the opinion below of 
Judge Wilkey, id., at 132-133, 553 F. 2d, at 1308-1309. 
6 The variou~ tlli3timony ,!e!rrrrd to in thls opinion wa;:; givrn at the 
ttontempt trial. See, e. g., nt, II?Zpra, .:l, 
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three-judge court's safekeeping order. United States v. 
McSurely, 154 U. S. App. D. C. 141, 154-155, 473 F. 2d 1178, 
1191-1192 (1972). 
On the same day that they appeared before the Subcom-
mittee, the McSurelys filed this action,' alleging that Senator 
McClellan, Brick, Jerome S. Adlerman (the Subcommittee's 
General Counsel), Donald F. O'Donnell (the Subcommittee's 
Chief Counsel), and individual Members of the Subcommittee 
had conspired to violate the McSurelys' constitutional rights. 
They sought declara.tory and injunctive relief and $50,000 
damages from each defendant. The action was stayed to per-
mit the contempt trial to proceed. M cSurely v. McClellan, 
138 U. S. App. D. C. 187, 4~6 F. 2d 664 (1970). In Septem-
ber 1971, while the appeal of their contempt conviction was 
pending, the McSurelys filed an amended complaint, naming 
Ratliff, McClellan, Brick, Adlerman, and O'Donnell as defend-
ants. The amended complaint alleged in essence that the 
federal defendants had conspired with Ratliff to carry out an 
illegal raid in 1967, and to inspect, tran,sport, and use the seized 
materials in violation of the McSurelys' constitutional and 
other rights. On October 26, 1971, petitioners moved to 
dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment on the 
basis of legislative immunity, failure to sta.te a claim, and 
collateral estoppel by virtue of the contempt conviction.8 The 
motion was denied and petitioners appealed.9 
7 Listed with the McSurelys as plaintiffs in this initial complaint were 
three associations with which they were connected: the Southern Conference 
Educational Fund, the Southern Student Organizing Committee, and the 
Students for a Democratic Society. 
8 Ratliff did not join this motion. 
9 Normally the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not appeal-
able because it is not a final decision for purposes of § 28 U.S. C. § 1291. 
See generally 6 J . Moore, Federal Practice ~ 56.21 [2], at 56-1275 to 
56-1286 (2d ed. 1976). The Court of Appeals, however, adopted the 
reasoning of the panel opinion, which held that this particular denial had 




McADAMS v. McSURELY 
In 1974, while petitioners' appeal was pending in the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, respondents obtained 
documents thought by them to indicate that the Subcommittee 
had established an information-sharing relationship with the 
Internal Revenue Service. These documents were lodged with 
the Court of Appeals, together with affidavits suggesting that 
petitioners might have exhibited the allegedly wrongfully 
seized materials to agents of the Internal Revenue Service. 
In 1976, the Court of Appeals, en bane, affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, and remanded.l0 Judge Leventhal wrote for 
himself and fom· others, as did Judge Wilkey. Senior Judge 
1024, 1031, quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 308 
(1962), to qualify as appealable, even though it was not a. decision that 
ended the action. The panel observed that the Speech or Debate Clause, 
upon which the summary judgment motion was focused, protects Members 
of Congress and their aides from the burdens of defending themselves as 
well as from the consequences of the litigation. 172 U.S. App. D. C., a.t 372, 
521 F. 2d, at 1032, cit.ing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967). 
Reasoning that the asserted right to be free of the burdens of a la.wsuit 
would be irretrievably lost if the case proceeded to tria.l, the panel con-
eluded that a.n appeal from the final judgment would come too la.t.e to pro-
vide meaningful review of tha.t claim. Hence, as to the as;;ertion of immu-
nity from inquiry, the denial of summary judgment was held a "final 
decision" for purposes of § 1291. 172 U. S. App. D. C., at 372, 521 F . 
2d, at 1032. Neither ~ide challlenges that analysis here, and we see no 
reason to depart from it. St'e abo Cohen v. Beneficial Loa:n Corp., 337 
u. s. 541 (1949) . 
10 While the ca~e was in 1 he Cour1 of Appeals, Brick and Adlerman died. 
180 U. S. App. D. C., at 104 n. 1, 553 F. 2d, at 1280 n. 1. The Court of 
Appeals did not decide whether the a.ctions against them survived, lea.ving 
that issue for the District Court on remand. In August 1977, respondent 
moved in the District Court to substitute the survivors or estates for Brick 
and Adlerman. Petitioners oppose that motion, arguing that respondents' 
delay caused the action to abate. They nevertheless named Brick and 
Adlerman as petitioners in case this opposition should fail. See Fed. Rule 
A pp. Proc. 43 (a) . We need not pass on the questions either of survival or 
nba.tement of the actions. 
Senator McClellan died while the case was pending before this Court. 
His executor was substituted under Rule 48 (1) of this Court. 
,, 
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Danaher, who had sat on the panel, joined Judge Wilkey's 
opinion, but wrote a separate opinion as well. The court 
unanimously reversed the refusal to dismiss that part of the 
complaint relating to the original seizure of the McSurelys' 
materials by Kentucky authorities. The court also agreed 
unanimously that summary judgment should have been 
granted as to the portion of the complaint charging unlawful 
use of the material within Congress itself. 180 U. S. App. 
D. C. 101, 104, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1280 (1976) . Respondents do 
not dispute those actions here. 
The Court of Appeals, again unanimously, affirmed what it 
designated as the denial of summary judgment as to those· 
portions of the complaint alleging dissemination of the mate-
rial outside of Congress. Ibid.11 By an evenly divided vote,. 
it affirmed the denial of summary judgment on the allegations· 
that Brick had violated the McSurelys' rights by inspecting· 
the documents subject to the safekeeping order and transport-
ing copies back to Washington.12 Judge Leventhal, writing· 
n Judge !Rventhal'~ opinion and the short per curiam opinion stating 
the j"ud'gment "Doth indicated that the dissemination claim was to proceed· 
upon remand. Judge Wilkey's opinion agreed with that disposition. 
Although Judge Danaher joined Judge Wilkey's opinion, his separate opin-
ion seems to call for a different resolution of the dissemination claim, since 
he would have directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint entirely, 
on the basis of official immunity. 
12 All 10 judgeH bt'low appear to have agreed that the McSurelys alleged 
seven categories of wrongdoing: 
" ( 1) The unlawful search and seizure of the McSurelys' books and' 
papers by Kentucky authorities ; 
" (2) the inspection by Brick of those unlawfully seized materials ; 
" (3) the transport by Brick of copies of 234 documents to Washington ; 
" ( 4) the inspection of some or all of these 234 copies by the staff of the-
Subcommittee ; 
" (5) the use of the copies, as the basis for issuance of subpoenas for some 
'of the documents; 
·u (&) the procurement of QQntempt a· Conpe:lll citations ag;1inst tht: 
I • 
76-1621-dPINION 
McADAMS v. McSURELY 
for himself and four others, concluded that the allegations 
and facts of record stated Fourth Amendment and invasion 
of privacy claims. Judge Wilkey, writing for the other five 
members of the court, disagreed and would have reversed and 
remanded only in the allegation of dissemination outside of 
\ Congress. Judge Danaher 'would have ordered the case dis-
missed on the basis of 'official immunity. We granted cer• 
tiorari. -U.S.- (1977), 
II 
1\ 
In this Court, petitioners have chosen to rely principally 
upon an argument that was rejected by all 10 judges of the 
Court of Appeals. They contend that the protection of the 
Speech or Debate Clause extends "to [the Use of] unlawful 
means to achieve legitimate objectives." 13 In their view, 
unlawful activities carried out in the course of an otherwise 
. legitimate investigatiqn should be completely· cloaked by a 
legislative immunity tha.t "precludes judicial inquiry e,ven into 
conduct that would he illegal or unconstitutional if performed 
by private persons." 14 Indeed, for purposes of this argument, 
petitioners concede that Brick's conduct was "a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment .• " 15 They insist, however, that legis-
plaintiffs by consciously withholding from the Senate the facts relating to 
the challenged subpoenas; 
"(7) the dissemination of some or all of the 234 copies obtained by Brick 
to persons or agencies outside of the Subcommittee-particularly the 
Internal Revenue Service/' 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 108, 553 F. 2d, at 
1285 (footnote omitOO) . 
At issue here are allegations (2), (3), and (7). 
1a Brief for Petitioners 15. 
14 !d., at 14. 
u At oral argument, petitioners made their concession on this issue quite 
explicit: 
. "QUESTION: Aren't you conceding for the purpose of argument that 
' there was wrongdoing? .. 
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lative immunity from suit is meaningful only when a Member 
or a legislative aid is alleged to have engaged in conduct that 
would be actionable if engaged in by a private citizen, since 
an "immunity that would protect on,ly when no wrong wa.s 
alleged to have been conunitted would be no immunity at 
all." 1.o 
While this extreme position may have some superficial plau-
sibility, its logic would lead to acceptance of untrammeled 
legislative power.17 Moreover, it has been rejected by prior 
decisions of this Court. In Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 
U. S. 82 (1967), this Court squarely held that legislative 
immunity did not shield a congressional aide charged with 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: We are conceding for the purposes of this 
·argument that [Brick's activity] was actionable in some way. 
"QUESTION: That's what I thought. 
"QUESTION: And also a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Yes, we are conceding for purposes of this 
argument." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. See also id., at 29. 
1.o Brief for Petitioner 15. 
"17 In pet-itioners' view, legislative immunity "probably" extends even to 
deliberate theft and murder, so long as they occur in the course of a 
congressional investiga.tion. This was made clear at oral argument: 
"MR EASTERBROOK: .... 
"But essentially our approach rests on the contention that the immunity 
is triggered by the purposes of the activity in which the Senator or the 
Senate aide was engaged. We believe that this approach was consistent 
with and indeed required by the considerations that led to the establishment 
of the constitutional privilege. 
"QUESTION: How far does that reasoning take you? Let's say its 
purposes were very clearly to aid the legislative process by aiding the 
congressional committees, and in pursuance of that. pristinely protected 
purpose he simply burglarized a house and stole things out of a locked 
drawer or safe. Is he protected under the Speech or Debate Clause for 
that? I am talking now, by "he" I mean an aide to the committee. 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Mr. Justice Stewart, that question raises a 
number of complexities. My answer to it ultimately is, yes, probably he 
is protected. 
"QUESTION: Including murder, I suppose. Well, maybe not there. 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: That, too falls within my yes, probably 
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violating the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights in the 
course of an otherwise legitimate investigation.18 Similarly, 
'our decisio'ri in Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 628-
answer, but I would like, if I can-this one, the answer is not intuitively 
'appealing,·! must concede.'1 Tr. of Oral Arg,. 14-15 .. See also {d., at 16-17. 
18 Petitioners attempt to distinguish Dombrowski on the ground that 
the congressiorutl aide involved in that case was not engaged in investiga-
tive activity on behalf of Congress. They argue that he merely "con-
spired with state officials to plan . a.tid carry out a raid to gain evidence 
for use in a state prosecution." Brief for Petitioners, at 29. In their 
view, summa.ry .iudgment in his favor was reversed simply because the 
· Speech ,or Deba.te Clause furnishes, no protection to activities not carried 
out in the cours~ of a congressional investigation. Petitioners' characteri-
zation of the facts in that case is erroneous. As we observed in Gravel v. 
United States, 408 U. S. 60Q, 620 (1972), the aide in Dombrowski "was 
gathering informatiop_ for a. hearing." Moreover, the record in Dom-
browski makes clear that the aide traveled to Louisiana at the behest of 
Senator · Eastland and in pursuance of the investigative functions of a 
Senate Subcommittee. Record in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 0. T. 1966, 
No. 118, pn. 35, 40-41 , 87, 91-94. Indeed, the Court of Appeals in Dom-
browski explicitly statrd thRt ;' the subpoena. was expressly authorized in 
the first instance by the Chairman of the [congressional] committee .... " 
Dombrowski v. Burbank, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 358 F .. 2d 821, 825 
(1966) . The is:sue as to th<' di~puted date of the subpoenn in that case-
upon which MR. JU!:ITICE REHNQUI!l'l' relies for the proposition that the 
allegntion in Dombrowski wa~ that the rudC' simply ma.y have been acting 
outside the aegis of n. congre~sional committee, ante, at - n. 2-was 
relevant not. to tlw aide'~ rongrr~sional authorizai ion to issue the sub-
poena, but to the qut>stion of his participation in the alleged conspiracy 
to mount t.he challenged raids. Sre Brief for thP Respondents in Opposi-
tion, Dombrowski v. Eastland, 0 . T. 1966, No. 118, pp. 9-11; Brief for 
Petitioners, id., pp. 10, 67-68. 
Dombrowski can be read as suggesting that the scope of legislative 
immunity for aides is narrower than that for the Member. 387 U.S., at 85. 
'This suggestion, however, wa.s laid to rest in Gmvel v. United States, 408 
U. S. 606 (1972), which held "that the Speech or Debate Clause applies 
not only to a Member but also to his aides insofar as the conduct of the 
latter would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member 
'himself." !d., at 618. Our decision in Eastland v. United States Service-
men:s Fund, 421 U .. S. 491, .502 (1975), viewed the distinction in 
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629 (1972), held that the Speech or Debate Clause did not 
immunize an aide from grand jury questioning concerning pos-
sible criminal conduct in the course 'of Senate information-
gathering activity. As we declared in Gravel, "no prior case 
[has] held that Members of Congress would be immune if 
they executed an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out 
an illegal arrest, or if, in order to secure information for a 
hearing, themselves seized the property or invaded the privacy 
of a citizen. Such acts are no more essential to legislating 
than the [conspiracy] held unprotected in United States v. 
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966)." Gravel, supra, at 621 (foot-
note omitted). Conduct in the course of informal investiga-
tive activity simply does not fall within the Speech or Debate 
Clause if it clearly exceeds the lawful powers of Congress. 
Our decision in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's 
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), is not to the contrary. There the 
Court addressed the "power to investigate and to do so through 
compulsory process." !d., at 504 (emphasis added). We 
refused to recognize an action to enjoin implementation of a 
facially proper subpoena, holding the subpoena "an indispen-
sable ingredient of lawmaking," tu id., at 505. We had no 
Dombrowski between Member and aide not as one deriving from a 
difference in the scope of their legislative immunities, but as one relating 
to the activities in which they were alleged to have engaged by the 
complaint. 
19 In this case the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of summary 
judgment as to the claims relating to the issuance of subpoenas: 
"The Subcommittee here employed proper process for information 'on 
which "legislation could be had."' We note that the subpoenas called fot 
materials that were at least arguably relevant to its investigation, but did 
not call for the production of Mrs. McSurely's letter or any other 
demonstrably irrelevant private correspondence. Under these circum-
stances Servicemen's Fund prevents further inquiry into plaintiff's charge 
that the Subcommittee's purpose was to harass and intimidate them in the 
exercise of their First Amendment rights. The Subcommitt~'s issuance of 
subpoenas is privileged activity, notwithstanding plaintiff's bare allegation 
·~h!,tt ~h~ real purtlose b~hind the sub.I?oena!:; was to 'cQver-up' the earlier 
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occasion, however, to consider the effect of lawless activity in 
the course of informal investigative conduct. Such activity 
simply is not a part of "the due functioning of the [legislative] 
process." Um:ted States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501, 516 
(1972) (emphasis in original) . 
In arguing that an immunity which evaporates with the 
allegation of actionable conduct is no immunity a~ all, peti-
tioners misapprehend the sweep of our prior decisions dealing 
with investigative activity. When Congress employs facially 
proper means of information-gathering-such as the subpoena 
in Servicemen's Fund-the Speech or Debate Clause precludes 
both inquiry into legislative motive and lawsuits for damages 
resulting from the investigation. But when Members of 
Congress or their aides resort instead to criminal or otherwise 
unlawful methods of obtaining information, they exceed the 
power duly vested in Congress and can expect no condonation 
by virtue of the Speech or ·Debate Clause. This "focus on 
means permits the court to afford relief 'without proof of a 
legislative act.' " 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 112, 553 F. 2d, at 
1288 (opinion of Leventhal, J.), quoting Gravel, 408 U.S., at 
621. Legislative immunity does not shield a Member or his 
aide from being called to account for Fourth Amendment or 
other violations committed in the course of their investigative 
work in the field. Dombrowski, supra; cf. Grave~, supra.'lo 
improper conduct by Brick, and the further assertion that had there been 
full disclosure the Subcommittee would not have issued the subpoenas, and 
the Senate would not have approved the contempt citation." 180 U. S. 
App. D . C., at 122, 553 F . 2d, at 1298 (footnotes omitted) . 
No question is raised here concerning the correctness of the Court of 
Appeals' judgment on this issue. 
~H MR . .JUSTICE REHNQlTIH'r',; roneurring opinion would dispose of th<:> 
ca~E' on the ba~iH of a nt>wly formulatt>cl doctrinE> of official immunity. 
Apart from the fact that thi:; i~sue was ne1ther embraced by tht> question::; 
presented in tht> petitiou for rertioran nor argut>cl or briefPd, adherence 
to that view would rrquire the sub silentio overruling of Dombrowski v. 
Eastla:nd. That ra:se involvPd a lt>gislative official , CommittE>e Counsel 
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Petitioners further contend that on the record in this case, 
respondents' complaint should be dismissed because they have 
not made the requisite showing of liability. It is clear that 
when a defendant entitled to invoke Speech or Debate immu-
nity moves for summary judgment on that basis, the Constitu-
tion requires the plaintiff to adduce evidence affording "more 
than, merely colorable substance" to allegations of actionable 
conduct. Dombrowski, 387 U. S., at 84. Otherwise, the 
cloak of immunity is not. lifted, and the Speech or Debate 
Clause forecloses further litigation. This follows from the 
established doctrine d1at Speech or Debate immunity protects 
Members of Congress and their aides "not only from the con-
sequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of 
defending themselves." !d., at 85. Since petitioners moved 
for summa.ry judgment on the basis of the Speech or Debate 
Clause, the courts below were required to determine whether 
the Dombrowski threshold-evidence affording "more than 
merely colorable substance" to the allegations of unimmunized 
conduct-had been passed with respect to each defendant.21 
Sourwine, of pr£ci~ely the same rank as two of the petitioners to whom 
MR. JUt;'l'ICE REHNQUIS1' today would accord absolute official immunity. 
Sourwine argued in thi~ Court. that he was entitled tol official immunity c.\.so\"-\'c 
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (r893), and Barr v. 
Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 ( 1959), Brief for Repondents, Dombrowski v. East-
land, 0. T. 1966, No. 118, pp. 38-41. Nevertheless, the Dombrowski 
Court permitted the case to proceed as to him. Hence, Dombrowski must 
be read as rejecting thr proposition that the contours of any distinct 
official legislative immunity depart from those of the Speech or Debate· 
Clausr. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 324 (1973). Moreover, it 
would be difficult to reconcile MR. JusTICE REHNQUIS1''s view of the scope· 
of~ immunity with the holding in Butz v. Economou, No. 76~709, 
decided Jlme -, 19i8. 
n Respondents were put on notice quite explicitly that by making the 
summary judgment motion petitioners were calling upon them to adduce 
some evidence tending to connect eaeh defendant to the alleged wrong-
<doing. The petitioners made that point repeatedly a.t the hearing on the 
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Respondents have satisfied the constitutional standard as to 
allegations of Brick's misconduct. It is stipulated that Brick 
inspected the documents subject to the safekeeping order in a 
summary judgment motion. For example, counsel for petitioners declared 
at one point as follows: 
" ... [P]art and partia.I [sic] of the defense of legislative immunity, is the 
immunity of having to suffer the burdens of extensive litigation. 
"This is what the Supreme Court held in Dombrowski against East-
)and . . . . And the only reason that Dombrowski against Eastland was 
,permitted to go into some discovery-and I understand that case has been 
dismissed for want of prosecution-the only reason was, there was on the 
record a discrepancy of factual evidence. The documents seemed to show 
some discrepancy about. a date on some subpoena which lent some support 
in argument, and the Supreme Court said, in view of this factual dispute, 
we need to resolve it a little further before we can consider whether or not 
legislative immunity is sufficient to protect [the Member's a.ide]." Tr. of 
Hearing Oct. 28, 1971, at 15-16. 
More succinctly, counsel for petitioners stated: 
...... I think the burden should be placed on the plaintiffs to come forward 
with any evidence t.hey may have to suggest and demonstra.te that these 
·defendants were not acting within the scope of their legislative duties. 
That would present an issue in which we were forewarned. That is the 
function of the motion for summary judgment." I d., at 18. 
Petitioners made a similar argument in a memorandum supporting their 
motion: 
"The affidavit of Senator McClellan filed in support of the pending 
motions fully establishes the circumstances by which the Senate Committee 
conducted its investigation and served the subpoenas out of which this 
litigation arises. Again, nothing in the McSurelys' affidavit fw-nishes any 
facts to demon<~trate that Br·ick, Adler-man, or 0' Donnell were acting 
o·utside the perimeter of their legislative function<~." Supplemental Memo-
randum of Poipts and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, Nov. 23, 1971, at 5 
'(emphasis added) . 
See also Memorandum of Point;; a.nd Authorities in Support of Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment , Oct. 26, 
1971, at 3-4; Reply of Defendants McClellan, Adlerman, O'Donnell, and 
Brick to Plaintiff's Letter to the Court Dated Sept. 12, 1972, Oct. 13, 1972, 
:at 10. 
Counsel for respondents indicated that he understood the burden peti-
' \. ··' 
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locked vault in Pikeville and that he transported copies of 
selected ones to Washington. The court below divided evenly 
as to whether, in light of the three-judge court's safekeeping 
order, the stipulated facts state a claim under the Fourth 
Amendment. On the present state of the record, however, 
there is no basis for concluding that respondents failed to 
state a claim, if only for invasion of privacy.22 Some of the 
facts at issue in the dispute as to the validity of the Fourth 
Amendment claim were obtained only after oral argument en 
bane. 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 126 n. 84, 553 F. 2d, at 1302 
n. 84. There has been no opportunity to weigh the various 
characteriza.tions of Brick's activity or the meaning of the 
three-judge court's safekeeping order. Moreover, the record 
also contains testimony by Brick that he carried to Washing-
ton a copy of at least one document that he believed to be 
of no relevance to the Subcommittee's investigation of the 
riots.23 Congress possesses no general power to investigate 
tioners sought to cast upon him, although he disputed their right to do so: 
"Now comes Mr. Goldbloom [counsel for petitioners] and says, prove to 
me by facts disputing Senator McClelland's [sic] affidavit that it is not 
true, before you can take depositions. How can I do tha.t? And this is 
what the trouble is with this whole posture. I am going to file an affidavit 
which says he is wrong. I have to say it on information and belief. And 
then he is going to come into court and say, it is just on information and 
belief." ld,, at 43-44. 
Thus, there can be no qut'Sf ion th:1l respondents were put on notice as 
lo the importance of adduring such evidence as they had with respect to 
c!lch defendant. 
22 At oral argument, counsel for petitioners acknowledged the possibility 
that the complaint may state a cause of action under state tort law: 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: . . . There is the possibility that under Dis-
trict of Columbia or Kentucky law there is a common-law tort lurking in 
the background of this case. That's the reason why we elected not to 
make strongly here any arguments about the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, precisely because there may be allegations of other bases of 
liability based on common law." Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. 
23 Brick testifiE>d ai" follows : 
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' private affairs, even by subpoena; the subject of . the inquiry 
must always be one on which legislation could be had. Serv-
icemen's Fund, 421 U. S., at 504 n. 15. Therefore, Brick's 
there that there was some of that stuff that you didn't think that you 
needed? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Did you give it; back to them? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Did you n'eed that letter signed Dearest Cucumber or address 
Dearest Cucumber? 
"MR. BRESS: Objection. Irrelevant. 
"THE COURT: !Ie may answer the question. 
"THE WITNESS: N(). Didn't you say signed Dearest Cucumber and 
when in fact it §ays addressed to Dearest Cucumber. 
"MR. STAVIS: No, I didn't. 
"THE WITN:Ji;SS: Was the question, did I need that letter? 
"BY MR. STAVIS:' 
"Q. Yes:, For the performance of your duties. 
"A. No sir .. 
"Q. As a matter of fa.ct, in respect to the performance of your duties, 
you didn't need 'most of the items in that list, did you? 
"A. Some of them. There were ma.ny others in the locked vault in 
the Court House that I would have obtained under the subpoena. 
"Q. That what? 
"A. · That I would have obtained under the subpoena had not the Sub-
committee stopped all action when the defendants went into Court. 
"Q. Did you-when I was asking my qu('_stions about this list of 234 
· ~terns, there were lots of these items that you didn't need at all, correct? 
· "MR. BRESS : Objection. Irrelevant. 
"THE COURT: I believe he has already answered the question. 
"BY MR. BRESS : 
"Q. What was your answer ? 
"A. Some, yes. 
''Q. Some that you did ? 
'-'A. It was-
"Q. Lots? 
"A. I object to the use of the word lots. 
''Q. A great marw, a great many? 
"A. Oh, I will say many. Let me explain. I didn't select any of these 
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copying and. transportation of concededly irrelevant material 
are sufficient to lift legislative immunity for purposes of a sum-
mary judgment motion. Brick's testimony on tha.t subject 
ultimately may be explained away, or the inclusion of a single 
irrelevant letter may be deemed de minimis. But his tes-
timony, together with the other factors mentioned above, 
is sufficient to carry respondents across the Dombrowski 
threshold. 
The posture of the other three federal defendants, however, 
is decidedly different. The opinion of Judge Leventhal noted 
that although 11plaintiffs have alleged Brick's involvement in 
possible actionable conduct with sufficient factual particularity 
to permit trial to proceed as to him, the record is silent on 
the involvement of defendants McClellan, Adlerman and 
O'Donnell 'in any activit.y that could result in liability.'" 
180 U. S. App. D. C., at 123, 553 F. 2d, at 1299, quoting Dom-
browski, S'Upra, at 84. In response to defendants' summary 
judgment motion and Senator McClellan's affidavit denying 
any conspiracy or activities outside the scope of legislative 
activity. respondents could aver only on information and 
belief that the defendants joined in the conspiracy to drive 
respondents out of Pikeville and exceeded the bounds of legis-
lative activity.24 Dombrowski teaches that mere allegations 
H Sencttor McClellan's aJridavit denied "any conspiracy, collaboration or 
any other part.icipa.tion of any sort in the allegedly illegal police raid 
allegedly planned and conducted by defendant Ratliff." App. 49. He also 
denied that he or his aides had exceeded the legislative authority of the 
Subcommittee. !d., at 50. While his affidavit contains no specific denial 
of a Fourth Amendment violation by Brick with respect to the inspection 
of documents in Pikeville, the general denial of exceeding legislative author-
ity must be read as embracing one. It is only fair to read the affidavit 
th1~t way, since the specific theory of a separate Fourth Amendment viola-
tion by Brick-though supportable on the allegations of the amended 
complaint-apparently did not emerge clearly until the case reached the 
Court of Appeals. 
F.#Cam.ination of the District, Co\.ll't record discloses no suggestion by 
,, 
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are not e11ough.~5 There must be fa~ts of record tending to 
connect the defendant to the alleged misconduct. Having 
found, properly, that the record was silent as to the involve-
ment of-McClellan, Adlerman, and O'Donnell in any activity 
' ' \ 
that could result in liability, it was the duty of the court 
appellants tha.t. Brick's nctivit.y in a.ncl of itself amounted to a separate 
violation of the Fomih Amendment . In::;tend, plt~intiffs' theory of the cnse 
was that ~:>ince the Kentucky HC'arrh and ~:;eizurr had been ruled unconstitu· 
tional at the timr of the Subcommittee tak<>ovrr of the documents, the 
subpoenas werr the f;,tit of the original Kentucky seizure. This is the only 
Fourth Amendmrnt theory set forth in tht' nrnended rompJajnt. App. 
'32-33. Thus, in the District Court the theory wns not that Brick's 
impPction of the doettmPntK in Pike:svill(~ was a second violation of the 
Fourth AmPnclment, thP is:snr dividing Judge Wilkey and Judge Leventhal ; 
rn.ther, the throry then was that Brick':,; inspection, takeover, and the 
subl;equent subpoenas wPre tl1e fruits of the original illegal SC<'I.rch and 
seizure. 
In these circumstances, it Jw.rdly could be expected that Sena.tor 
McClellan's affidavit would declare S)Wcifically that there had been no 
FourtJ1 Amendment violation by Brick Respondents had not been 
presented with tha.t theory of the case. Since the amended compla.int has 
'been viewed expaJ1sively, the Senntor'l:l affidavit correspondingly must be 
taken as putting in issue all the allegatioru; subsequently read into the 
amended complrunt. It Mnies, on behalf of all the respondents, any 
activity outside the scope of lPgislative mlthority. 
To this denial, respondents could reply only "on information and belief 
[that] the defendan,t McClellan, together with defendants Adlerman, 
O'Donnell, and Brick, joined in the conspiracy of the defendant Ratliff 
to force u;;; out of Pikevillr .... " App. 55-56. See also n . 21 , S'Upr-a. 
They also contested McClellan's general denial of exceeding legislative 
authority, App. 56, but agrun no facts were adduced. 
26 Nor mny the involvement of the Member or some of his aides be 
inferred solely from the involvement of other aides. In Dombrowski, sum-
mary judgment for Senator Eastland was upheld despite an allegation of 
conspiracy and the existence of facts linking his Subcommittee's chief 
counsel to possible Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, the mere fact 
that Brick may have engaged in conduct outside the scope of legislative 
immunity does not suffice to link the other defendants to that conduct. 
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below to reverse the denial of their motion for summary 
judgment. 
Although this standard imposes a not insubstantial burden 
upon plaintiffs who seek to lift the veil of legislative immu-
nity, it is justified by the purposes served by the Speech or 
Debate Clause.20 As noted above, it is intended to protect 
Members of Congress and their aides from "the burden 
of defending themselves against unsubstantiated claims." 
Dombrowski, supra, at 85. Even where an injunction is not 
sought, Members are forced "to divert their time, energy, and 
attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation." 
Id., at 503. Thus, the Constitution requires that motions 
founded on legislative immunity "be given the most expedi-
tious treatment by district courts beca.use one branch of Gov-
ernment is being asked to halt the functions of a coordinate 
branch." Servicemen's Fund, supra, at 511 n. 17. 
III 
The Speech or Deba.te Clause does not immunize the dis-
semination of allegedly actionable ma.terial "beyond the rea-
sonable bounds of the legislative task." Doe v. McMillan, 
412 U. S. 306, 315 ( 1973). Respondents argue that they have 
made an adequate showing of improper dissemination. They 
rely on the lodging with the Court of Appeals in 1974 of re-
cently obtained material indicating that the Subcommittee 
had permitted agents of the IRS to inspect portions of the 
Subcommittee files. Specifically, respondents pointed to a 
26 Whilf' MR. ,lu~o;TICJ~ HEHNQUJ:sT's coucf'rn with maintaining "uniform 
procednra ~tandard~ in civil rases," post, at 4, is understandable, it 
should not be pPrmittf'd to owmde thE' dictates of thE' Speech or Debate 
Clau:;e. Dornbrowsl.·i makes it clPar that motions foundf'd on the Clause 
can be defea.ted only b~· a ,;bowing of "more than merPly colorable ~>ub­
stance" to the allPgation~ of unimmunizPd conduct. 487 U. S., at 84. 
This requiremE'nt ,;tern~ directly from the Constitution; a motion for sum-
·mary judgmf'nt undPr FN!. Rule Civ. Proc. 56 is merely the vehicle for 





20 McADAMS v. McSURELY 
letter of March 5. 1969,2 7 in which Senator McClellan in ... 
formed the Secretary of the Treasury that the Subcommittee 
had taken certain steps in September 1968, toward arranging 
meetings with Internal Revenue .agents for the purpose of ex-
changing information about organizations under investigation. 
'27 Thi:s letter rf'ad a~ follows: . 
"UNITED STATES SENATE 
Committee on 
Government, Operations 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee 
on lnvestigatiops 
Washington, D. C. 20510 
March 5, 1969 
''Dear Mr. Secretary: ' 
"In accordance with Executive Order 11337, dated March 27, 1967, a 
resolution was duly adopted by the Committee on Government Opera-
tions on September 18, 1968, with rega.rd to the organizations listed on the 
attached pages. It should be noted that this request was made on Decem-
ber 16, J968, prior to the expiration of Executive Order 11337. This is 
to reaffirm the ·same request pursuant to Executive Order 11454 dated 
Februa.ry 7, 1969, and.Treasury Decision 6133. 
"Pursuant to this resolution, I hereby designate the following individ-
uals, members of the Subcommittee staff, to make such examinations: MT. 
Philip R. Manuel, Mr. John E. Drass, Mr. Fred P. Miller, Mr. Perman 
H. Clay, Mr: James H. Dillon, and Mr. Walter S. Fialkewicz. In, this 
connection, it will be appreciated if the files could be assembled in the 
district office of jurisdiction. In order to facilitate the woi:k of the staff, 
it would be further appreciated if the staff designees be permitted to con-
sult with Internal Revenue Agents and Auditors familiar with the content 
of the respective files . 
"Your cooperation in this matter will be greatly appreciated. 
"Honorable David M. Kennedy 
Secretary of the Treasury 
Washington, D. C." 
. .. . A:pp., a.t 70. 
"Sincerely yours, 
·- John ,J. McClellan 
· Chail'Illlin 
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Respondents also emphasized an IRS memorandum 28 showing 
August 28, 1968, as the date on which the possibility of a 
cooperative ralationship between Subcommittee and Service 
was first explored. Respondents argue that these materials 
tend to establish that. the defendants exhibited to the Internal 
Revenue agents the Pikeville documents, which were not re-
turned to reSpondents until November 8, 1968.20 
2 ~ The memorandum reads in pertinent part as follows : 
"FACT SHEET 
Es'l'ABLISHMENT oF SPECIAL SERVICE STAFF 
"Allegations have been made that the Internal Revenue Service estab-
lished. the Special Service Staff from instntctions received from White 
House officials. This simply is not tnte. The facts are these: 
"August 28, 1968. Mr. Philip Manuel, an investigator with the Perma-
nent Committee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Government 
Operations, contacted. the Service to say that he had a group of seven 
investigators working for him on matters pertaining to certain organiza-
tions and other groups; that he had prepared a letter for the Chairman 
of the Committee, Honorable John J. McClellan; and tha,t he expected 
the request to be signed shortly. His call was to alert us to the fact that 
he wanted. the Committee investigators to be permitted. to discuss these 
matters with our District officials rather than to conduct inspection of 
returns in the National Office." App., at 73. 
'20 Although the documents were not returned to the McSurelys until 
November, Brick testified that he returned the Subcommittee copies to 
Kentucky authorities on August 14, 1968-two weeks before the initial 
exploration of possible cooperation between the Subcommittee and the 
Service. He also declared that the Subcommittee had made no additional 
copies : 
"Q. And did they-did there come a time when you returned those 
documents? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. During the time that you had possession of the documents, were 
they publicly-publicized, distributed or seen by anybody outside of the 
Committee? 
"A. No, sir, and not by anybody inside of the Committee, either. 
"Q. Where were the documents maintained? 
"A. In my personal file under lock and key and the key was always 
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The Court of Appeals, however, apparently did not view 
respondents' amended complaint as presenting this belated 
claim of dissemination outside the Subcommittee: 
"The claim of dissemination of some or all of the 234 
documents to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was 
not made in the amended complaint. This claim arose 
because of the disclosure of certain IRS documents, 
obtained as a result of a Freedom of Information Act suit, 
which indicated contacts, beginning on August 28, 1968, 
between members of the Subcommittee staff and the IRS 
concerning formal access to each other's files." 180 U. S. 
App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d, at 1285 n. 25 (em-
phasis added). 
The court noted further, ibid., that the complaint "also" made 
two other allegations that could have been related to the 
dissemination claim. First, there was a cha.rge that Brick had 
exhibited the McSurely documents "to persons whose names 
"Q. Did Senator McClellan look at those records? 
"A. No, sir. He looked at one. 
"Q. Did there come a time when you-after the expiration of certain 
litigation between the McSurelys and the officials in Kentucky, did you 
then return that batch of documents to the authorities in Kentucky? 
"A. I did. I returned them to Thadeus Scott on August 14, 1978. 
"Q. And is the receipt that has been marked listing the 230-some docu-
_•)nents, is that the receipt tha.t you got when you returned them? 
"A. That is the receipt I prepared and he signed, yes. 
"Q. Did you retain any of the documents thereafter or did you make 
!lJIY copy of any documents and retain them in your file? 
"A. I never made a single copy of those documents. I retained none. 
I have not now and the Subcommittee has none. All the documents were 
returned to Mr. Thadeus Scott. I have never used a Xerox machine on 
those documents, although it has been said here a number of times that 
t did'. T did not." App. 97-98. 
This testimony was incorporated in Senator McClellan's affidavit accom-
panying the summary judgment motion: /d., at 50. Respondents dis-
pute it, although they have adduced no facts tending to disprove it. See 
n. 30, infra. 
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are unknown to plaintiffs." App. 31-32. Second, the com-
plaint alleged that McClellan has "used the instrumentality 
of the [Subcommittee] investigation to carry out a personal 
vendetta between himself and a certain personage of promi-
nence named in some of the private ~orrespondence of the 
plaintiff Margaret McSurely." App. 35. The court pointed 
out, however, that there was "no specific allegation that Brick 
embarrassed plaintiffs or that McClellan pursued his purported 
'vendetta' by dissemination outside the Subcommittee itself. 
The claim of dissemination outside the Halls of Congress 
apparently rests on access by the IRS officials." 180 U. S. 
App. D. C., at 109 11. 25, 553 F. 2d, at 1285 11. 25.30 In sum, 
30 The Court of Appeals' di~ruo;l:'ion of the partiE's' dio;pute and the two 
allegations in the amended complaint is as follows: 
"On November 25, 1974, plaintiffs filed a supplemental affidavit lodging 
these recently disclosed materials wit.h the court. The federal defendants 
.countered on January 24, 1975, arguing that even if the IRS had gained 
access to the Subcommittee files at some point after August 28, 1968, the 
McSurelys could not have been harmed thereby because the 234 copies 
were returned to Commonwealth Detective Scott on August 14, 1968 (and 
reCBived by the McSurelys on November 8, 1968), and Brick had testified 
at the McSurelys' contempt trial tha.t he made no copies and that neither 
he nor the Subcommittee retained any of the documents, D. A., II, 730. 
Plaintiffs, in their reply to defendants' response, filed January 31, 1975, dis-
pute bot.h that the documents were turned over to Scott on August 14, 
1968, and that no copies were made. Since we affirm the District Court's 
denial of summary judgment on this claim, we leave the resolution of this 
question to the District Court on remand. 
"Plaintiffs' amended complaint also alleges that Brick exhibited copies 
of the 234 items to unknown persons causing plaintiffs damage and embar-
ra.ssmei~t, and that McClellan 'used the instrumentality of the [Subcom-
mittee] investigation to carry out a personal vendet.ta between himself and . 
a certain personage of prominence named in some of the private corre-
spondence of the plaintiff Margaret McSurely.' Amended and Suppl. 
'Com pl. mf 19, 28 (b) (ii), App. 45, 50. However, there is no specific alle-
gation that Brick embarrassed plaintiffs or that McClellan pursued his pur-
·ported 'vendetta.' by dissemination outside of the Subcommittee itself. The 
<el!l-in!. Qf 4!EJEJeminatiop outsidl:l of th(:l HallE! of Congress apparently rests ·On 
.. 
76-1621-0PINION 
McADAMS v. McSURELY 
the court's conclusion that the dissemination claim "was not 
made in. the amended complaint," its distinction between that 
claim and the other two claims actually made in the com-
plaint, and its ultimate conclusion that the claim of dissemina-
tion rested solely on the newly developed theory indicate that 
the Court of Appeals did not believe that the amended com-
plaint encompassed this claim. ~ ' 
In light of this apparent conclusion, it is difficult to under.,. 
stand the court's declaration in the same footnote that it was 
' ' 
affirming "the District Court's denial of summary judgment 
on this claim," as well as ~e statement to that effect in the 
per curiam opinion announcing the judgment. If the com-
plaint did not encompass the new dissemination claim, there 
had been no occasion for the District Court to pass on its 
sufficiency, nor for the Court of Appeals to affirm any judg-
ment thereon. Respondents' belated injection, of the dissemi-
nation theory into the case, standing alone, would not amount 
to an amendment of the complaint, and no motion to amend 
was made. Becau~ there had been no trial, there had been 
no admission of evidence to which the pleadings could be held 
to conform under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15' (b). ·· Thus, it is 
u~clear wheth-er any issue regarding dissemination of the 
McSurely materials outside Congress was properly befote the 
Court of Appeals. 
For this reason, we must vacate the judgment of affirmance 
as to that claim. We express no opinion as to the merits 
of the dissernination theory. On remand, the Court of Ap-
peals may determine whether the dissemination claim is 
embraced by respondents' amended complaint, or it may take 
such other steps with respect to this claim as it qeems proper •. 
access by IRS officials." 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d, 
at 1285 n. 25. 
3 1 The pan PI opinion wa:s no c]parer on this i~;sue. See 172 U. S. App. 
~D. C., at 373-374, and n. 29, 521 F. 2d, at 1033-:1034, and n. 29. 
,• 
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IV 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed insofar 
as it reversed the refusal of the District Court to dismiss the 
portions of the complaint relating to the original seizure of the 
McSurelys' materials. It is also affirmed insofar as it directs 
the entry of summary judgment. for petitioners as to claims 
concerning use of the materials within Congress. With 
respect to the claim concerning Brick's inspection of the docu-
ments and transportation of copies, the judgment is affirmed 
as to Brick, but reversed as to McClellan, Adlerman, and 
O'Donnell, and remanded with directions to enter summary 
judgment for them on that claim. Finally, the judgment is 
vacated insofar as it purports to affirm the denial of sum-
mary judgment on tlw dissemination issue and is remanded 
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et al., Petitioners, Court of Appeals for 
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Alan McSurely et ux. lumbia Circuit. 
'[March -, 1978] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL announced the judgment of the Court 
and delivered the following opinion.* 
This case presents important issues concerning the scope 
of legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause.1 
SpecificaUy, the original petitioners-a United States Senator 
and three members of a committee staff-contend that the 
Clause protects them from suits based on the aUeged use of 
illegal means in the course of field investigations related to 
congressional inquiries. They also argue that, on this record, 
respondents have not adduced sufficient evidence connecting 
them to the alleged illegal actions to lift the cloak of legisla-
tive immunity. For the reasons that follow, we reject the 
first contention, but agree with the second argument as to 
three of the four petitioners. 
I 
In 1967, Alan and Margaret McSurely were field organizers 
for the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., in Pike 
County, Ky. Alan McSurely also had served as a field orga-
*Part II of this opinion is joined only by THE CHIEF .JusTICE and MR. 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN. 
1 Article I,§ 6, cl. 1, provideo that "for Speech or Debate in either House, 
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nizer for the National Conference of New Politics and 
distributed literature for Vietnam Summer. On the night of 
August 11, J967, under authority of a warrant charging sedi-
tious activities against the Commonwealth of Kentucky and 
the United States in yiolat.ion of Ky. "ftev. Stat. § 432:040, 
Pike County officials arrested the McSurelys and seized a 
quantity of books, pamphlets-,. and letters found in their 
home. Shortly after the raid, Thoma~ Ratliff, Common-
wealth Attorney for Pike ·County, announced publicly that the 
seized material ~buld be made available to any Congressional 
Committees interest~d in the M~Surelys. 
On September 14, 196{, a three-judge District Court for the 
Eastern District of Kentucky, one judge dissenting~ declared 
the Kentucky sedition statute unconstitutional on its face and 
enjoined state prose~mtion of the McSurelys. M cSurely v. 
Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (ED Ky. 1967). The court ordered 
that all the seized material "be held by [Ratliff] in safekeeping 
until final disposition of this case · by appeal or otherwise/' 
App. 78. 
Soon after issuance of the · District Court's otder, ··Ratliff 
received a telephone call fronfLavern Duffy, Assistant Counsel 
to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
Senate Committee on Government Operations . ... The Subcom-
mittee, which was headed by Senator McClellan, was investi-
gating the causes "of various riots across the, Nation; including 
one that had occurred in Nashville; Tennessee, in April 1967. 
Some of the Subcommittee's information showed that the 
organizations with which the McSurelys were -affiliated might 
have been involved in· the· Nashville riot. Hence, Duffy 
asked Ratliff whether the materials seized from the McSurelys 
were in his · custody. Ratliff replied that they were, and on 
October 8, 1967, a Subcommittee investigator, John· Brick, 
arrived in Pikeville, the county seat. 
· That same evening Thadeus Scott, a Commonwealth dete.c-
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of 234 of the seized documents. The next morning, Brick 
spent an hour examining the originals in a locked room at the 
Pike County courthouse. Ratliff testified that he had tried 
to reach the members of th<' three-judge court before permit-
ting Brick to enter the locked room. He succeeded in reach-
ing the dissenting member of the court, but what transpired 
is not clear.2 
Brick also visited the Clerk of the District Court, who 
allowed him to inspect the case file of the McSurelys' three-
judge court action. Brick arranged to have the Clerk send 
him a copy of the court's safekeeping order and the inventory 
of seized items. On October 12, 1967, Brick again entered the 
locked room at the county courthouse and spent four hours 
taking notes on the materials. He then returned to Washing-
ton, taking with him the 234 copies that Scott had given him. 
This material included at least one personal letter addressed 
to Mrs. McSurely, which concededly had no relevance to 
Brick's investigation. At Senator McClellan's direction, Brick 
prepared subpoenas duces tecurn for some of the material in 
Ratliff's possession. 
The McSurelys moved before the three-judge court to 
prevent Ratliff from releasing the subpoenaed materials.3 On 
October 30, 1967, the court denied the motion and directed the 
2 At the McSurely's subsequent trial for contempt of Congress, see n. 5, 
infra, Ratliff testified that "I had my permission" before he allowed Brick 
access to the stored materials. Defendants' Appendix 407, United States 
v. McSurely, Nos. 24,812, 24,813 (DC 1971). The implication of this 
statement was that the dissenting judge gave "permission," but that is not 
clear. Moreover, the scope of any permission remains unexplained. Ratliff 
conceded that he had not communicated with the cocustodian of the 
materials, United States Marshal Archie Kraft, before permitting Brick to 
inspect the materials. Id., at 407-408. 
8 The McSurelys did not premise their opposition to the subpoenas upon 
any allegedly unlawful activity on Brick's part in inspecting and transport-
ing the documents, lndePd, they later te;;tified that they did not even 
become aware of Brick'~ actual role until December 5, 1967. Id., at 655~ 
~56,681-682, 704-705,707-709. 
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parties to cooperate with the Subcommittee.4 Further litiga. 
tion ensued," culminating in an order of the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit in July 1968, holding that since the time 
for appeal from the judgment of the District Court striking 
down the sedition statute had expired, there was no basis for 
con:tinued court custody. The court ordered the seized mate-
rials returned to the McSurelys, M cSurely v. Ratliff, 398 F. 2d 
817 (CA6 1968), and noted that questions as to the validity of 
the subpoenas still were open. According to· Brick, the Sub-
committee's photocopies were returned to Detective Scott on 
August 14, 1968. The originals and copies were returned to 
the McSurelys on November 8, 1968. Upon receipt of these 
materials, the McSurelys were served with new subpoenas. 
On March 4, 1969, McSurelys appeared before the Sub-
committee and refused to comply with the subpoenas. Their 
refusal resulted in' a conviction for contempt of Congress,6 but 
in December 1972, the Court of Appeals for the District -of 
Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the subpoenas were 
the fruit of two Fourth Amendment violations: (i) the original 
seizure by Kentucky officials, and (ii) Brick's "unauthorized 
search and inspection of the documents" in violation · of the 
4 The court's order read in part as follows: 
"The parties to tins action and the officers of this Court are directed to 
cooperate with the Senate Committee in making available such of- the 
ma,teria.Is, or copies thereof, as the Committee considers pertinent to its 
inquiry; but until time for appeal is expired, this will be done in such 
manner as to keep intact those materials that may be pertinent to the 
appeal of this case." 
H ca,nnot be determined whether this may be read as a retroactive 
ratification of Brick's in~pection and tran~porta.tion activties. There is 
nothing in tlw rrcord beforr u~ to indicate that th!:' thr!:'e-judge court was 
nppri~ed of tho~e activities. See 180 U.S. App. D . C., at 117 n. 59, 553 
F. 2d, at 1293 n. 59. 
5 For a synopsis of that litigation's course, see the opinion below of 
Judge Wilkey, id., a.t 132-133, 553 F. 2d, .at 1308-1309. 
u The variou;; tE>.~timoi_1X ,;.e!erred to in this opinion was given at the< 
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three-judge court's safekeeping order. United States v. 
McSurely, 154 U.S. App. D. C. 141, 154-155, 473 F. 2d 1178, 
1191-1192 (1972). 
On the same day that they appeared before the Subcom-
mittee, the McSurelys filed this action/ alleging that Senator 
McClellan, Brick, Jerome S. Adlerman (the Subcommittee's 
General Counsel), Donald F. O'Donnell (the Subcommittee's 
Chief Counsel), and individual Members of the Subcommittee 
had conspired to violate the McSurelys' constitutional rights. 
They sought decla.ra.tory and in,junctive relief and $50,000 
damages from each defendant. The action was stayed to per-
mit the contempt trial to proceed. M cSurely v. McClellan, 
138 U.S. App. D. C. 187, 426 F. 2d 664 (1970). In Septem-
ber 1971, while the appeal of their contempt conviction was· 
pending, the McSurelys filed an amended complaint, naming 
Ratliff, McClellan, Brick, Adlerman, and O'Donnell as defend-
ants. The amended complaint alleged in essence that the 
federal defendants had conspired with Ratliff to carry out an 
illegal raid in 1967, and to inspect, tran-sport, and use the seized 
materials in violation of the McSurelys' constitutional and 
other rights. On October 26, 1971, petitioners moved to 
dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment on the 
basis of legislative immunity, failure to state a claim, and 
collateral estoppel by virtue of the contempt conviction.8 The 
motion was denied and petitioners appealed.9 
7 Listed with the McSurely:: as plaintiffs in this initial complaint were 
three associatjons with which they were connected: the Southern Conference 
Educational Fund, the Southern Student Organizing Committee, and the 
Students for a Democratic Society. 
8 Ratliff did not join thi:; motion. 
0 Normally the denial of a motion for :;ummary judgment i:; not appeal-
able because it is not a final decision for purposes of § 28 U. S. C. § 1291. 
See generally 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice ~ 56.21 [2], at 56- 1275 to 
56-1286 (2d ed. 1976) . The Court of Appeals, however, adopted the 
reasoning of the panel opinion, which held that this particular denial had 
'"$.utlicient indicia O:f finality," 172 U. S. App. D. C. 364, 371, 521 F. 2d 
' ' 
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In 1974, while petitioners' appeal was pending in the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, respondents obtained 
documents thought by them to indicate that the Subcommittee 
had established an information-sharing relationship with the 
Internal Revenue Service. These documents were lodged with 
the Court of Appeals, together with affidavits suggesting that 
petitioners might have exhibited the allegedly wrongfully 
seized materials to agents of the Internal Revenue Service. 
In 1976, the Court of Appeals, en bane, affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, and rema.nded.1.o Judge Leventhal wrote for 
himself and four others, as did Judge Wilkey. Senior Judge 
1024, 1031, quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 308 
(1962), to qualify as appealable, even though it was not a decision that 
ended the action. The panel observed that the Speech or Debate Clause, 
upon which the summary judgment motion was focused, protects Members 
of Congress and their aides from the burdens of defending themselves as 
well as from the consequences of the litigation. 172 U.S. App. D. C., at 372, 
521 F. 2d, at 1032, citing Dombmwski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82,85 (1967) . 
Reasoning that the asserted right to be free of the burdens of a. la.wsuit 
would be irretrievably lost if the case proceeded to trial, the panel con-
eluded that an appt>111 from the final judgment would come too late to pro-
vide meaningful review of lhR.t claim. Hence, as to the assertion of immu-
nity from inquiry, the denial of summary judgment was held a "final 
decision" for purposes of § 1291. 172 U. S. App. D. C., at 372, 521 F. 
2d, at 1032. Neither side challlmges that analysis here, and we see no 
reason to depart from it.. s~·e also Cohen V. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 
U. S. 541 (1949) . 
Jo While the case wRs in tht> Cour1 of Appeals, Brick and Adlerman died. 
180 U. S. App. D. C., at 104 n. 1, 553 F. 2d, at 1280 n. 1. The Court of 
Appeals did not decide whether the actions against them survived, leaving 
that issue for the District Court on, remand. In August 1977, respondent 
moved in the District Court to substitute the survivors or estates for Brick 
and Adlerman. Petitioners oppose that motion, arguing that respondents' 
delay caused the action t,o abate. They nevertheless named Brick and 
Adlerman as petitioners in case this opposition should fail. See Fed. Rule 
App. Proc. 43 (a). We need not pass on the questions either of survival or 
abatement of the actions. 
Senator McClellan died while the case was pending before this Court. 
!lis executor was substituted. under Rule 48 (1) of this Court, 
'1\ 
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Danaher, who had sat on the panel, joined Judge Wilkey's 
opinion, but wrote a separate opinion as well. The court 
unanimously reversed the refusal to dismiss that part of the 
complaint relating to the original seizure of the McSurelys;. 
materials by Kentucky authorities. The court also agreed 
unanimously that summary judgment should have been 
granted as to the portion of the complaint charging unlawfut 
use of the material within Congress itself. 180 U. S. App .. 
D. C. 101, 104, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1280 (1976) . Respondents do' 
not dispute those actions here. 
The Court of Appeals, again unanimously, affirmed what it 
designated as the denial of summary judgment as to those· 
portions of the complaint alleging dissemination of the mate-
rial outside of Congress. Ibid. 11 By an evenly divided vote,. 
it affirmed the denial of summary judgment on the allegations· 
that Brick had violated the McSurelys' rights by inspecting 
the documents subject to the safekeeping order and transport-
ing copies back to Washington.12 Judge Leventhal, writing· 
n Judge Leventhal '~ opinion and the short per curiam opinion stating 
the judgment both indicated that the dissemination claim was to proceed· 
upon remand. Judge Wilkey's opinion agreed with that disposition. 
Although Judge Danaher joined Judge Wilkey's opinion, his separate opin-
ion seems to call for a different resolution of the dissemination claim, since 
he would have directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint entirely, 
on the basis of official immunity. 
12 All 10 judges below appear to have agreed that the McSurelys alleged 
seven categories of wrongdoing: 
" ( 1) The unlawful search and seizure of the McSurelys' books and' 
papers by Kentucky authorities; 
" (2) the inspection by Brick of those unlawfully seized materials; 
" (3) the transport by Brick of copies of 234 documents to Washington ; 
" ( 4) the inspection of some or all of these 234 copies by the staff of the 
Subcommittee; 
" (5) the use of the copies, as the basis for issuance of subpoenas for some 
'of the documents; 
·" (6.] the vrocurement of C®temiJt Qf Cont~~ citations agp,inst thee 
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for himself and four others, concluded that the allegations 
and. facts of record stated Fourth Amendment an:d invasion 
of privacy claims. Judge Wilkey, writing for the other five 
members of the court, disagreed and would have reversed and 
remanded only in the ailegation of dissemination outside of 
Congress. Judge Danaher 'would have ordered the case dis-
missed on the basis of 'official immunity. We granted cer-
tiorari. -U.S.- (1977). 
II 
~ 
In this Court, petitioners have chosen to rely principally 
upon an argument that was rejected by all 10 judges of the 
Court of Appeals. They contend that the protection of the 
Speech or Debate Clause extends "to [the use of] unlawful 
means to achieve legitimate objectives." 13 In their view, 
unlawful activities carried out in the course of an otherwise 
legitimate investigation should be completely· cloaked by a 
legislative immunity that "precludes judicial inquiry e~ven into 
conduct that would be illegal or unconstitutional if performed 
by priva.te persons." 14 Indeed, for purposes of this argument, 
petitioners concede that Brick's conduct was "a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment." w They insist, however, that legis-
plaintiffs by consciously withholding from the Senate the facts relating to 
the challenged subpoenas ; 
" (7) the dissemination of some or all of the 234 copies obtained by Brick 
to persons or agencies outside of the Subcommittee-particularly the 
Internal Revenue Service/' 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 108, 553 F. 2d, at 
1285 (footnote omitoo) . 
At issue here are allegations (2), (3), and (7). 
1 a Brief for Petitioners 15. 
11 !d., at 14. 
15 At oral argument, petitioners made their concession on this issue quite 
explicit: 
. "QUESTION : A11en't you conceding for the purpose of argument that 
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lative immunity from suit is meaningful only when a Member 
or a legislative aid is alleged to have engaged in conduct that 
would be actionable if engaged in by a private citizen, since 
an "immunity that would protect on,ly when no wrong was 
alleged to have been committed would be no immunity at 
all." to 
While this extreme position may have some superficial plau-
sibility, its logic would lead to acceptance of untrammeled 
legislative power.17 Moreover, it has been rejected by prior 
decisions of this Court. In Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 
U. S. 82 (1967), this Court squarely held that legislative 
immunity did not shield a congressional aide charged with 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: We are conceding for the purposes of this 
argument that [Brick's activity] was actionable in some way. 
"QUESTION: That's what I thought. 
"QUESTION: And also a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Yes, we are conceding for purposes of this 
argument." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. See also id., at 29. 
111 Brief for Petitioner 15. 
1 7 In petitioners' view, legislative immunity "probably" extends even to 
deliberate theft and murder, so long as they occur in the course of a 
congressional investigation. This was made clear at oral argument: 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: .. . . 
"But essentially our approach rests on the contention that the immunity 
is triggered by the purposes of the activity in which the Senator or the 
Senate aide was engaged. We believe that this approach was consistent 
with and indeed required by the considerations that led to the establishment 
of the constitutional privilege. 
"QUESTION: How far does that reasoning take you? Let's say its 
purposes were very clearly to aid the legislative process by aiding the 
congressional committees, a.nd in pursuance of that pristinely protected 
purpose he simply burglarized a house and stole things out of a locked 
drawer or safe. Is he protected under the Speech or Debate Clause for 
that? I am talking now, by "he" I mean an aide to the committee. 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Mr. Justice Stewart, that question raises a 
number of complexities. My answer to it ultimately is, yes, probably he 
is protected. 
"QUESTION: Including murder, I suppose. Well, maybe not there. 
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violating the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights in the 
course of an otherwise legitimate investigation?8 Similarly, 
'our decision in Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 628-
answer, but I would like, if I can-this one, the answer is not intuitively 
'appealing,·! must concede.'1 Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15. See also (d., at 16-17. 
18 Petitioners attempt to distinguish Dombrowski on the ground tha.t 
the congressional aide involved in that case was n.ot engaged in investiga-
tive activity on behalf of Congress. They argue tha.t he merely "con-
spired with state officials to plan. . a{ld carry out a raid to gain evidence 
for use in a state prosecution.'' Brief for Petitioners, at 29. In their 
view, summary judgment in his favor was reversed simply because the 
Speech ,or Deba.te Clause furnjshes_ no protection to activities not carried 
out in the cours¢ of a. congressional investigation. Petitioners' characteri-
zation of the facts in that case is erroneous. As we observed in Gravel v. 
United States, 408 U. S. 606, 620 (1972), the aide in Dombrowski "was 
gathering informatiop. for a. hearing." Moreover, the record in. Dom-
browski makes clear that the aide traveled to Louisiana. at the behest of 
Senator Eastland and in pursuance of the investigative functions of a 
Senate Subcommittee. Record in Domb1'0wski v. Eastland, 0. T. 1966, 
No. 118, pp. 35, 40-41, 87, 91-94. Indeed, the Court of Appeals in Dom-
browski explicitly stat('([ that "H1e subpoena was expressly authorized in 
the first in::;tance by t lw Chairman of the [congressional] committee .... " 
Dombrowski v. Burbank, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 358 F .. 2d 821, 825 
(1966). The issu!' as to the disputed date of the. subpoena in that case--
upon which MR. Jms'l'ICE REHNQUIS'l' relies for thP proposition that the 
allegation in Dombrowski wa,; that the a1de simply may have been acting 
out8ld~ th(• aPgi~ of a. eongre::;sional committee, ante, at - n. 2'-was 
relevant not. to thr aidP's congres::;ion::tl authorization to issue the sub-
poena, but to thP qu<'stion of his participation in thr alleged conspiracy 
to mount the challenged raids. See Brief for th<' Respondents in Oppo;;i-
tiou, Dombrowsh v. Eastlaud, 0 . T. 1966, No. 118, pp. 9-11; Brief for 
Petitioners, id., pp. 10, 67-68. 
Dombrowski can be read as suggesting that the scope of legislative 
immunity for aides is narrower than that for the Member. 387 U.S., a.t 85. 
This suggestion, however, was laid to rest in Gravel v. United States, 408 
U. S. 606 (1972), which held "that t.he Speech or Debate Clause applies 
not only to a Member but also to his aides insofar as the conduct of the 
latter would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member 
l1imself." !d., at 618. Our decision in Eastland v. United States Service-
men:s Fund, 421 U. S. 491, 502 (1975), viewed the distinction in 
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629 ( 1972), held that the Speeeh or Debate Clause did not 
immunize an aide from grand jury questioning concerning pos-
sible criminal conduct in the course ·of Senate information-
gathering activity. As we declared in Gravel, "no prior case 
[has] held that Members of Congress would be immune if 
they executed an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out 
an illegal arrest, or if, in order to secure information for a 
hearing, themselves seized the property or invaded the privacy 
of a citizen. Such acts are no more essential to legislating 
than the [conspira~y] held unprotected in United States v. 
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966)." Gravel, supra, at 621 (foot-
note omitted). Conduct in the course of informal investiga-
tive activity simply does not fall within the Speech or Debate 
Clause if it clearly exceeds the lawful powers of Congress. 
Our decision in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's 
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), is not to the contrary. There the 
Court addressed the "power to investigate and to do so through 
compulsory process." Id., at 504 (emphasis added). We 
refused to recognize an action to enjoin implementation of a 
facially proper subpoena, holding the subpoena "an indispen-
sable ingredient of lawmaking," 111 id., at 505. We h!lld no 
Dombrowski between Member and aide not as one deriving from a 
difference in the scope of their legislative immunities, but as one relating 
to the activities in which they were alleged to have engaged by the 
complaint. 
111 In this case the Court of Appeali:i revNi:ied the denial of summa.ry 
judgment as to the claims relating to the issuance of subpoenas: 
"The Subcommittee here employed proper process for information 'on 
which "legislation could be had."' We note that the subpoenas called for 
materials that were at least arguably relevant. to its investigation, but did 
not call for the production of Mrs. McSurely's letter or any other 
demonstrably irrelevant private correspondence. Under these circum-
stances Servicemen's Fund prevents further inquiry into plaintiff's charge 
that the Subcommittee's purpose was to harass and intimidate them in the 
exercise of their First Amendment rights. The Subcommittee's issuance of 
subpoenas is privileged activity, notwithstanding plaintiff's bare allegation 
·~lwt ~he real pur.(lose behind the sub.I?oenas was to 'cover-up' the earlier 
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occasion, however, to consider the effect of lawless activity in 
the course of informal investigative conduct. Such activity 
simply is not a part of "thfl due functioning of the [legislative] 
process." United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501, 516 
( 1972) (emphasis in original) . 
In arguing that an immunity which evaporates with the 
allegation of actionable conduct is no immunity at all, peti-
tioners misapprehend the sweep of our prior decisiqns dealing 
with investigative activity. When Congress employs facially 
proper means of information-gathering-such as the subpoena 
in Servicemen's Fund-the Speech or Debate Clause precludes 
both inquiry into legislative motive and lawsuits for damages 
resulting from the investigation. But when Members of 
Congress or their aides resort instead to criminal or otherwise 
unlawful methods of obtaining information, they exceed the 
power duly vested in Congress and can expect no condonation 
by virtue of ·the Speech or 'Debate Clause. This "focus on 
means permits the court to afford relief 'without proof of a 
legislative act.' " 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 112, 553 F. 2d, at 
1288 (opinion of Leventhal, J.), quoting Gravel, 408 U.S., at 
621. Legislat.ive immunity does not shield a Member or his 
aide from being called t.o account for Fourth Amendment or 
other violations committed in the course of their investigative 
work in the field. Dombrowski, supra; cf. Gravel, supra.20 
improper conduct by Brick, and the further assertion that had there been 
full disclosure the Subcommittee would not have issued the subpoenas, and 
the Senate would not have approved the contempt citation." 180 U. S. 
App. D. C., at 122, 553 F. 2d, at 1298 (footnotes omitted) . 
No question is raised here concerning the correctness of the Court of 
Appeals' judgment on this issue. 
~o MR. JusTICE REHNQUlsT's concurring opinion would dispose of the 
case on the basil:i of a newly formulatE-d doctrinE' of olficial immunity. 
Apart from the fact that thi~ i~,;ue was neithPr Pmbraced by the que:stwn,; 
pre:sented in the pctitiou for certiorari nor arguPd or briefed, adherence 
to that viPw would rpquirP the sub silentio overruling of Dombrowski v. 
Eastland. That case involved a lE-gislative oflirial, Committee Counsel 
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Petitioners further contend that on the reQord in this case, 
respondents' complaint should be dismissed because they have 
not made the requisite showing of liability. It is clear that 
when a defendant entitled to invoke Speech or Debate immu-
nity moves for summary judgment on that basis, the Constitu-
tion requires the plaintiff to adduce evidence affording "more 
than merely colorable substance" to allegations of actionable 
conduct. Dombrowski, 387 U. S., at 84. Otherwise, the 
cloak of immunity is not. lifted, and the Speech or Debate 
Clause forecloses further litigation. This follows from the 
established doctrine that Speech or Debate immunity protects 
Members of Congress and their aides "not only from the con-
sequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of 
defending themselves." I d., at 85. Since petitioners moved 
for summa.ry judgment on the basis of the Speech or Debate 
Clause, the courts below were required to determine whether 
the Dombrowski threshold-evidence affording "more than 
merely colorable substance" to the allegations of unimmunized 
conduct-had been passed with respect to each defendant.21 
Sourwine, of pricbely the same rank as two of the petitioners to whom 
MR. Jus·rrcE REHNQUfS'I' today would accord absolute official immunity. 
Sourwine argued in this Court that he was entitled tofofficial immunity 
nndt>r the doctrinE' of Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (i893), and Barr v. 
Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959), Brief for Repondents, Dombrowski v. East-
land, 0. T . 1966, No. 118, pp. 38-41. Nevertheless, the Dombrowski 
Court permitted the caHe to proceed as to him. Hence, Dombrowski must 
be read as rt>jectiug thr proposition that the contours of any distinct 
official legislative immunity depart from those of the Speech or Debate· 
Clau~;r. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 324 (1973). Moreover, it 
would be difficult to reconcile MR. JusTICE REHNQUit;T's view of the scope 
of~ immunity with the holding in Butz v. Economou, No. 76-709, 
decidei:l June -, 1978. 
21 Respondents were put on notice quite explicitly that. by making the 
summary judgment motion petitioners were calling upon them to adduce-
some evidence tending to connect each defendant to the alleged wrong-
doing. The petitioners made that point repeatedly at the hearing on the-
·. 
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Respondents have satisfied the constitutional standard as to 
allegations of Brick's misconduct. It is stipulated that Brick 
inspected the documents subject to the safekeeping order in a 
summary judgment motion. For example, counsel for petitioners declared 
at one point as follows: 
" ... [P]art and partial [sic] of the defense of legislative immunity, is the 
immunity of having to suffer the burdens of extensive litigation. 
"This is what ihe Supreme Court held in Dombrowski against East-
hnd . . . . And the only reason that Dombrowski against Eastland was 
,permitted to go into some discovery-and I understand that case has been 
dismissed for want of prosecution-the only reason was, there was on the 
record a discrepancy of factual evidence. The documents seemed to show 
some discrepancy about a date on some subpoena which lent some support 
in argument, and the Supreme Court said, in view of this factual dispute, 
we need to resolve it a little further before we can consider whether or not 
legislative immunity is sufficient to protect [the Member's aide]." Tr. of 
Hearing Oct. 28, 1971, at 15-16. 
More succinctly, counsel for petitioners stated: 
·" .•. I think the burden should be placed on the plaintiffs to come forward 
with any evidence they may have to suggest and demonstrate that these 
·defendants were not acting within the scope of their legislative duties. 
That would present an issue in which we were forewamed. That is the 
function of the motion for summary judgment." I d., at 18. 
Petitioners made a similar argument in a memorandum ;;upporting their 
motion: 
"The affidavit of Senator McClellan filed in support of the pending 
motions fully establishes the circumsta,nces by which the Senate Committee 
conducted its investigation and served the subpoenas out of which this 
litigation arises. Again, nothing in the McSurelys' affidavit furnishes any 
facts to demonstrate that Brick, Adlerman, or O'Donnell were acting 
o·utside the perimeter of their· legislative functions." Supplementru Memo-
randum of Poirts and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, Nov. 23, 1971, at 5 
'(emphasis added). 
See also Memorandum of Point,; and AutJ10rities in Support of Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, Oct. 26, 
1971, at 3-4; Reply of Defendants McClellan, Adlerman, O'Donnell, and 
Brick to Plaintiff's Letter to the Court Dated Sept. 12, 1972, Oct. 13, 1972, 
:at 10. 
Counsel for respondents indicated that he understood the burden peti-
" ... · 
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locked vault in Pikeville and that he transported copies of 
selected ones to Washington. The court below divided evenly 
as to whether, in light of the three-judge court's safekeeping 
order, the stipulated facts state a claim under the Fourth 
Amendment. On the present state of the record, however, 
there is no basis for concluding that respondents failed to 
state a claim, if only for invasion of privacy.22 Some of the 
facts at issue in the dispute as to the validity of the Fourth 
Amendment claim were obtained only after oral argument en 
bane. 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 126 n. 84, 553 F. 2d, at 1302 
n. 84. There has been no opportunity to weigh the various 
characterizations of Brick's activity or the meaning of the 
three-judge court's safekeeping order. Moreover, the record 
also contains testimony by Brick that he carried to Washing-
ton a copy of at least one document that he believed to be 
of no relevance to the Subcommittee's investigation of the 
riots.23 Congress possesses no general power to investigate 
tioners sought to cast upon him, although he disputed their right to do so: 
"Now comes Mr. Goldbloom [counsel for petitioners] and says, prove to 
me by facts disputing Senator McClelland's [sic] affidavit that it is not 
true, before you can take depositions. How can I do that? And this is 
what the trouble is with this whole posture. I am going to file an affidavit 
which says he is wrong. I have to say it on information and belief. And 
then he is going to come into court and say, it is just on information and 
belief." !d., at 43-44. 
Thus, there can be no q11rstion that respondents wert> put on noticE' as 
to the importancE' of adducing such evidence as they had with rt>Spect to 
each dt>fendant. 
22 At oral argument, coum;t>l for petitioners acknowledged the possibility 
that the complaint may state a cause of action under state tort law: 
"MR. EASTERBROOK: . . . There is the possibility that under Dis-
trict of Columbia or Kentucky law there is a common-law tort lurking in 
the background of this case. That's the reason why we elected not to 
make strongly here any arguments about the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, prec·isely because there may be allegations of other bases of 
liability based on common law." Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. 
23 Brick testified a!' follows : 
~'Q. Did yo\1 teU Mr. DQtsQn or any ,of the fQlk with whom you met. 
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' private affairs, even by subpoena; the subject of the inquiry 
must always be one on which legislation could be had. Serv-
icemen's Fund, 421 U. S., at 504 n. 15. Therefore, Brick's 
there that there was some of that stuff that you didn't think that you 
needed? · · ' 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Did you give it back to them? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Did you need that letter signed Dearest Cucumber or address 
Dearest Cucumber? 
"MR. BRESS: Objection. Irrelevant. 
"THE COURT: He may answer the question. 
"THE WITNESS: N~. Didn't you say signed Dearest Cucumber and 
when in fact 'it says addressed to Dearest Cucumber. 
"MR. STAVIS:. No, I didn't. 
"THE WITNESS: Was the question, did I need that letter? 
"BY MR. STAVIS :' 
"Q. Yes. For the performance of your duties. 
"A. No sir. 
"Q. As a matter of fact, in respect to the performance of your duties, 
you didn't need most of the items in that list, did you? 
"A. Some of them. There were many others in the locked vault in 
~he Court House that I would have obtained under the subpoena. 
"Q. That what? 
"A. · That I would have obtained under the subpoena had not the Sub-
committee stopped all action when the defendants went into Court. 
"Q. Did you-when I was asking my questions about this list of 234 
~terns, there were lots of these items that you didn't need at all, correct? 
"MR. BRESS: Objection. Irrelevant. 
"THE COURT: I believe he has already answered the question. 
"BY MR. BRESS : 
"Q. What was your answer? 
11A. Some, yes. 
''Q. Some that you did? 
''A. It was-
11Q . Lots? 
11A. I object to the use of the word lots. 
"Q. A great many, a great many? 
11A. Oh, I will say many. Let me explain. I didn't select any of these 
:as I told you."· App. 101-102. 
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eopying and transportation of concededly irrelevant material 
are sufficient to lift legislative immunity for purposes of a sum-
mary judgment motion. Brick's testimony on that subject 
ultimately may be expla.ined away, or the inclusion of a single 
irrelevant letter may be deemed de minimis. But his tes-
timony, together with the other factors mentioned above, 
is sufficient to carry respondents across the Dombrowski 
threshold. 
The posture of the other three federal defendants, however, 
is decidedly different. The opinion of Judge Leventhal noted 
that although "plaintiffs have alleged Brick's involvement in 
possible actionable conduct with sufficient factual particularity 
to permit trial to proceed as to him, the record is silent on 
the involvement of defendants McClellan, Adlerman and 
O'Donnell 'in any activity that could result in liability.'" 
180 U. S. App. D. C., at 123, 553 F. 2d, at 1299, quoting Dom-
browski, supra, at 84. In response to defendants' summary 
judgment motion and Senator McClellan's affidavit denying 
any conspiracy or activities outside the scope of legislative 
activity, respondents could aNer only on information and 
belief that the defendants joiued in the conspiracy to drive 
respondents out of Pikeville and exceeded the bounds of legis-
lative activity.21 Dombrowski teaches that mere allegations 
H Senator McClellan '~ affidavit denird "any conspiracy, collaboration or 
any other participatiOn of any sort in the allegedly illegal police raid 
allegedly planned and conducted by defendant Ratliff." App. 4\}. He also 
denied that he or his aides had exceeded the legislative authority of the 
Subcommittee. !d., at 50. While his affidavit contains no specific denial 
of a Fourth Amendment violation by Brick with respect to the inspection 
of documents in Pikeville, the general denial of exceeding legislative author-
ity must be read as embracing one. It is only fair to read the affidavit 
that way, since the specific theory of a separate Fourth Amendment viola-
tion by Brick-though supportable on the allegations of t.he amended 
complaint-apparently did not emerge clearly until the case reached the 
Court of Appeals 
Examination of the Di~tri.ct Coll.rt rrcord di:;clos<'::i no suggestion by-
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are not enough.~r. There must be fa~ts of record tending to 
connect the defendant to the alleged misconduct. Having 
found, properly, that the record was silent as to the involve-
ment of.McClellan, Adler:man, and O'Donnell in any activity 
t ' . \ 
that could result in liability, it was the duty of the court 
appellants tha.t Brick's activit.y in and of itself nmounted to a sepa.rate 
violation of the Fomih Amendment . Instead, plaintiffR' theory of the case 
w11s that ~ince the Kentucky ;:enrch nnd ;.;eizure had been n1led unconstitu-
tionaJ at t.Jw time of 1 hr Subcommittee tak('over of the documents, the 
subpo<'nas were the fmit of the original Kentucky seizure. This is the only 
Fourth Amendment theory set forth in tlw nmended complaint. App. 
'32-33. Thus, in the Dist.rict Court the theory wns not that Brick's 
inspec·tion of the documents in Pikesville was a S<'cond violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, the issue dividing .Judge Wilkey and Judge Leventhal ; 
rat.her, the tht:>ory then was thnt. Brick'" inspection, takeover, and the 
subsequent subpoenas were t.he fruits of the original illegal search and 
seizure. 
In these circumstances, it hardly could be expected that Sena.tor 
McClellan's affidavit wotrld declare specificnJly that there had been no 
Fourth Amendment violn.tion by Brick. Respondents had not been 
presented with tha.t theory of the case. Since the amended complaint has 
'been viewed expansively, the Senator's affidavit correspondingly must be 
taken as putting in issue all the allegations subsequently read into the 
amended complaint.. It denies, on behalf of all the respondents, any 
activity outside the scope of legislative atlthority. 
To this denial, respondents could reply only "on information and belief 
[that] the defendant McClellan, together with defendants Adlerman, 
O'Donnell, and Brick, joined in the conspiracy of the defendant Ratliff 
to force us out of Pikevill(' .... " App. 55-56. See also n. 21 , s'Upra. 
They also contested McClellan's general denial of exceeding legislative 
authority, App. 56, but again no facts were adduced. 
2 5 Nor may thr involvement of the Member or some of his aides be 
inferred solely from the involvement of other aides. In Dombrowski, sum-
mary judgment for Senator Eastland was upheld despite an allegation of 
· conspiracy and the existence of facts linking his Subcommittee's chief 
counsel to possible Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, the mere fact 
that Brick may have engaged in conduct outside the scope of legislative 
immun,ity does not suffice to link the other defendants to that conduct. 
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below to reverse the denial of their motion for summary 
judgment. 
Although this standard imposes a not insubstantial burden 
upon plaintiffs who seek to lift the veil of legislative immu-
nity, it is justified by the purposes served by the Speech or 
Debate Clause.2n As noted above, it is intended to protect 
Members of Congress and their aides from "the burden 
of defending themselves against unsubstantiated claims." 
Dombrowski, supra, at 85. Even where an injunction is not 
sought, Members are forced "to divert their time, energy, and 
attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation." 
Id., at 503. Thus, the Constitution requires that motions 
founded on legislative immunity "be given the most expedi-
tious treatment by district courts because one branch of Gov-
ernment is being asked to halt the functions of a coordinate 
branch." Servicemen's Fund, supra, at 511 n. 17. 
III 
The Speech or Debate Clause does not immunize the dis-
semination of allegedly actionable material "beyond the rea-
sonable bounds of the legislative. task." Doe v. McMillan, 
412 U. S. 306, 315 ( 1973). Respondents argue that they have 
made an adequate showing of improper dissemination. They 
rely on the lodging wit.h the Court of Appeals in 1974 of re-
cently obtained material indicating that the Subcommittee 
had permitted agents of the IRS to inspect portions of the 
Subcommittee files. Rpecifically, respondents pointed to a 
2o While MR. ,lusTICE HEHNQ.l'Hi'I''H concern with maintaining "uniform 
procednra :>tandard~ m civil rasrs," post, at 4, is understandable, it 
should not be permitted to owmde the dictates of the Speech or Debate 
Clau,;e. Dombrowski makC'S it rlear that motions founded on the Clause 
can be defea.ted onl~' by a ~howing of "more than merely colorable sub-
stance" to the allegationi' of unirnmunized conduct. 487 U. S., at 84. 
This requirement stem~ din,ctly from the Constitution ; a motion for sum-
·mary judgment under FNl. Rule Civ. Proc. 56 is merely the vehicle for 
'effectuating the independent policies of the Speech or Debate Clause. 
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letter of March 5, 1969/7 in which Senator McClellan in-
formed the Secretary of the Treasury that the Subcommittee 
had taken certain steps in September 1968, toward arranging 
meetings with Internal Revenue agents for the purpose of ex-
changing information about organizations under investigation" 
'2 1 Thi:-; letter rf'ad as follow~:> : . 
"UNITED STATES SENATE 
Committee on 
Government, Operations 
Senate Pel'Ilk'tnent Subcommittee 
on Investigations 
Washington, D. C. 20510 
March 5, 1969 
''Dea.r Mr. Secretary: 
"In accordance with Executive Order 11337, dated March 27, 1967, a 
resolution was duly adopted by the Committee on Government Opera-
tions on September 18, 1968, with regard to the organizations listed on the 
attached. pages. It should be noted that this request was made on Decem-
ber 16, ,1968, prior to the expiration of Executive Order 11337. This is 
to reaffirin the same request pursuant to Executive Order 11454 dated 
February 7, 1969, and .Treasury Decision 6133. 
"Pursuant to this resolution, I hereby designate the following individ-
uals, members of the Subcommittee staff, to make such examinations: Mr. 
Philip R. Manuel, Mr. John E. Drass, Mr. Fred P. Miller, Mr. Perman 
H. Clay, Mr. James H. Dillon, and Mr. Walter S. Fia.Ikewicz. In, this 
connection, it will be appreciated if the files could be assembled in the 
district office of jurisdiction. In order to facilitate the wo'rk of the staff, 
it would be further appreciated if the staff designees be permitted to con-
sult with Interna.I Revenue Agents and Auditors familiar with the content 
of the respective files. 
"Your cooperation in this matter will be greatly appreciated. 
"Honorable David M.' Kennedy 
Secretary of the Treasury 
Washington, D. C." 
A:pp., at 70. 
"Sincerely yours, 
·- John J . McClellan 
· Chairman 
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Respondents also emphasized an IRS memorandum 28 showing 
August 28, 1968, as the date on which the possibility of a 
cooperative ralationship between Subcommittee and Service 
was first explored. Respondents argue that these materials 
tend to establish that. the defendants exhibited to the Internal 
Revenue agents the Pikeville documents, which were not re-
turned to reSpondents until November 8, 1968.29 
28 The memorandum reads in pertinent p~trt as follows : 
"FACT SHEET 
ES1'ABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL SERVICE STAFF 
"Allegations have been made that the Internal Revenue Service estab-
lished the Special Service Staff from instmctions received from White 
House officials. This simply is not tme. The facts are these: 
"August 28, 1968. Mr. Philip Manuel, an investigator with the Perma-
nent Committee on Investigations, Sena.te Committee on Government 
Operations, contacted the Service to say that he had a group of seven 
investigators working for him on matters pertaining to certain organiza-
tions and other groups; that he had prepared a letter for the Chairman 
of tl1e Committee, Honorable John J. McClellan; and that he expected 
the request to be signed shortly. His call was to alert us to the fact that 
he wanted the Committee investigators to be permitted to discuss these 
matters with our District officials rather than to conduct inspection of 
returns in tl1e National Office." App., at 73. 
'20 Although the documents were not returned to the McSurelys until 
November, Brick testified that he returned the Subcommittee copies to 
Kentucky authorities on August 14, 1968-two weeks before the initial 
exploration of possible cooperation between the Subcommittee and the 
Service. He also declared that the Subcommittee had made no additional 
copies : 
"Q. And did they-did there come a time when you returned those 
documents? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. During the time that you had possession of the documents, were 
they publicly-publicized, distributed or seen by anybody outside of the 
Committee? 
"A. No, sir, and not by anybody inside of the Committee, either. 
"Q. Where were the documents maintained? 
"A. In my personal file under lock and key and the key was always 
'in my pocket and that; was by order of Senator McClell~. 
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The Court of Appeals, however, apparently did not view 
respondents' amended complaint as presenting this belated 
claim of dissemination outside the Subcommittee: 
"The claim of dissemination of some or all of the 234 
documents to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was 
not made in the amended complaint. This claim arose 
because of the disclosure of certain IRS documents, 
obtained as a result of a Freedom of Information Act suit, 
which indicated contacts, beginning on August 28, 1968, 
between members of the Subcommittee staff and the IRS 
concerning formal access to each other's files." 180 U. S. 
App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F . 2d, at 1285 n. 25 (em-
phasis added). 
The court noted further, ibid., that the complaint "also" made 
two other allegations that could have been related to the 
dissemination claim. First, there was a charge that Brick had 
exhibited the McSurely documents "to persons whose names 
"Q. Did Senator McClellan look at those records? 
" "A. No, sir. He looked at one. 
"Q. Did there come a time when you-after the expiration of certain 
litigation between the ·McSurelys and the officials in Kentucky, did you 
then return that batch of documents to the authorities in Kentucky? 
"A. I did. I returned them to Thadeus Scott on August 14, 1978. 
"Q. And is the receipt that has been marked listing the 230-some docu-
h nents, is that the receipt that you got when you returned them? 
"A. That is the receipt I prepared and he signed, yes. 
"Q. Did you retain any .of the documents thereafter or did you make 
any copy of any documents and retain them in your file? 
"A. I never made a single copy of those documents. I retained none. 
I have not now and the Subcommittee has none. All the documents were 
returned to Mr. Thadeus Scott. I have never used a Xerox ma.chine on 
those documents, although it has' been said here a number of times that 
! did~ I did not." App. 97- 98. 
This testimony was incorporated in Senator McClellan's affidavit accom-
panying the summary judgment motion: ld., at 50. Respondents dis-
pute it, although they have adduced no facts tending to disprove it. See 
n . 30, infra. 
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a.re unknown to plaintiffs." App. 31-32. Second, the com-
plaint alleged that McClellan has "used the instrumentality 
of the [Subcommittee] investigation to carry out a personal 
vendetta between himself and a certain personage of promi-
nence named in some of the private correspondence of the 
plaintiff Margaret McSurely." App. 35. The court pointed 
out, however, that there was "no specific allegation that Brick 
embarrassed plaintiffs or that McClellan pursued his purported 
'vendetta' by dissemination outside the Subcommittee itself. 
The claim of dissemination outside the Halls of Congress 
apparently rests on access by the IRS officials." 180 U. S. 
App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d, at 1285 n. 25.;<0 I11 sum, 
so The Court of Appral!~' di::;cus;;ion of the parties' d1~:>pute and the two 
allegations in the amended complaint is as follows: 
"On November 25, 1974, plaintiffs filed a supplemental affida.vit lodging 
these recently disclosed materials with the court. The federal defendants 
-countered on January 24, 1975, arguing that even if the IRS had gained 
access to the Subcommittee files at some point after August 28, 1968, the 
McSurelys could not have been harmed thereby because the 234 copies 
were returned to Commonwealth Detective Scott on August 14, 1968 (and 
received by the McSurelys on November 8, 1968), and Brick had testified 
at the McSurelys' contempt tria.] that he made no copies and that neither 
he nor the Subcommittee retained any of the documents, D. A., II, 730. 
Plaintiffs, in their reply to defendtmts' response, filed January 31, 1975, dis-
pute both that the documents were turned over to Scott on August 14, 
1968, and that no copies were made. Since we affirm the District Court's 
denial of summary judgment on this claim, we leave the resolution of this 
question to the District Court on remand. 
"Plaintiffs' amended complaint also alleges that Brick exhibited copies 
of the 234 items to unknown persons causing plaintiffs damage and embar-
rassment, and that McClellan 'used the instrumentality of the [Subcom-
mittee] inve&-tigation to carry out a personal vendetta between himself and 
a certain personage of prominence named in some of the private corre-
spondence of the plaintiff Margaret McSurely.' Amended and Suppl. 
Com pl. mf 19, 28 (b) (ii), App. 45, 50. However, there is no specific alle-
gation that Brick embarrassed plajntiffs or that McClellan pursued his pur-
-ported 'vendetta' by dissemination outside of the Subcommittee itself. The 
oclaim Qf gj~~minatiop outside of th~ Hall~ of Congress apparently rests ·OU 
\ 
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the court's conclusion that the dissemination claim "was not 
made in the amended complaint," its distinction between that 
claim and the other two claims actually made in the com-
plaint, and its ultimate co~clusion that the claim of dissemina-
tion rested solely on the newly developed theory indicate that 
the Court of Appeals did not believe that the amended com-
plaint cncompassf'u this claim."' 
In light of this appa.rent conclusion, it is difficult to under.,. 
stand the court's declaration in the same footQot~ that it was 
affirming "the District Court's denial of summary judgment 
on this claim," as well as the statement to that effect in the 
' 
per curiam opinion announcing the judgment. If the com-
plaint did not encompass the new dissemination claim, there 
had been no occasion for the District Court to pass on its 
sufficiency, nor for the Court of Appeals to affirm any judg-
ment thereon. Respondents' belated injection, of the dissemi-
nation theory into the case, standing alone, would not amount 
to an amendment of the complaint, and no motion to amend 
was made. Becau~ there had been no trial, there had been 
no admission of evidence to which the pleadings could be held 
to conform under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15 (b). ·· Thus, it is 
u~clear whether any issue regarding dissemination of the 
McS'urely materials outside Congress was properly before the 
Court of Appeals. 
For this reason, we must vacate the judgment of affirmance 
as to that claim. We express no opinion as to the merits 
of the dissemination theory. On remand, the Court of Ap-
peals may determine whether the dissemination claim is 
embraced by respondents' amended complaint, or it may take 
such other steps with respect to this claim as it deems proper •. 
access by IRS officials." 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d, 
at 1285 n. 25. 
aJ The panrl opinion wa~ no clrarPr on this issue. See 172 U. S. App. 
~D . C., at 373-374, and n. 29, 521 F. 2d, at 1033-:1034, and n. 29. 
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IV 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed insofar 
as it reversed the refusal of the District Court to dismiss the 
portions of the complaint relating to the original seizure of the 
McSurelys' materials. It is also affirmed insofar as it directs 
the entry of summary judgment, for petitioners as to claims 
concerning use of the materials within Congress. With 
respect to the claim concerning Brick's inspection of the docu-
ments and transportation of copies, the judgment is affirmed 
as to Brick, but reversed as to McClellan, Adlerman, and 
O'Donnell, and remanded with directions to enter summary 
judgment for them on that claim. Finally, the judgment is 
vacated insofar as it purports to affirm the denial of sum-
mary judgment on tlw dissemination issue and is remanded 





MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
DATE: June 19, 1978· 
RE: Justice White's Draft in McAdams v. Mc.Surely, No. 
Part I of BRW's opinion is devoted to establishing 
that field investigations are not within the protection 
of the Speech or Debate Clause. He reads Gravel v. United 
States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), as establishing the princi-
ple that field investigation is not within the p n , u· 
of the Speech or Debate Clause's protection. In actuality, 
the case never says that. It uses rather hazy language 
to dance all around the point, eg.: the immunity is una-
vailable ._ where legislators "engaged in illegal con-
duct that was not entitl~d to Speech or Debate Clause ..._.. 
protection." 408 U.S., 620. That language could fit 
our holding as well as BRW's. We could add a one-line 
footnote somewhere in our draft .t stating that Gravel 
would have been a much easier case .& if its holding 
,__ _______ ~ - ----------------------
had been that field invest}gation wasn't covered. All 
that the case held was that the congressional aide coul 
be questioned about tlll .. ll.'l his knowlegge of the 
criminal activity concerning the obtaining of the Penta 
gon Papers. Certainly the holding of the case does 
---------------------------
not go beyond • our holding in this case. 
Part II of the opinion takes on our summary judgment 
holding and is rather persuasive in that regard. BRW 
b~ically makes the sa~points I unsuccessfully tried to 
sell last February. I don't think there is a great 
deal that we can say to him in reply, since most of 
the arguments to be made have already been inserted 
in response to fue memo he circulated in March. We 
do stretch the pleadings in favor of McClellan, 
and we do read them very narrowly against the 
plaintiffs, for which BRW takes us to task. Our 
only answer 
the opinion 
and one that is already made i~ 
is that the Speech or Debate Clause 
dictates those procedures. 
In Part III, Justice White argues with our interpre-
tation of the Leventhal opinion insofar as it deals 
with the dissemination claim. Again, I dorlt think 
that there is anything to say that we have not said 
already. In the second part of Part III, BRW anticipates 
Justice Stevens' position and argues that there is 
no privilege for exhibition of these sorts of materials 
to executige agencies. Since we do not address that 
issue, we have no need of reply there. 
2. 
To: Tho Chi ef J ustice 
Mr . Jus t ice Brennan 
Mr. Jus t lce Stnwart 
Mr . Jus tice Uarshall 
],lr~usttc0 Blackmun 
~ Just i0;J Po we ll 
Mr . J ust i ce R~hnquist 
Mr. Jus t i ce Stevens 
From: Mr. Justice White 
Circulated: 6/19/78 
Recirculated: ________ __ 
No. 76-1621 - McAdams v. McSurely 
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
This is an interesting study of the Supreme Court 
at work. 
The petition for certiorari which we granted 
pressed two claims: first, even if Brick violated the 
Fourth Amendment (which petitioners concede that he 
did for the purposes of this case), petitioners are 
immune from liability under the Speech or Debate Clause, 
and second, t~1at the Clause also protects them from 
liability for disseminating to other branches of the 
Government. 
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The Court unanimously rejects the claim that the Speech 
or Debate Clause protects against liability for constitutional 
infringements by congressional investigators, six of us be-
cause field investigations are not legislative acts entitled 
to Speech or Debate Clause immunity; and three of us because 
the Clause does not protect against constitutional violations 
by congressional investigators, the latter ground also being 
the basis for the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Under 
any ordinary application of our rules that we do not deal 
with questions not presented by the petition for certiorari, 
one would expect that the Court would therefore affirm this 
part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals,which had also 
concluded that the Speech or Debate Clause did not protect 
against constitutional wrongs by congressional investigators. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is nevertheless 
reversed as to three of the petitioners. The majority is 
divided among themselves. As MR. JUSTICE POWELL and two other 
members of the Court read the record, respondents failed ade-
quately to respond to petitioners' summary judgment motion 
in the trial court; petitioners are thus entitled to judgment. 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined by MR. JUSTICE STEWART, reverses 
because petitioners are absolutely immune from damages liability, 
not because of the Speech or Debate Clause, but because of 
common-law official immunity. 
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As I shall explain later, MR. JUSTICE POWELL's ground 
for reversal is not fairly included in or subsumed by the 
questions presented here. Indeed, the Court of Appeals, 
having ruled that the Speech or Debate Clause did not protect 
against constitutional transgressions, remanded the case to 
the trial court, among other things to permit the petitioners 
to make a new motion for summary judgment, if they cared to 
do so, addressed to the very issue of whether petitioners LL 
were sufficiently implicated in the alleged transgressions. 
Petitioners never claimed in the District Court or in the 
Court of Appeals that if they were wrong on their Speech or 
Debate Clause argument they were nevertheless entitled to 
judgment. As for the official immunity ground for reversal, 
that issue is not raised by the petition, has not been briefed 
or argued and, as MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST concedes, it is a 
novel question that has never been decided or dealt with by 
this Court. 
Of course, this Court has the power to reach and eliminate 
plain error appearing in the record, even though not raised by 
the petition for certiorari. But the disposition of this case 
is all the more remarkable because the position espoused by 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL and those who join him, which leads him to 
deal with the summary judgment issue, is rejected by a majority 
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As I shall explain later, MR. JUSTICE POWELL's ground 
for reversal is not fairly included in or subsumed by the / 
1/ 
questions presented here.- Indeed, the Court of Appeals, 
having ruled that the Speech or Debate Clause did not protect 
against constitutional transgressions, remanded the case to 
the trial court, among other things to permit the petitioners 
to make a new motion for summary judgment, if they cared to do 
so, addressed to the very issue of whether petitioners were 
2/ 
sufficiently implicated in the alleged transgressions.-
Petitioners never claimed in the District Court or in the 
Court of Appeals that if they were wrong on their Speech or 
Debate Clause argument they were nevertheless entitled to 
judgment. As for the official immunity ground for reversal, 
that issue is not raised by either of the questions presented 
in the petition, has not been briefed or argued in any mean-
ingful sense and, as MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST concedes~ it is a 
novel question that has never been decided or dealt with by 
this Court. 
Of course, this Court has the power to reach and 
.eliminate plain error appearing in the record, even though not 
raised by the petition for certiorari. But the disposition of 
this case is all the more remarkable because the position es-
poused by MR. JUSTICE POWELL and those who join him, which leads 
him to deal with the summary judgment issue, is rejected by a 
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majority of the Court: that is, the Speech or Debate Clause 
is not to be applied, as they would have it, to informal in-
vestigations by Congress. A majority of the Court likewise 
rejects MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's position that highly placed 
officials in the Government should be free deliberately and 
knowingly to violate the law because the adversary processes are 
so unreliable and erratic that they cannot be trusted rapidly to/ 
distinguish between innocent or negligent mistakes of law or 
fact and those that are knowing and deliberate and because it \ 
would be distracting for high officials to have to defend them-
selves at all. Although trustworthy enough to sort out those who 
are subject to the death penalty and those who are not, even 
though intent and purpose may be critical elements in such de-
terminations, judges and juries are, in MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's 
view, quite inadequate to give the Attorney General, assistant 
Attorneys General and other Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officers, the 
breathing room they require if they are to be effective public 
servants. That position has been rejected in Butz v. Economou, 
___ U.S. ___ (1977), but nevertheless forms the basis for two of 
the determinative votes to reverse in this case. 
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of the determinative votes to reverse in this case. 
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In dissent, I shall first state my reasons for 
concluding that the Speech or Debate Clause does not extend 
its protections to congressional investigators in the field. 
As I have said, six members of the Court agree with this re-
sult, if not with the reasoning to reach it. I shall then, 
with all due respect, express my disagreement as to the 
grounds employed for reversing the investigative phase of 
the Court of Appeals' judgment. I shall also disagree with 
the reversal of the judgment as to the dissemination issue. 
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The initial question posed by this case is whether 
the gathering of information by means other than the use of 
formal process is within the scope of the immunity provided 
by the Speech or Debate Clause. The Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia agreed with the Government that 
investigative activities conducted in the field, as well as 
the more formal functions of conducting hearings and obtain-
ing information by means of subpoena, are protected by the 
Clause. It went on to hold, however, that the employment of 
unlawful means to perform otherwise proper legislative ac-
tivities is not essential to legislating and that if Brick 
violated the Fourth Amendment, neither he nor anyone who acted 
in complicity with him in such illegal conduct ,.;ould be im-
2/ 
mune. -- MR. JUSTICE POWELL agrees with the Court of Appeals 
that legislative immunity does not shield Members of Congress 
or their agents from liability for violations of law con~itted 
during the course of field investigations, but finds it un-
necessary to reach the question of "whether even properly 
conducted field investigation would fall outside the protection 
of the Speech or Debate Clause." Ante, at 12 n. 20. Although 
I agree that the illegal acts alleged by respondents are not 
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, I reach this conclu-
sion by a somewhat different analysis. In my view, our past 
f) 
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cases clearly establish that the Speech or Debate Clause 
immunizes even violations of law committed in the course of 
performing functions covered by the Clause but that inves-
tigative activities other than by means of formal process are 
not protected by the Clause. 
A 
Our past cases clearly establish that "once it is 
determined that Members are acting within the 'legitimate 
legislative sphere' the Speech or Debate Clause is an absolute 
bar to - interference." Eastland v. United States Servicemen's 
Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975). It should be obvious that an 
immunity that would only protect when no illegality was alleged 
would be absolutely useless. Immunity from suit or criminal 
prosecution is of assistance only when a Member of Congress or 
a legislative aide is alleged to have engaged in activities 
that would violate the law if done by a private citizen. For 
this reason, we have held that "Congressmen and their aides are 
immune from liability for their actions within the 'legislative 
sphere,' Gravel v. United States [408 U.S. 606, 624-625 (1972)], 
even though their conduct, if performed in other than legislative 
contexts, would in itself be unconstitutional or otherwise con-
trary to criminal or civil statutes." Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 
306, 312-313 (1973). 
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Nevertheless, the allegations that petitioners 
illegally inspected and transported to Washington the 
documents seized from respondents clearly relate to conduct 
outside the coverage of the Speech or Debate Clause. This 
aspect of the case is governed by Gravel v. United States, 
408 U.S. 606 (1972), which held that the informal gathering 
of information, even at the direction of a Member of Congress 
for valid legislative purposes, is not itself a legislative 
act within the meaning of the Speech or Debate Clause. Of 
course, there can be no doubt that the obtaining of informa-
tion by informal means for legitimate legislative purposes is 
a proper and appropriate activity. But as Gravel recognized: 
'~hat Senators generally perform certain acts 
in their official capacity as Senators does not 
necessarily make all such acts legislative in 
nature. • • • 
"Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. 
The heart of the Clause is speech or debate in 
either House. Insofar as the Clause is con-
strued to reach other matters, they must be an 
integral part of the deliberative and communi -
cative processes by which Members participate 
in committee and House proceedings with respect 
to the consideration and passage or rejection 
of proposed legislation or with respect to other 
matters which the Constitution places within the 
jurisdiction of either House." 408 U.S., at 625. 
See also United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966). 
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Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 
491 (1975), which held that Members and their aides are immune 
from liability for acts relating to the issuance of subpoenas, 
did not in any way impair the vitality of . Gravel's holding that 
investigatory activities are normally outside the scope of the 
Speech or Debate Clause. The Court in Servicemen's Fund care-
fully distinguished Gravel on the ground that it dealt with 
investigative activities which, unlike the use of compulsory 
process, are not essential to legislating. Although Ser~icernen's 
Fund probably goes further than any of our cases in protecting 
activities removed from the actual deliberative processes of 
Congress, which constitute the core of what the Speech or Debate 
Clause protects, it did not purport to limit the holding in 
Gravel that investigatory activities not involving the issuance 
of formal process are not so essential to legislating as to come 
within the protection of the Clause. 
This distinction between the exercise of the power to 
obtain information by means of subpoena and the use of other less 
formal modes of investigation is supported by important consider-
ations which are implicit, though perhaps not fully articulated, 
in Gravel and Servicemen's Fund. First, the subpoena power, unlike 
informal investigative methods, is essential to the gathe~ing of 
information required to enact legislation. If Congress were de-
prived of all means of acquiring information other than by means 
of compulsory process, it would still be able to perform its 
I 
f 
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legislative functions, though perhaps less expeditiously. 
Without the power to acquire information by means of subpoena, 
however, the ability of Congress to fulfill its legislative 
responsibilities would be seriously curtAiled. Second, although 
the use of the subpoena power is subject to abuse, its inclusion 
within the Speech or Debate Clause does not place it completely 
beyond judicial control. Unlike the legality of activities such 
as the seizure of materials involved here, even though Speech 
or Debate Clause immunity applies, the legality of a sut.poena may 
be judicially tested by its recipient if an effort is made to 
enforce it against him. If petitioners are immune for the in-
vestigative acts here alleged, however, respondents and those 
similarly situated would have no means whatsoever of challenging 
conduct which impinges upon their legal rights. Finally, the 
issuance of a subpoena is a formal act which generates an official 
record. It may be expected that these considerations, particu-
larly the fact that the use of the subpoena power will frequently 
be exposed to the scrutiny of the public and of other legislators, 
will generally persuade legislators to exercise the subpoena power 
with restraint. These considerations persuade me that Gravel and 
Servicemen's Fund drew the appropriate line between investigatory 
activities which the Speech or Debate Clause does and does not 
immunize at the point separating the use of the subpoena power and 
other conduct related to the gathering of information. 
21 
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The United States makes the additional argument that 
even if the actual inspection and transportation to Washington 
of the McSurelys' documents are not legislAtive acts for Speech 
or Debate Clause purposes, nevertheless Senator McClellan may 
not be held liable consistent with the Clause for doing no more 
than authorizing these acts. It does not question that under 
the ordinary rules of liability for common law and constitutional 
torts one who orders or conspires with others to violate the law 
stands in the same shoes as those who physically commit the vio-
lation but urges that legislative immunity shields Members of 
Congress from liability for directing the actions of others. This 
conclusion is said to be compelled by Kilbourn v. Thompson , 103 U.S. 
168 (1881), which held that although Congress lacked power to punish 
a witness for contempt and that therefore those who participated in 
Kilbourn's arrest were liable, the Speech or Debate Clause protected 
House Members who merely voted for the resolution authorizing 
Kilbourn's arrest. But the activity it held to be protected in 
Kilbourn was not that of ordering or authorizing but rather only that 
of voting. Significantly, the Court predicated its holding upon the 
assumption that the Members themselves "did not in any manner assist 
in the arrest of Kilbourn or his imprisonment, nor did they order or 
direct the same, except by their votes and by their participation 
as members in the introduction of, and assent to, the official acts 
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at 200. Indeed, the clear implication of Kilbourn is that 
the Court would have held House Members liable if they had 
personally advised or instructed the sergeant-at-arms in 
connection with the actual making of the ~rrest. 
Subsequent cases have interpreted Kilbourn as standing 
only for the proposition that voting is so integral to the 
legislative process as to be, at least absent extraordinary 
circumstances, privileged regardless of the invasion of rights 
resulting from it. In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, the 
Court on the authority of Kilbourn dismissed the action against 
House Members who did no more than vote for the resolution 
barring Representative Powell from the House, but held that it 
could be maintained against those employees of the House who 
took or threatened to take actions to prevent Powell from taking 
his seat. Indeed, Powell, like Kilbourn, reserved the question 
of whether even the act of voting was privileged under all cir-
cumstances by declining to reach the question "whether under the 
Speech or Debate Clause petitioners would be entitled to maintain 
this action solely against the Members of Congress where no agents 
participated in the challenged action and no other remedy was 
!LI 
available." 395 U.S. , at 506 n. 26. See Kilbourn, 103 U.S. , 
at 204-205. 
Even if the matter were previously in doubt, Gravel clearly 
established that the Speech or Debate Clause does not provide Members 
with immunity for complicity in illegal actions to which immunity 
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would not otherwise attach just because they only directed 
or authorized the actions. First, Gravel held that the 
Speech or Debate Clause is concerned with activities rather 
than persons and that Senators have no more immunity than 
their aides. Secondly, Gravel did not restrict inquiry into 
conduct by Senator Gravel and his aide to acts of a physical 
nature or to acts which implemented broad directives. The 
Court concluded that conduct by a Senator or his aide not 
integral to the legislative process was outside the protection 
of the Speech or Debate Clause even if it consisted of no more 
than the issuance of orders and requests or the entering into 
of arrangements which were ultimately implemented by others. 
It specifically held that Senator Gravel's arrangements with 
Beacon Press to publish the Pentagon Papers was not protected 
speech or debate and that inquiry could be made into any such 
arrangement. This holding forecloses the contention that com-
munications between Gravel and Beacon Press or between Gravel and 
his aides would have been protected if they consisted of no more 
than orders or requests relating to the publication of the Penagon 
Papers which were later carried out by others. Similarly, Gravel 
permitted inquiry into any activities of or knowledge possessed 
by Gravel or his aide relevant to determining how the Pentagon 
Papers came into the Senator's possession. Again, it is clear that 
the Court did not regard any conduct by Gravel relating to the 
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obtaining of the Pentagon Papers -- even a telephone call 
from him to a third party requesting their production or an 
order to an aide to do the same -- as being within the scope 
of the Speech or Debate Clause. Gravel stands for the prop-
osition that Speech or Debate Clause immunity protects acts 
integral to the legislative process such as voting and speech 
during formal proceedings, but does not attach to individual 
member functions such as authorizing aides and supervising them 
5/ 
with respect to an infinite variety of activities.--
It is thus sufficiently clear to me that absolute 
legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause does not 
attach to investigators such as Brick who are sent into the fie ld 
to gather papers, evidence or information, or interrogate individ-
uals or representatives of organizations. It is incredible to me 
that congressional investigators should have absolute immunity 
under the Clause from any liability for investigative acts in the 
field, no matter how invasive of privacy or injurious to persons 
or property, although for the same acts their counterparts in 
other agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the 
Internal Revenue Service would not be entitled to absolute im-
munity but only to a qualified immunity. 
It also follows for me that Senator McClellan would have 
been immune if he did no more than subpoena the materials in 




for a resolution instructing Brick to act as he did. The 
latter situation would have been analogous to Kilbourn. To 
hold, however, that field investigations are covered by the 
Speech or Debate Clause and that Members 8f Congress who 
actually order or urge the commission of illegal acts by means 
other than voting, debating, and otherwise participating in 
formal floor or committee sessions are therefore immune from 
liability would represent a major and unwarranted extension of 




This conclusion, as I see it, should end the "investiga·· 
tion" phase of this case and to that extent the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. ·Unfortunately, that 
is not the case. 
A 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and two other Justices ·~ 
conclude that although respondents have alleged conduct on 
the part of all four petitioners which is outside the protec-
tion of the Speech or Debate Clause, the Court of Appeals 
erred in not entering summary judgment in behalf of petitioners 
McClellan, O'Donnel, and Alderman. As I have said, I doubt 
very much that this issue is properly before the Court. 
First, the issue is not subsumed within either of the ques-
t . d • • • I "t" f • • ~ 1ons presente 1n pet1t1oners pet1 1on or cert1orar1. 
Only the first question is remotely related to the claim, and 
it raises only the issue of whether the Speech or Debate Clause 
"bars a private suit for damages against a Senator and his 
aides, alleging that some of their investigatory activities. 
were improper or unconstitutional." (Emphasis added.) The 
additional claim now addressed by MR. JUSTICE POWELL that 
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even if such a suit is not barred three of the petitioners 
were nevertheless entitled to summary judgment on the basis 
of the record before the Court of Appeals is not comprised 
within that question. Secondly, petitioners failed to raise 
this issue in either the District Court or the Court of 
Appeals. Their motion to dismiss in the District Court, 
like Question One presented here, raised only the issue of 
whether the Speech or Debate Clause afforded absolute immunity~ 1 
Nor was the present proposition that even on the Court of 
Appeals view of the Speech or Debate Clause, petitioners were 
entitled to summary judgment on the basis of affidavits sub-
mitted presented in the Court of Appeals. Since three Justices 
nevertheless are prepared to enter judgment in favor of three 
of the petitioners on the basis of this contention, however, 
I proceed to address it. 
B 
I agree that under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56 if a defendant 
comes forward with affidavits specifically denying the alle-
gations in complaint, the plaintiff must come forward with 
specific factual allegations which create a material issue 
of fact, or adequately justify his inability to do so, if he 






is more basic to summary judgment procedure than that a 
defendant is not entitled to relief unless he demonstrates 
that he "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Rule 56(c). See Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 
159-161 (1970). This is true even if a plaintiff remains 
silent. On the record before us, the defendants in the 
trial court, petitioners here, were not entitled to summary 
judgment because they failed to even allege facts which 
would constitute a defense to the charge that they had 
complicity in the inspection and transportation to Washing-
ton of the McSurelys' documents. 
The only affidavit submitted by any of the petitioners 
was that of Senator McClellan, and it basically did no more 
than state that the acts complained of were done as part of 
a properly authorized investigation. Significantly, the 
Senator did not deny respondents' allegations that he was 
responsible for and involved in Brick's allegedly illegal 
inspection and transportation of the relevant documents. 
All that he denied was "any conspiracy, collaboration or 
any other participation of any sort in the allegedly illegal 
police raid allegedly planned and conducted by defendant 
Ratliff." App., at 49, ,[ 11. As a result of the Court of 
No. 76-1621 
Appeals' decision, however, no question concerning the 
federal defendants' complicity in the initial police seizure 
of the documents remains in the case, but only issues relat-
ing to their complicity in the subsequent inspection, trans-
portation, and dissemination of the documents. As to these 
matters, Senator McClellan was completely silent. Nor does 
Senator McClellan's affidavit say anything concerning the 
involvement of Alderman or O'Donnell. 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL recognizes that the Senator's affi-
davit fails to specifically deny respondents' allegations 
of Fourth Amendment violations, but argues that the Senator's 
general assertion that all actions by himself and the other 
petitioners in relation to the McSurelys "were taken pursuant 
to a lawful congressional investigation within the legislative 
authority of the Senate of the United States as assigned to 
said Subcommittee," app. 50, ~ 11, must be read broadly as 
denying all of respondents' charges because at the time it 
was filed Senator McClellan could not have been expected to 
understand the nature of respondents' allegations. Ante, at 
17 n. 24. I find this untenable. If Senator McClellan did 
not understand the nature of respondents' allegations of 





deny them. There is no support whatsoever for the 
proposition that a court may enter summary judgment on the 
basis of speculation concerning what defendant would have 
denied or alleged under circumstances other than those on 
the basis of which he filed his sworn statement. In any 
event, one could as readily speculate that if Senator 
McClellan had denied the charges, respondents would have 
come forward with affidavits creating material issues of 
fact. Furthermore, apart from general principles of sum-
mary judgment procedure, Senator McClellan's assertion that 
he and the other petitioners engaged only in legislative 
acts cannot be plausibly construed as a .broad denial 
of committing illegal acts, because it has been the position 
of petitioners at every stage of this proceeding that all of 
the illegal acts with which they were charged were within 
the scope of their legislative duties and, under their view 
of the law, absolutely protected by the Speech or Debate 
Clause regardless of their legality. 
On this record, therefore, I cannot agree that summary 
judgment should be entered for petitioners. That issue 
should be first dealt with on remand to the District Court, 





MR. JUSTICE POWELL would remand respondents' claim 
that petitioners illegally disseminated some of the seized 
materials to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to the 
Court of Appeals for consideration of whether it is within 
the scope of the amended complaint. But in my view it is 
quite clear that the Court of Appeals has already passed 
upon thts matter. Otherwise one must believe that the 
Court of Appeals unanimously held that the claim of dissemi-
nation should not be dismissed on the ground of Speech or 
Debate Clause even though it "did not believe that the 
amended complaint encompassed this claim." Ante, at 23. 
There is nothing in the opinion below which supports such 
an unlikely supposition. 
Paragraph 19 of the amended complaint alleges that 
Brick "exhibited [the McSurely documents] to persons whose 
k t th 1 • t•ff II names are un nown o e p a~n ~ s .... App. 31-32. 
Footnote 25 of the Court of Appeals opinion, which I agree 
is the key to the matter, begins by stating that "[t]he 
claim of dissemination of some or all of the 234 documents 
to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was not made in the 
amended complaint." It is clear, however, that the court 
' I } 
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was not stating that the complaint did not encompass 
dissemination to the IRS but only that it did not mention 
the IRS in haec verba. Indeed, this very same footnote 
goes on to state that "[p]laintiffs' amended complaint 
also alleges that Brick exhibited copies of the 234 items 
to unknown persons .... The claim of dissemination outside 
the Halls of Congress apparently rests on access by IRS 
officials." The logical conclusion to draw from this, 
particularly the last sentence, is that the Court of Appeals 
did not view the claim of dissemination to the IRS as being 
outside the scope of the complaint but rather as being the 
only specific claim pressed by plaintiffs which supported 
the broad allegation of dissemi.nation set forth in ,[ 19 of 
the amended complaint. Moreover, I see little point in 
straining to find that the Court of Appeals acted in a self-
contradictory fashion, because there can be no doubt that 
the allegation of dissemination in the amended complaint 
is broad enough to encompass dissemination to the IRS. 
On the merits, I agree with the unanimous conclusion 
of the Court of Appeals that Gravel v. United States, 408 
U.S. 606 (1972), and Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), 
foreclose the contention that dissemination of materials 
to an agency of the Executive constitutes a legislative 
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act within the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause.~ 
Gravel held that the dissemination of the Pentagon Papers 
by means of private publication and the arrangements made 
with respect to this dissemination were not privileged. 
Again, the Court did not question that the Senator's dis-
semination of the Pentagon Papers was related to his offi-
cial duties and performed in his official capacity but 
nevertheless concluded that immunity was not available 
because the dissemination of information outside of Congress 
is "in no way essential to the deliberations" of Congress. 
408 U.S., at 625. Doe v. McMillan went further and held 
that the Speech or Debate Clause does not immunize from 
private suit those who, even wi.th the formal authorization 
of Congress, distribute materials which infringe upon the 
rights of individuals. 
The only conceivable distinction between the dissemina-
tions alleged in Gravel and Doe v. McMillan and that alleged 
here is that the former were directrd toward the general 
public while the latter is directed toward an agency of the 
Executive. The holding in neither case, however, was limited 
to public dissemination. Both types of dissemination un-
doubtedly serve .many valuable functions. But Gravel and 




or Debate Clause does not generally protect conduct 
relating to or in aid of the legislative process but only 
acts integral to the actual enactment of legislation. See 
also United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 514-516. 
Moreover, I am unable to discern any reason for concluding, 
and petitioners advance none, that the dissemination of in-
formation to agencies of the Executive is more integral to 
the enactment of legislation than the communication of in-
formation to the general public. As Doe v. McMillan explained 
during the course of its discussion of why the dissemination 
of information beyond the confines of the Congress was not 
privileged: "Members of Congress may frequently be in touch 
with and seek to influence the Executive Branch of Govern-
ment, but this conduct 'though generally done, is not pro-
tected legislative activity."' 412 U.S., at 313, quoting 
from United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S., at 625. 
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals in its entirety. 
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_I I The Court of Appeals said: 
Although plaintiffs have alleged Brick's involvement 
in possible actionable conduct with sufficient factual par-
ticularity to permit trial to proceed as to him, the 
record at present is silent on the involvement of defend-
ants McClellan, Adlerman and O'Donnell "in any activity 
that could result in liability." Dombrowski '1..'. Eastland, 
387 U.S. at 84. Plaintiffs allege that the latter defendants 
were acting in concert with Brick in the actions that 
are pertinent. If that is so, they enjoy no greater im-
. munity for conduct not "essential to legislating" than 
Brick, their agent. Of course, an allegation is not proof. 
But at this stage of the case, given that the argument 
of parties thus far has been drawn in terms of whether 
or not the Speech or Debate Clause erects a complete 
barrier to this action, we are unable to say on the basis 
of the undisputed facts that the other federal defend-
ants are constitutionally entitled to summary judgment 
excusing them from further inquiry, even tbough Brick 
is not. The path remains open for these defendants to 
make a renewed motion for summary judgment on the 
ground that the McSurelys have failed to adduce spe-
cific facts "which afford more than merely colorable sub-
stance," Dornb1·owski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. at 84, to 
the assertion of concert with Briel\: iri conduct that sur-
vives the legislative immunity bar. Since the Speech 
or Debate Clause acts as an exclusionary rule and testi-
monial privilege, as \Yell as substantive defense, plain-
tiffs must prove their case through evidence ·which ''does 
not draw in question the legislative acts of the defend-
ant Member of Congress [and his aides] or [their] mo-
tives for performing them.'«"United States v. Brewster, 
408 U.S. at 526, quoting United States v. Johnson, 383 
U.S. at 185.11 
I 
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__ I_/ (continued) The Court of Appeals ordered on 
remand that the District Court, among other things, make the 
"necessary detennination11 as to "whether any other federal 
defendants acted in concert with Brick in action for which 
he enjoys no legislative innnunity." 
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553 F.2d 1277, 1286-1288, 1303 n. 3 
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), pro-
vides no support for petitioners' contention that investi-
gations conducted by means other than formal process are 
protected by the Clause. In that case, the Court held only 
that members of a congressional committee and their aides 
were immune insofar as they engaged in the acts of introducing 
materials at committee hearings, referring a committee report 
to the Speaker of the House, and voting for the publication 
of the report. This conclusion was predicated upon the hold-
ing in Gravel that the Senator was immune from the imposition 
of liability for any actions which occurred during the meet-
ing of a sub.cqmmittee, including the reading of the Pentagon 
Papers. Doe did no more than once again recognize that 
"'voting by Members and committee reports are protected' and 
'a member's conduct at legislative committee hearings, although 
subject to judicial review in various circumstances, as is 
legislation itself, may not be made the basis for a civil or 
criminal judgment against a Member because that conduct is 
within the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity."'" 
Doe, 412 U.S., at 311-312, quoting from Gravel, 408 U.S., at 
624. Significantly, Doe also held that the Speech or De-
bate Clause does not immunize from private suit those who, 
No. 76-1621 FOOTNOTES McAdams v. McSurely 
~/ (continued) even with authorization from Congress, 
distribute materials which allegedly infringe upon the rights 
of individuals. See supra, pp. All that Doe immunized 
were formal proceedings at the core of the legislative process. 
~/ The clear implication of Dombrowski v. East-
land, 387 U.S. 82 (1967), is also that Members are not 
immune from liability for membership in a conspiracy designed 
to violate the legal rights of others. Although the Court 
held that the complaint against Senator Eastland should be 
dismissed, it did so only on the ground that he was entitled 
to summary judgment because of his lack of participation in 
the conspiracy alleged. See infra, p. 
_f_! In Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), the 
Court held on the basis of Kilbourn and Gravel that House 
Members and their employees could not be held liable for in-
troducing materials at a committee hearing, referring the 
report which contained the materials to the · Speaker of the 
House, and voting for publication of the report. Again, 
however, Kilbourn was interpreted not as protecting Members 
of Congress from. liability for ordering or supervising the 
commission of illegal acts but rather as immunizing acts 
No. 76-1621 FOOTNOTES McAdams v. McSurely 
21 (continued) integral to the legislative function 
such as voting and other forms of conduct by Members on the 
floor or during legislative committee hearings, even though 
such formal actions actually authorized unconSitutional 
conduct. 
~/ The auestions presented in the petition, Pet. for 
Cert. 2., and repeated in petitioners' brief are: 
"1. Whether the Speech or Debate Clause bars 
a private suit for damages against a Senator and 
his aides, alleging that some of their investigatory 
activities, in connection with a subject on which 






Whether the court of appeals properly 
an allegation of dissemination of documents 
not presented to or decided by the district 
II App. 45-46. 
8/ 553 F.2d 1277, 1285-1286, 1303. 
76-1621 - McAdams v. McSurel~ 
~ fbe Chiet Justice 
Jr. Jut.t.oe Brennan 
·Jir. ~ust1oe Stewart 
llr. Juat1oe ih1 te 
~~zo; ruttoe Marsball 
ltr. lUstioe Bla.ok:nnm 
Mr. Jua~1oe Powell 
lr. Zwrtioe Behnquial 
~~ -· lustioe Btev8Jl.ll 
~tn~t· JUN 2o me .. ----
~------------
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
Although I concur in substantially everything in MR. 
JUSTICE WHITE's opinion, I am uncertain about the proper 
disposition of a portion of the dissemination claim. ~he 
Speech or Debate Clause protects the internal distribution of 
legislative materials but not their general, public 
dissemination. Doe v. McMillan, 412 u.s. 306, 317. 
Distribution is internal, and therefore protected, even when 
the materials "are available for inspection by the press and bv 
the public." Id. In this case, I am unable to discern from 
the record whether the materials that were assertedly made 
available to the Internal Revenue Service are on the protected 
or unprotected side of the line identified in McMillan. I 
would therefore leave the issue open to be addressed in the 
first instance by the District Court. With the understanding 
that this issue was not foreclosed by the Court or Appeals, I 
would affirm its judgment. 
~u:prmtt Qfllurl of flrt ~b ~taftg 
~agfrhtghrn. ~. (!}. 2!l&D!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE w ... .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
June 20, 1978 
RE: No. 76-1621 McAdams v. McSurely 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Mr.Justice White 
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LFP 6/20/78 
No. 76-1621 McAdams v. McSurely, 
Rider, p. 11, after "1966" new footnote 19: 
19/ MR. JUSTICE WHITE refers to Gravel as 
"holding that investigatory activities are normally 
outside the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause." Post, 
WangDraft at 9. This reading of Gravel has not yet been 
adopted by the Court. The Court in that case was careful 
to speak in terms of illegal activities, not field 
investigation in general, as falling outside the scope of 
the Clause. For example, in explaining the reach of prior 
cases, including Dombrowski v. Eastland, the Gravel Court 
emphasized the presence of illegal conduct: 
[I]mmunity was unavailable because [congressional 
aides] engaged in illegal conduct that was not 
entitled to Speech or Debate Clause protection. 
The • . • cases reflect a decidedly jaundiced 
view towards extending the Clause so as to 
privilege illegal or unconstitutional conduct 
beyond that essential to foreclose executive 
control of legislative speech or debate and 
associated matters such as voting and committee 
reports and proceedings." 408 U.S., at 620 
(emphasis added) . 
This emphasis would not have been necessary if the Court 
had been of the view that field investigations simply are 
not covered by the Clause at all. 
MR. JUSTICE WHITE also suggests that the Court 
in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 u.s. 
491 (1975), distinguished Gravel on the basis that it 
involved field investigations outside the scope of the 
2. 
Speech or Debate Clause. Post, at WangDraft 9. The 
Servicemen's Fund Court, however, referred to Gravel 
merely as dealing with "actions which were not 'essential 
to legislating.'" 421 U.S., at 508 {emphasis in 
original). Nowhere did the Court draw the distinction for 
which MR. JUSTICE WHITE now contends. 
!~ J I 
( 1 
lfp/ss 6/21/78 
McAdams v. McSurely, No. 76-1621 
Rider, p. 19, line 2, after "judgment," new footnote 26: 
26. We agree with MR. JUSTICE WHITE, post, at 
WangDraft 11 and n.4, that a Member of Congress who 
conspires with aides to violate the constitutional rights 
,, 
of others should stand in the same shoes as those who 
,, 
physically commit the violation. It is precisely this 
holding, however, which necessitates the rule of 
Dombrowski requiring that allegations of such conspiracies 
be supported by facts lending them more than merely 
colorable substance. In the absence of such a rule, bare 
allegations of conspiracy would serve to subject Members 
of Congress and their aides to burdens of litigation, in 
derogation of the policies of the Speech or Debate Clause. 
C HAMBERS O F 
JUSTI C E LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
.iltJTfttnt <!Jcurl cf tJrt ~tb .itldts 
._a:sfringhm. !). <!J. 2llbi'1&4 
June 21, 1978 
No. 76-1621 McAdams v . McSure1y 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I plan to make the attached changes in my opinion 
at the points indicated. 




.JUSTICE LEWIS F: POWELL, .JR. 
~tUtt ~curl af tltt ~tb ;ihttt.e 
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No. 76-1621 McAdams v. Surely 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I have concluded that we should give serious 
consideration to dismissing this case as improvidently 
granted. 
On yesterday, I reviewed the several opinions that 
have been filed. The Court is about as badly fragmented on 
the Speech or Debate Clause central issue (Part II) as if 
we were three separate panels in disagreement on a Court of 
Appeals, producing a disabling intracircuit split. Our 
opinions will afford no guidance to other courts, and are 
not likely to be reassuring to the members of the Congress 
in terms of their knowing the boundaries of their 
constitutional privilege. 
Moreover, we have Bakke and the capital cases in 
which the Court also speaks with several voices. But the 
law will not be left in the same degree of confusion by 
either of these cases as it will be with ~espect to Speech 
or Debate if we bring down McSurely. 
I am persuaded that the Court will be disserved 
institutionally if all three of these cases are brought 
down at the end of a Term, with divisions among us as 
sharply divided as they happen to be. 
Although I still feel as strongly as ever that the 
McSurely litigation is wholly without merit as to at least 
three of the four defendants, and that 11 years in the 
courts in a frivolous vendetta is enough. Normally, I 
would think that our first duty, once we take a case, is to 
do justice to the parties. But I believe that if we DIG 
this case, the injustice will be limited to one additional 




erred in remanding rather than disposing of the case, Judge 
Leventhal's opinion makes it rather clear that he shares my 
own view as to the lack of substance to the McSurely 
claims, at least as to the three Washington defendants. A 
District Court, on remand, will have this guidance. 
In sum~ I am motivated to suggest a DIG by genuine 
concern as to of this Court's duty to afford guidance and 
stability on major constitutional issues. But I also 
believe that in the end a just result probably will be 









No. 76-1621 McAdams v. Surely 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: ., 
"' ~1 
I have concluded that we should give serious 
consideration to dismissing this case as improvidently 
granted. ~ 
On yesterday, I reviewed the several opinions that 
have been filed. The Court is about as badly fragmented on 
the Speech or Debate Clause central issue {Part II) as if 
we were three separate panels in disagreement on a Court of 
Appeals, producing a disabling intracircuit split. Our 
opinions wiJJ. afford no guidance to other courts, and are 
not likely to be reassuring to the members of the Congress 
in terms of their knowing the boundaries of their 
constitutional privilege. 
' . Moreover, we have Bakke and the capital cases 1n 
which the Court also speaks with several voices. But the 
Jaw will not be left in the same degree of confusion by 
either of these cases as it will be with respect to Speech 
or Debate if we bring down McSureJy. 
I am persuaded that the Court will be disserved 
institutionally if all three of these cases are brought 
down at the end of a Term, with divisions among us as 
sharply divided as they happen to be. .~ 
Although I still feel as strongly as ever that the 
McSurely litigation is wholly without merit as to at least 
three of the four defendants, and that 11 years in the 
courts in a frivolous vendetta is enough. Normally, I 
would think that our first duty, once we take a case, is to 
do justice to the parties. But I believe that if we DIG 
this case, the injustice will be limited to one additional 










~. ... .. 
erred in remanding rather than disposing of the case, Judge 
Leventhal's opinion makes it rather clear that he shares my 
own view as to the Jack of substance to the McSurely 
claims, at least as to the three washington defendants. ~A 
District Court, on remand, will have this guidance. ~ 
In sum, I am motivated to suggest a DIG by genuine 
concern as to of this Court's duty to afford guidance and 
stability on major constitutional issues. But I also 
believe that in the end a just result probably will be 
reached if we allow this case simply to run its tortuous 
course. 












~o: Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr . Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquiat 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
F..rom: The Chief Justice 
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SUPREME CQU~T OF ~HE UNITED STATES 
No. 76-.-1621 
Herbert H. McAdams, III, as Executor 
of the Estate of John L. McCl~llan, 
e~ al., Petition~rs, 
v. 
Alan; McSurely et ux. 
[June -, 1978] 
PER CURIAM. 
On Writ of Certiorari 
to the Unitecl States 
Court of Appeals for 
the District o{ Co-
lumbia Circuit. 
The writ of certiorari is dismissed a,s improvidently granted. 
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The Chief Justice 




To: Mr. Justice Brennan 
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SUPBEME COV~T OF ~HE UNITED STATES 
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Herbert H. McAdams, III, as Executor 
of the Estate of John L. McCl~llan, 
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I 
Alan McSurely et ux. 
[June -, 1978] 
Pl<JR CuRIAM. 
On Writ of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit. 
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